Essays on financial crises and bank capital regulation by Zhang, Xue
Essays on Financial Crises and Bank
Capital Regulation
Xue Zhang
Department of Economics
University of Mannheim
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines
Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universität Mannheim
Herbstsemester 2018
Abteilungssprecher: Prof. Dr. Jochen Streb
Referent: Prof. Dr. Michèle Tertilt
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Georg Duernecker
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 21. September 2018
Eidesstattliche Erklärung
Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation selbstständig angefertigt und
die benutzten Hilfsmittel vollständig und deutlich angegeben habe.
Mannheim, 24. August 2018 Xue Zhang

Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors Michèle Tertilt and
Georg Duernecker for their invaluable guidance, inspiration and encouragement. I am
truly grateful to Michèle, who not only guided my research with constructive sugges-
tions and constant support as an academic advisor, but also inspired me tremendously
as a mentor in life. From her, I learned to think critically, work responsibly and ask
questions directly; all of which are invaluable lessons for a lifetime. I am deeply
grateful to Georg for his indispensable encouragement and support at the very begin-
ning of my research, when I was confused and unconfident. His insightful comments,
helpful discussions and challenging questions helped me to look at my research from
a different perspective. I am incredibly fortunate to have Michèle and Georg as my
advisors. Without them, I would never have made to this point.
I sincerely thank my co-author, colleague and friend Johannes Pöschl for his
contagious enthusiasm and persistence in research, the inspiring discussions, and most
of all for pulling me repeatedly out of frustrations with his calmness and optimism in
hard times. Through Johannes, I got to know Marcus Mølbak Ingholt, who joined as a
co-author in our second project and brought new insights into the project.
I would like to thank the macroeconomics faculty members at the University of
Mannheim for their kind support and the helpful comments and suggestions they
provided in the macro brown bag seminars. I would also like to thank my colleagues
at the University of Mannheim, especially members of Michèle’s research group, for
interesting discussions and for the time we spent together. Moreover, I am grateful to
the Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences at the University of Mannheim
for the opportunity to conduct research and teach tutorials, an experience I truly
enjoyed and deeply appreciate.
Lastly, I would like to thank my parents and my grandmothers for their love,
encouragement and continuous support in all my pursuits throughout my studies and
life. I would like to say a special thank you to Steven for sharing my joy and pain and
for his lovely company along the journey of my PhD.

Table of contents
Declaration of Authorship iii
Acknowledgements v
List of figures xi
List of tables xiii
Introduction 1
1 Endogenous Shadow Banking Crises and Bank Capital Regulation 3
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.2 Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.3 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3.1 Calibration Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3.2 Numerical Solution and Simulation Procedure . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4 Untargeted Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.1 Financial Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.2 Business Cycle Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5.1 How Can Bank Capital Regulation Increase Welfare? . . . . . 27
1.5.2 The Steady State Effect of Retail Bank Capital Requirements . 34
1.6 Counterfactuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.6.1 Welfare Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.6.2 The Welfare Cost of Bank Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.6.3 Policy Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
viii Table of contents
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2 Housing, Financial Crises and Macroprudential Regulation: The Case of
Spain 47
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.1.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2 The Spanish Financial Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2.1 Housing Crisis and Economic Recession . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2.2 Banks and Households in the Financial Crisis . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2.3 Macroprudential Policy in Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3.1 The Model Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.3 Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3.4 Rest of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3.5 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4 Financial Accelerator Effect under Different Financial Constraints . . 64
2.4.1 Case I: Binding Borrowing Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.4.2 Case II: Binding Lending Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4.3 Financial Constraints and Bank Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.5 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.5.1 Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.5.2 Matching Aggregate Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5.3 The Role of Financial Shocks and Real Shocks . . . . . . . . 70
2.6 Macroprudential Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.6.1 Higher Capital Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.6.2 Expected Loan Loss Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.6.3 Tighter LTV Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3 Capital Requirements and Credit Easing: Ex-ante vs Ex-Post Interven-
tion Policy 81
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.1.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2.2 Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.2.3 The Central Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.4 Capital Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Table of contents ix
3.2.5 Consumption Goods Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.2.6 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.3 Parameterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4 Policy Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4.1 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Bibliography 97
Appendix A Appendix to Chapter 1 101
A.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.2 Steady State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.3 Equilibrium Conditions in the Dynamic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
A.3.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
A.3.2 Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
A.3.3 Production Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A.3.4 Full Statement of the Equilibrium Conditions . . . . . . . . . 111
A.4 Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Appendix B Appendix to Chapter 2 117
B.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
B.2 Steady State of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
B.2.1 Steady State Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
B.2.2 Comparative Statics in Steady State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
B.3 Complete Statement of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
B.3.1 Impatient Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
B.3.2 Patient Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
B.3.3 Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
B.3.4 Bank’s Problem: Non-binding Optimality Conditions . . . . . 127
B.4 Numerical Solution Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
B.4.1 Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
B.4.2 Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
B.4.3 Nonlinear Equation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Curriculum Vitae 135

List of figures
1.1 Model overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 Sequence of decisions for a bank of type J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 General equilibrium effects of a constant retail bank capital require-
ment on the bank run probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.4 General equilibrium effects of a run-contingent retail bank capital
requirement on the bank run probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5 General equilibrium effects of a constant capital requirement on the
future capital price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6 General equilibrium effects of a run-contingent retail bank capital
requirement on the future capital price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.7 Steady state effect of a retail bank capital requirement on the capital
allocation and the aggregate capital stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.8 Steady state effect of a retail bank capital requirement on leverage and
the coverage ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.9 Steady state effect of a retail bank capital requirements on consumption 38
1.10 Probability of bank runs with a constant minimum capital requirement 41
1.11 Welfare with a constant minimum capital requirement . . . . . . . . . 42
1.12 Probability of bank runs with a run-contingent capital requirement . . 43
1.13 Welfare with a run-contingent capital requirement . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.1 House prices and real GDP in Spain, 2007-2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2 Bank leverage and household leverage in Spain, 2007-2017 . . . . . . 52
2.3 Deposit and mortgage rates and the credit spreads in Spain, 2007-2017 53
2.4 Overview of the economy in equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.5 Empirical and theoretical paths of aggregate variables . . . . . . . . . 69
2.6 Generalized impulse response functions to a negative 5-sd house qual-
ity shock at t = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.7 Generalized impulse response functions to a negative 2-sd productivity
shock at t = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.1 Overview of the economy in equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
xii List of figures
A.1 Detrended data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B.1 Comparative statics with respect to the leverage constraint ψ . . . . . 122
B.2 Comparative statics with respect to the exit rate of banks η . . . . . . 123
B.3 Comparative statics with respect to the discount factor of impatient
households β I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
B.4 Comparative statics with respect to the steady state productivity µZ . . 125
List of tables
1.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.2 Untargeted financial crisis moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3 Untargeted business cycle moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4 Agents’ willingness to pay to avoid bank runs in the baseline model . 39
2.1 Parameters of the baseline model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.2 Model fit: targeted moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3 Policy experiment results for three different macroprudential policies:
minimum capital requirement, expected loan loss provisioning, and
maximum LTV constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.1 Baseline parameterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.2 Steady state under baseline parameterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.3 Policy experiment results : simulation outcomes of different interven-
tion policy combinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
B.1 Variable definitions and data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

To my grandfather

Introduction
This thesis consists of three chapters, all of which contribute to the literature on
financial crises and bank capital regulation. A common feature of the quantitative
models in the three chapters is the endogenous bank run equilibrium à la Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2015). Chapter 1 studies the cost and benefit of retail bank capital
requirements in an economy with both retail and shadow banks, where financial
crises take the form of shadow bank runs. Chapter 2 compares the effect of three
macroprudential policies on financial stability in an economy with intertwined housing
and banking crises. Chapter 3 analyzes the macroeconomic effects of the policy
combination of bank capital requirement (an ex-ante intervention policy) and credit
easing (an ex-post intervention policy). Chapter 1 is co-authored with Johannes Pöschl.
Chapter 2 is a joint work with Johannes Pöschl and Marcus Mølbak Ingholt. Chapter
3 is single-authored.
Chapter 1, titled Endogenous Shadow Banking Crises and Bank Capital Regulation,
sheds light on the optimal level and dynamic design of retail bank capital requirements
in an economy with two banking sectors – retail and shadow banking. Systemic
banking crises occur endogenously in the form of self-fulfilling runs on shadow banks.
A negative externality exists, as banks do not internalize the effects of their leverage
choices on the probability of bank runs, creating a role for government interventions,
e.g., through bank capital requirements.
We show that a dynamic capital requirement, which requires retail banks to build
up capital buffers during normal times and allows the buffers to be depleted during
a bank run, can reduce the frequency and severity of systemic banking crises. We
highlight the importance of relaxing the capital requirement in a timely manner when
a bank run happens. Otherwise, the capital requirement would restrict the retail banks’
ability to absorb liquidated assets of shadow banks, resulting in more frequent and
more severe banking crises. Meanwhile, tightening the capital requirement leads to
less financial intermediation and shifts banking activities from retail to shadow banks.
Based on our calibration, we find retail bank capital requirements undesirable, as the
welfare cost of less financial intermediation outweighs the benefit of fewer bank runs.
Chapter 2 is titled Housing, Financial Crises and Macroprudential Regulation:
The Case of Spain. Based on the observation of the intertwined housing and banking
crisis in Spain between 2008 and 2016, our objective is to study the effectiveness of
different macroprudential regulation policies in preventing crises of this kind.
We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which
we introduce a housing market and mortgage credit while keeping the mechanism of
banking crises as in Chapter 1. However, instead of distinguishing retail and shadow
banking, we simplify the model by including only one banking sector in the economy.
The equilibrium mortgage credit allocation in the economy is determined either by a
capital requirement on the banks or a loan-to-value (LTV) constraint on the borrowers.
Large drops in the house price (housing crises) occur endogenously and can lead to
runs on the banking sector (banking crises).
We calibrate the model to match the Spanish economy in 2007-2017. We find
that all three macroprudential policies can reduce the mortgage default rate and the
frequency of bank runs, but the effect is stronger with the higher capital requirement
and the tighter LTV constraint. Dynamic loan loss provisioning is effective at reducing
the cyclicality of the capital structure of banks, while a tighter LTV constraint amplifies
the cyclicality of bank and household leverage.
Chapter 3 is titled Capital Requirements and Credit Easing: Ex-ante vs Ex-Post
Intervention Policy. In the first two chapters, the policy focus is on ex-ante macropru-
dential policies, which are designed to improve financial stability and prevent potential
financial crises in the future. In this chapter, I turn to ex-post intervention policies. In
particular, I introduce a credit easing policy by the central bank to an economy with
endogenous banking crises similar to Chapter 1 but has only one banking sector.
I show that bank capital requirements and credit easing policies exhibit very
different trade-offs. In particular, tightening bank capital requirements effectively
reduces bank leverage but leads to less financial intermediation. For the credit easing
policy, I highlight an unintended ex-ante effect: it decreases the banks’ risk premium
in a financial crisis, resulting in more leverage taking of banks and a higher frequency
of bank runs. Nonetheless, the credit easing policy facilitates financial intermediation
in both normal and crisis periods and stabilizes asset prices during financial crises. A
combination of the two policies can offset their respective negative effects, reducing
the frequency and severity of financial crises while maintaining efficient financial
intermediation in the economy.
The thesis is structured as follows. The quantitative model and main findings of
each chapter are presented in respective Chapters 1 to 3. Data sources, full statement
of the model equilibrium, and numerical solution algorithms for Chapter 1 and 2 are
gathered in Appendices A and B, respectively. All the references are in Bibliography.
Chapter 1
Endogenous Shadow Banking Crises
and Bank Capital Regulation
with Johannes Pöschl
1.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis, bank capital regulation as
an intervention policy for combating future crises has been subject to extensive debates
among policymakers and researchers. Supporters of stringent bank capital regulations
emphasize that higher capital requirements make the banking system more resilient
to financial panics, therefore enhance financial stability of the economy. Opponents
argue that higher capital requirements increase the financing cost of the financial
institutions and diminish financial intermediation in the economy. Moreover, some
worry that stringent regulations on retail banks can cause banking activities shifting to
the unregulated shadow banking sector, which could undermine financial stability. This
policy debate leads to our research question: How should bank regulators optimally
design capital requirements and adjust them dynamically in response to changes in the
state of the economy?
In this chapter, we study the macroeconomic effects of regulating retail banks in a
non-linear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with both retail and
shadow banks. Taking shadow banks into consideration is crucial for several reasons.
First, shadow banking has grown tremendously over the last decades into an essential
part of the modern financial system.1 Second, the collapse of the shadow banking sector
played an important role in the financial turmoil that ultimately turned into a global
1According to the Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2016 by the Financial Stability
Board, in 2015, shadow banking accounts for 13 percent of the total financial system in 27 jurisdictions
included in the report, where the shadow banking to the GDP ratio is around 70 percent.
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financial crisis. Third, it is important to take into account the unintended spillover
effects on the shadow banks when analyzing the effects of retail bank regulations. In
this chapter, we define shadow banks as financial institutions that (i) borrow from other
financial institutions on a wholesale funding market, (ii) are highly leveraged, and (iii)
are more efficient than retail banks in investments to non-financial firms.2
Specifically, we consider a closed economy in the spirit of Gertler, Kiyotaki, and
Prestipino (2016) (henceforth GKP), which is populated with households, retail banks,
shadow banks, capital producers and consumption goods producers. In equilibrium,
households make deposits at retail banks, which in turn lend to shadow banks through
a wholesale funding market. Both banking sectors face an endogenous leverage
constraint due to a moral hazard problem. In addition, retail banks face a regulatory
capital requirement. There are two production sectors: consumption goods producers,
which produce consumption goods using capital and labor subject to productivity
shocks, and capital producers, which transform consumption goods into capital subject
to capital adjustment cost. Uncertainty arises in the form of productivity shocks and
liquidation cost shocks, which affect the liquidation value of capital in bank runs. A
shadow bank run equilibrium exists when retail banks foresee that a fall in the capital
price in the even of a run can reduce the value of the shadow banks’ assets below their
liabilities, making shadow banks insolvent. We focus on the case of shadow bank runs
and not runs on the retail banks, as the subprime mortgage crisis was essentially a
shadow banking crisis (see, e.g., GKP).
In our model, financial regulators can address two externalities by imposing retail
bank capital requirements. First, banks do not internalize the effects of their lever-
age decisions on the likelihood of systemic bank runs, which we call the bank run
externality. To our best knowledge, this externality has not been addressed in an
infinite horizon DSGE model on macroprudential regulations in the literature before.
Second, as price-taking agents also do not internalize the effects of their decisions on
asset prices, there is a pecuniary externality. If banks expand their balance sheets by
increasing leverage, then the capital price increases, which relaxes the banks’ borrow-
ing constraints. As a result, banks borrow and invest more, and drive up the capital
price even further. The capital price externality amplifies the business cycle volatility,
creating welfare losses for households. This pecuniary externality has been explored
theoretically by Lorenzoni (2008) and Dávila and Korinek (2017) and in a quantitative
framework by Bianchi (2011).
2The last characteristic of shadow banks can be a result of either benefits of specialization or due to
fewer regulatory restrictions for shadow banks. Examples of shadow banks by our definition include
financial institutions such as finance companies, stand-alone broker-dealers, asset-backed security
originators, and non-bank affiliated structured investment vehicles.
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Our model captures the following trade-off of bank capital requirements. On the
positive side, a higher dynamic capital requirement reduces the frequency and severity
of banking crises. Under a higher capital requirement, retail banks build up more
capital buffer during expansion periods, which can be depleted to absorb liquidated
assets upon bank runs. As such, the liquidation price of capital is higher in bank runs,
which in turn increases the recovery rate of the retail banks’ lending to shadow banks
in a run. As the likelihood of a shadow bank run is negatively related to the recovery
rate, the probability of bank runs is reduced. We show that for this policy to take effect,
it is crucial that the regulators relax capital requirements timely during a bank run,
allowing retail banks to absorb liquidated assets of shadow banks. On the negative side,
a higher capital requirement on retail banks leads to less financial intermediation and a
shifting of banking activity from retail to shadow banks. The high capital requirement
pushes up the financing cost for retail banks, which is further passed through wholesale
funding to the shadow banks. This results in less financial intermediation and a higher
required return on capital, a lower aggregate capital stock, and eventually lower output
of the economy. Furthermore, the relative share of financial intermediation conducted
through the shadow banking sector will increase as the capital requirement on retail
banks increases, which in turn makes bank runs on the shadow banking sector more
costly and therefore increases the severity of financial crises.
Three assumptions are crucial for the trade-off results above. First, there is no
equity market between households and banks. As such, banks respond to a higher
capital requirement by reducing assets and not expanding equity. Second, agents differ
in their investment efficiencies. More precisely, households are the least efficient
investors and shadow banks are the most efficient investors in the economy. Under
a higher bank capital requirement, capital reallocates from the banking sector to the
households. As a result, financial intermediation decreases and consequently the
steady state capital stock shrinks. Third, banks can divert assets, which leads to an
endogenous leverage constraint. Importantly, for shadow banks, assets funded through
wholesale funding are more difficult to divert than those funded by deposits. Hence,
wholesale funding allows for higher leverage, making it the preferred funding option
for shadow banks. For retail banks, wholesale lending to shadow banks is more difficult
to divert than lending to consumption goods producers. Thus, wholesale lending can
be funded with a higher leverage. As a result, shadow banks borrow from retail banks
in equilibrium. A higher cost of capital for retail banks is therefore passed through to
shadow banks. In addition, in response to a higher capital requirement, retail banks
reduce lending to consumption goods producers more than lending to shadow banks,
which leads to the reallocation of banking activity from retail banks to shadow banks.
We solve the model non-linearly using global methods, since bank runs are catas-
trophic events that drive the economy far away from its steady state. To solve the
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model, we use a projection method and rely on a sparse grid algorithm developed by
Judd, Maliar, Maliar, and Valero (2014). We calibrate our model to match stylized
facts of the US economy and banking system, and the post-war financial crises in
OECD countries (since financial crises are rare events in a single economy). The
calibrated model generates financial crises of plausible magnitude and business cycle
comovement between real and financial variables similar to the US data.
As a first numerical exercise, we compute the welfare cost of bank runs. We find
that despite low risk aversion implied by log utility and that bank runs are only rare
events, households are willing to pay 0.2 percent in permanent consumption equivalent
units to avoid bank runs. Risk-neutral retail and shadow banks are willing to pay 1.1
and 8.5 percent in consumption equivalent units to avoid bank runs, respectively.
We then investigate the effects of static and dynamic capital requirements on
financial stability and welfare. We find that increasing the bank capital requirement
from 8 to 15 percent leads to a decrease in bank run frequency from 2.8 to 0.8 runs
per 100 years. We highlight that this is only the case if the regulators relax bank
capital requirements during a bank run. Otherwise, the frequency of bank runs would
increase instead of decrease. Meanwhile, the steady state capital stock decreases by
approximately 5 percent under the dynamic capital requirement policy above. Overall,
based on our calibration, the steady state effect dominates. Higher retail bank capital
requirements reduce welfare despite effectively eliminating banking crises.
1.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is closely related to two strands of literature. The first studies the role of
financial frictions as a driving force of financial crises. Early studies in this line of
literature include Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In
these papers, financial frictions are embedded in the financial structure of firms instead
of financial intermediaries. After the 2007-2009 financial crisis, there is an emerging
literature that links financial frictions in the banking sector to the outbreak of the
worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression.3 Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)
develop a canonical macroeconomic framework of financial crisis in the form of bank
runs. Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016) extend Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) by
subdividing the financial intermediation sector into a retail and a wholesale banking
sector. In their model, aggregate capital stock is fixed and banks are unregulated. We
build on their framework and modify it by adding capital accumulation and retail bank
capital requirement to analyze the welfare and financial stabilization effect of bank
capital regulation.
3See, for example, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2014), Boissay et al. (2016).
1.1 Introduction 7
Recently, there is a growing literature on the role of shadow banking system in
evaluating the bank regulation policy, such as Plantin (2015) and Huang (2014). The
way they model shadow banking corresponds to the off-balance sheet shadow banking
activities conducted by traditional banks. In contrast, we consider shadow banking
to be an independent banking sector that conducts financial intermediation outside
the regulatory framework of banks. Our notion of shadow banks corresponds to the
external shadow banking sector in contrast to the off-balance sheet shadow banking
activities carried out by traditional banks. We consider the internal shadow banking as
a part of the traditional banking as bank capital regulations (such as Basel III) are, or at
least supposed to be, implemented on a fully consolidated basis. In contrast to internal
shadow banking, external shadow banking is a result of gains from specialization and
vertical integration rather than a result of regulatory arbitrage as is the internal shadow
banking (see, e.g., Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016).
Our modeling framework is most closely related to Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino
(2017), where banking panics are introduced into an infinite horizon DSGE model. A
key distinction is that we introduce endogenous capital accumulation, which allows
us to study the steady state effects of bank capital regulation. Moreover, we discuss
the motive (bank run and pecuniary externality) and welfare effects of bank capital
regulation and compute the welfare cost of bank runs. Finally, we allow for multiple
shocks, including productivity shocks, whereas uncertainty in their model arises
exclusively through capital quality shocks.
Another paper that addresses a similar research question to this chapter is Begenau
and Landvoigt (2017), which also studies retail bank capital requirements in an
economy with an unregulated external shadow banking sector and endogenous capital
accumulation. The key difference to their framework lies in the flow of funds in our
economy. In our model, households have direct access to capital markets and there is a
wholesale funding market that links the retail and the shadow banking sector. In their
model, households hold both debt and equity of retail and shadow banks but have no
access to the capital market, and there is no interbank market between the two banking
sectors. Consequently, the spillover effects of regulating retail bank capital on shadow
banks are small in their model. They also model bank runs, but the probability of a
bank run is determined exogenously and independently of the liquidation losses.
Finally, regarding the effectiveness of regulation, the results of this chapter are
related to Angeloni and Faia (2013), who study the effectiveness of dynamic capital
requirements in the presence of bank runs. Our model setup differs in the following.
First, we include shadow banks in our analysis. This gives us a spillover effect of
regulation of retail banks on the shadow banking sector. Second, we consider runs on
the interbank market as opposed to depositor runs. Financial instability in our model
arises therefore for a different reason, and gives a different motive to regulate retail
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Fig. 1.1 Model overview
banks. Third, banks in our model invest into long-lived assets, which gives rise to
self-fulfilling crises through changes in asset prices. Therefore, macroprudential policy
can have additional effects through affecting these asset prices.
We proceed as follows. In section 1.2, we explain the model. The calibration
strategy is outlined in section 1.3. We compare the model to the data in section 1.4.
We discuss the main mechanism in section 1.5 and present the welfare cost of bank
runs as well as the welfare effects of bank capital regulation in section 1.6. Finally,
section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model
This section outlines a closed economy with an infinite horizon, which is populated
with households, retail banks, shadow banks, capital producers and consumption goods
producers. Households consume, deposit at banks, and make direct capital investments
to consumption goods producers. Banks receive deposits from households, obtain
funds from a wholesale funding market, and invest capital at consumption goods
producers. During a bank run, the wholesale funding market breaks down. Figure 1.1
shows an overview of the flow of funds in the no-run equilibrium of the model.
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1.2.1 Households
Households maximize utility from consumption. Their utility function is given by
Et
[ ∞
∑
s=t
β s−t ln(cHs )
]
, (1.2.1)
where β is the discount factor of the household and cHt denotes household consumption
in period t. We follow the convention that lower case letters for variables denote
variables of individual agents, while upper case letters denote aggregate variables.
Households consume, invest in capital kHt+1 and make deposits d
H
t+1 at banks. They
supply labor inelastically and receive Wt in return. In addition, they own the capital
producers and receive the profits ΠQt .4 Deposits yield a safe gross return RDt+1 in
the subsequent period. Capital can be sold and purchased at price Qt and yields an
uncertain net return rKt+1 in the subsequent period. Capital depreciates at rate δ . The
remaining fraction of the capital stock in the next period is valued at the next period
capital price, Qt+1. The net worth of the household at the beginning of period t is
given by
nHt =
[
rKt +(1−δ )Qt
]
kHt +R
D
t d
H
t +Wt +Π
Q
t . (1.2.2)
In reality, households delegate credit supply to banks, because banks have a relative
advantage of screening and monitoring non-financial firms.5 To capture this advantage
of banks in a simple way, we follow GKP and introduce a quadratic holding cost of
new capital for households. This capital holding cost takes the form
ηH
2
(
kHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt .
Following GKP, we assume that retail banks purchase capital management services
from specialized firms.6 Retail banks pay a linear fee f Rt to these firms for each unit of
capital managed. The profit of these capital management firms is given by
f Rt K˜
R
t+1−
ηR
2
(
K˜Rt+1
Kt
)2
Kt
4Profits of capita producers are zero in steady state, but may be positive or negative outside of the
steady state due to a quadratic capital adjustment cost. Subsection 1.2.3 provides a detailed discussion
of the profit of the capital producers.
5Diamond (1984) develops a model in which a monitoring advantage of banks arises through
diversification.
6Some examples of such firms are appraisal management companies, which determine the value of
a property, and credit bureaus, which determine the credit worthiness of a household.
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where K˜Rt+1 is the amount of capital managed and the second component captures the
capital management cost. These firms are owned by the households. They operate in a
competitive market, which means the equilibrium fee f Rt is taken as given by house-
holds and retail banks, and is determined in equilibrium such that capital management
firms are willing to manage the capital of the retail banks, i.e., K˜Rt+1 = K
R
t+1.
7
The optimization problem of the household can be summarized as
max
{cHt ,kHt+1,dHt+1,K˜Rt+1}∞t=0
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β t ln
(
cHt
)]
, (1.2.3)
s.t.
cHt = n
H
t −QtkHt+1−dHt+1−
ηH
2
(
kHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt +
(
f Rt −
ηR
2
K˜Rt+1
Kt
)
K˜Rt+1,
kHt+1,d
H
t+1,c
H
t ≥ 0,
with nHt given by Equation (1.2.2).
1.2.2 Banks
There is a unit measure of both retail banks (R-banks) and shadow banks (S-banks) in
the economy. J-banks, J ∈ {R,S} can take deposits dJt+1 from households and borrow
or lend on the wholesale funding market bJt+1. In addition, they purchase capital k
J
t+1,
which is invested into the production of consumption goods.8
Banks differ in their ability in investing at the consumption goods producers. In
particular, retail banks pay a linear fee f Rt k
R
t+1 for the capital management services
provided by the screening firms owned by the households. There is no such fee and no
capital holding cost for the shadow banks.9
Following GKP, we assume that banks of type J receive an exit shock each period
with probability σ J . In the case of such a shock, the banks liquidate their assets and
7The capital management firms assumption is important for technical reasons. It ensures that the
decision problem of the retail banks is linear in their net worth. Therefore it is sufficient to characterize
the decision problem of a representative retail bank.
8In practice, banks’ lending to the non-financial sector is largely in the form of debt rather than
equity. In the context of our model, banks’ investment in the non-financial sector takes the form of equity
investment rather than debt. This is a common assumption in the literature with financial intermediation
for simplicity. Otherwise, another layer of liability of the non-financial sector has to be added.
9Adrian and Ashcraft (2016) discuss reasons for the existence of shadow bank credit intermediation
in addition to retail bank credit intermediation. They argue that securitization allowed shadow banks
to reduce informational frictions in credit markets, thereby offering loans to high-risk creditors which
yield a superior return.
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exit the economy. To keep the measure of banks constant over time, new banks with
mass σ J enter the economy with an exogenous endowment υJKt/σ J .10
Both types of banks can divert a fraction of their assets after they have made their
borrowing and lending decisions. How much they can divert depends both on the type
of assets and the source of financing for the assets. Capital investment is easier to divert
than wholesale lending, and assets financed through wholesale funding are harder to
divert compare to those financed by deposits or equity.11 In particular, a fraction ψ ,
0 < ψ < 1, of equity or deposit financed capital investment can be diverted. Only a
fraction γψ , 0 < γ < 1, of equity or deposit financed wholesale loans is divertible.
And a fraction ωψ , 0 < ω < 1, of wholesale funding financed capital investment can
be diverted. The parameter ω captures the monitoring intensity of the creditors of
wholesale lending. Adrian and Ashcraft (2016) argue that due to deposit insurance,
depositors have a lower incentive to monitor investments of the banks than wholesale
lenders who lend against securitized assets. For the former, the implicit government
guarantee is enough to ensure depositors that their lending is risk-free, whereas for the
latter, the riskiness of their lending depends on the diversification of the borrowers. For
γ < 1, the intuition lies in the higher standardization of wholesale lending compared
to other lending activities. For example, the collateral underlying a repo contract (a
typical wholesale lending instrument) is often a high quality government bond, whose
market value is easy to verify for creditors. The collateral underlying a loan can be
real estate, for which only a rough estimate of the market value exists. Hence, the
potential for diversion is much higher for loans compared to wholesale lending.
If banks divert assets, they will not repay their liabilities. In this case, they will be
forced to exit the economy by their creditors (depositors or wholesale fund lenders).
Because diversion occurs at the end of the period before next period uncertainty
realizes, an incentive constraint (IC) on the banks can ensure that diversion will never
occur in equilibrium. This incentive constraint states that the benefit of diversion must
be smaller or equal to the continuation value of the bank.
Figure 1.2 displays the timing of intra-period decisions of banks. The intra-period
problem of a J-bank consists of three stages: survival, borrowing and investment
decisions and diversion. After the productivity uncertainty of the consumption goods
producers has realized, banks receive the exit shock. If they exit, they consume their
net worth, otherwise they make their investment and borrowing decisions. New banks
10We scale the endowment of newly entering banks by the capital stock to ensure that the arguably
stylized assumptions on entry do not affect the comparative statics through changes in the relative size
of the endowment.
11Diversion entails the liquidation of the banks’ assets and a subsequent default on creditors. One
way to justify why equity financed assets cannot be diverted fully is that diversion creates a loss to
the diverting bank which is equal to 1−ψ times the diverted assets. Since banks utility is linear in
consumption, such a cost may either be a pecuniary cost in the form of a penalty or a stigmatic utility
cost.
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Fig. 1.2 Sequence of decisions for a bank of type J
enter the economy and also make these intertemporal decisions. Finally, after banks
have decided how much to invest and how much to borrow, they can decide whether or
not to divert their assets. If they divert, they consume the gain from diversion, default
on their next period debt and exit the economy. Otherwise, they transition to the next
period and the same procedure repeats.
Shadow Banks
If shadow banks do not exit, they consume cSt , borrow funds on the wholesale funding
market bSt+1 and invest in capital k
S
t+1. If they do exit, they consume their net worth n
S
t .
The utility function of shadow banks is linear in consumption:
Et
{ ∞
∑
s=t
{[
β (1−σS)
]s−t [
σSnSs +(1−σS)cSs
]}}
, (1.2.4)
where β is the discount rate, σS is the exit probability, nS is the net worth of the shadow
bank and cS is consumption in the case that the shadow bank does not exit. The net
worth of an incumbent shadow bank in period t is given by
nSt = R
K
t k
S
t −RBt bSt . (1.2.5)
A new shadow bank is endowed with an exogenous amount of resources when entering
the economy, which equals their net worth in period t:
n˜St =
υSKt
σS
. (1.2.6)
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The balance sheet constraint of shadow banks requires that assets equal liabilities plus
equity:
QtkSt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Asset
= bSt+1︸︷︷︸
Liability
+nSt − cSt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Equity
. (1.2.7)
Since shadow banks borrow exclusively from retail banks and lend only to consumption
goods producers, their payoff from diversion is given by
ψ
[
(nSt − cSt )+ωbSt+1
]
.
The incentive constraint is given by
ψ
[
(nSt − cSt )+ωbSt+1
]
≤ βEt
[
V St+1
]
, (1.2.8)
where Et
[
V St+1
]
is the continuation value of the shadow bank defined below. This
constraint states that the value from continuing to operate the shadow bank must be
at least as high as the value of diverting assets, therefore ensures that asset diversion
would never occur in equilibrium.
Continuing shadow banks reinvest their entire net worth, i.e., cSt = 0. This is an
optimal choice, whenever
Qt < βEt
[
V St+1
nSt+1
RKt+1
]
.
This equation says that even if the shadow bank invests his entire net worth in capital,
the benefit of investment still exceeds the cost of investment. We verify that this
condition holds in our numerical solution.
The incentive constraint is always binding. In this case, the problem of a shadow
bank reduces to:
V St = max{kSs+1,bSs+1}∞s=t
Et
[ ∞
∑
s=t
[
β (1−σS)
]s−t
σSnSs
]
, (1.2.9)
s.t.
QtkSt+1 = b
S
t+1+n
S
t , (Balance Sheet Constraint)
ψ
(
nSt +ωb
S
t+1
)
≤ βEt
[
σSnSt+1+(1−σS)ψ
(
nSt+1+ωb
S
t+2
)]
, (IC)
kSt+1,b
S
t+1 ≥ 0,
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with net worth given by (1.2.5) for incumbent banks and by (1.2.6) for new shadow
banks. Finally, we define leverage as the market value of assets over equity, i.e.,
φSt ≡
QtkSt+1
nSt
.
Retail Banks
Retail banks consume cRt , invest in capital k
R
t+1, take deposits from households d
R
t+1,
and lend to shadow banks on the wholesale funding market bRt+1. Their utility function
is given by
Et
{ ∞
∑
s=t
{[
β (1−σR)]s−t [σRnRs +(1−σR)cRs ]}} . (1.2.10)
In period t, incumbent retail banks obtain a gross return on capital, RKt k
R
t , and a gross
return from lending to shadow banks, RBt b
R
t . They return R
D
t d
R
t to households for their
deposits. The retail bank’s net worth in period t is given by
nRt = R
K
t k
R
t +R
B
t b
R
t −RDt dRt . (1.2.11)
The net worth of newly entering retail banks given by
n˜Rt =
υRKt
σR
. (1.2.12)
The balance sheet of retail banks states that assets equal liabilities plus equity:
(Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+b
R
t+1 = d
R
t+1+n
R
t − cRt . (1.2.13)
We again focus on the case of zero consumption of continuing banks, which is optimal
whenever
Qt + f Rt < βEt
[
V Rt+1
nRt+1
RKt+1
]
.
Since retail banks lend on the wholesale funding markets and refinance themselves
exclusively through deposits and net worth, their payoff from diversion is given by
ψ
[
(Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+ γb
R
t+1
]≤ βEt [V Rt+1] . (1.2.14)
Further, define the leverage ratio of retail banks as
φRt ≡
(Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+ γb
R
t+1
nRt
. (1.2.15)
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This leverage ratio excludes a fraction (1− γ)bRt+1 of wholesale loans, because this
fraction is non-divertible and can therefore be completely financed with deposits.
The fraction of equity financing used by retail banks is thus given by 1φRt
. With this
formulation, the incentive constraint for retail bank pins down the leverage ratio:
ψφRt n
R
t ≤ βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
. (1.2.16)
In this sense, the incentive constraint can be interpreted as a market imposed leverage
constraint.
Capital Regulation
The regulator can impose a capital requirement on depository institutions, which
stipulates that the bank’s equity to asst ratio has to be above a certain threshold.
Importantly, we assume that whether a bank is regulated depends on whether the bank
accepts deposits or not and not on the type of bank per se. We make this assumption
to avoid situations where households will shift deposits from regulated retail banks to
unregulated shadow banks. This assumption can be justified, because the ability to
issue deposits requires participation in a deposit insurance scheme, like the FDIC in
the US, which is usually attached to stringent oversight requirements. In equilibrium,
only retail banks accept household deposits and are thus regulated. We assume that
the regulator weighs assets in the same way as the market. That is, a fraction (1− γ)
of wholesale loans can be financed completely with deposits. Accordingly, the capital
requirement can be formulated as
1
φRt
≥ 1
φ¯t
, (1.2.17)
where 1φ¯t is the minimum capital ratio that the regulator allows.
Recall that there are two classes of assets on the retail bank’s balance sheet: retail
bank’s capital holding,
(
Qt + f Rt
)
kRt+1, and wholesale lending, b
R
t+1. The interpretation
of (1.2.17) is that the retail bank can finance at most 1− 1φ¯t share of its capital holding
by households’ deposit and at most 1− γφ¯t share of its wholesale lending by households’
deposit. In other words, with γ < 1, at least a share 1φ¯t of capital holding has to be
financed by retail banks’ own equity, but only a share γφ¯t of wholesale lending has to
be financed by equity.
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The problem of the retail bank in the presence of a regulatory capital requirement
can be summarized as:
V Rt = max{kRs+1,bRs+1,dRs+1}∞s=t
Et
{
σR
∞
∑
s=t
[
β (1−σR)]s−t nRs} , (1.2.18)
s.t.
(Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+b
R
t+1 = d
R
t+1+n
R
t , (Balance Sheet Constraint)
(Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+ γb
R
t+1 ≤ φ¯tnRt , (Regulatory Capital Requirement)
ψ
[
(Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+ γb
R
t+1
]≤ βEt {σRnRt+1+(1−σR)ψ [(Qt+1+ f Rt+1)kRt+2+ γbRt+2]} , (IC)
kRt+1,d
R
t+1,b
R
t+1 ≥ 0,
with nRt given by Equation (1.2.11) for incumbent retail banks and Equation (1.2.12)
for new retail banks. We refer to the economy in which the regulatory bank capital
requirement is so low that retail bank leverage is always determined by the incentive
constraint of the retail banks as the baseline economy.
1.2.3 Production
Consumption Goods Producers
The consumption goods producers hire labor from households and borrow capital from
households, retail banks and shadow banks to produce consumption goods, using a
Cobb-Douglas production technology:
Yt = ZtF(Kt ,Lt) = ZtKαt L
1−α
t . (1.2.19)
The price of the consumption goods is normalized to one. Productivity Zt follows an
AR(1) process:
ln(Zt) = (1−ρZ)µZ +ρZ ln(Zt−1)+ εt , (1.2.20)
where |ρZ|< 1 and εt ∼ N(0,σZ).
The consumption goods producers take the prices of the production input and
output as given and make zero profits.12 They maximize profits taking the aggregate
wage Wt and the rental rate of capital rKt as given:
max
Lt ,Kt
Πt = ZtKαt L
1−α
t −WtLt − rKt Kt .
12Since the consumption goods producers make zero profits, it does not matter who owns the them.
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The first order conditions of the consumption goods producers’ problem determine the
wage and rental rate of capital in equilibrium:
Wt = (1−α)ZtKαt L−αt , (1.2.21)
rKt = αZtK
α−1
t L
1−α
t . (1.2.22)
Capital Producers
Capital producers use a technology that transforms one unit of consumption goods
into one unit of capital:
Y Kt = F
K(It) = It , (1.2.23)
where Y Kt is the amount of capital produced in period t and It is the amount of
consumption goods used for the production. Adjustment to the production of capital is
costly. In particular, the capital adjustment cost takes the form
θ
2
(
It
Kt
−δ
)2
Kt , (1.2.24)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. This form of capital adjustment cost
implies that whenever the investment rate differs from the depreciation rate, a positive
proportional adjustment cost is incurred. Therefore, the relative price of capital is
endogenous. The adjustment cost is scaled by the aggregate capital stock Kt , which
the capital producers take as given.
As the capital adjustment cost depends on the capital stock from last period, the
constant return to scale does not necessarily hold. Therefore the capital producers
may earn a non-zero profit. We assume that the capital producers are owned by the
households and any profits or losses are transferred to the households each period.
The capital producers’ problem can be summarized as:
max
It
ΠQt = QtIt − It −
θ
2
(
It
Kt
−δ
)2
Kt . (1.2.25)
The first order condition of the capital producers’ problem yields the following expres-
sion for the capital price:
Qt = 1+θ
(
It
Kt
−δ
)
. (1.2.26)
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1.2.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium
Aggregation
The aggregate net worth of the retail and shadow banking sector is given by the sum
of the net worth of incumbent and newly entering banks:
NRt =
(
RKt K
R
t +R
B
t Bt −RDt Dt
)
(1−σR)+υRKt ,
NSt =
(
RKt K
S
t −RBt Bt
)
(1−σS)+υSKt .
Aggregate output is given by production net of the capital holding costs:
Yt = ZtKαt +υ
RKt +υSKt − η
H
2
(
KHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt − η
R
2
(
KRt+1
Kt
)2
Kt . (1.2.27)
Define It as net investment excluding capital adjustment costs, that is
It = Kt+1− (1−δ )Kt .
We define aggregate gross investment I˜t as the total expenditure necessary to change
the capital stock from Kt to Kt+1. Therefore, our measure of aggregate investment
includes the capital adjustment costs.13 The gross investment is given by
I˜t = It +
θ
2
(
It
Kt
−δ
)2
Kt . (1.2.28)
Since there is a representative household, the individual consumption and aggregate
consumption are equal, cHt =C
H
t . Household consumption can be inferred from the
aggregate resource constraint:
CHt = Yt − I˜t −σR
NRt −υRKt
1−σR −σ
S N
S
t −υSKt
1−σS (1.2.29)
No-Run Equilibrium
In the absence of bank runs, we use a standard sequential equilibrium definition.
Crucially, in the no-run equilibrium, each retail bank expects all other retail banks to
roll over shadow bank debt, such that a bank run will never arise in this equilibrium.
Taking the bank capital regulation policy φ¯t as given, the no-run equilibrium is a
sequence of prices {
Qt ,rKt ,R
D
t ,R
B
t ,Wt , f
R
t
}∞
t=0
13A similar distinction between gross investment and net investment is for example used in Christiano
et al. (2005).
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and allocations for
• households,
{
CHt ,K
H
t+1,D
H
t+1
}∞
t=0,
• retail banks,
{
CRt ,K
R
t+1,D
R
t+1,B
R
t+1
}∞
t=0,
• shadow banks,
{
CSt ,K
S
t+1,B
S
t+1
}∞
t=0,
• consumption goods producers, {Kt ,Lt}∞t=0, and
• capital producers, {It}∞t=0,
that solve the respective optimization problems of all agents as defined above, clear
the markets for
• capital Kt = KHt +K
R
t +K
S
t ,
• labor Lt = 1,
• investment goods It = KHt+1+K
R
t+1+K
S
t+1− (1−δ )Kt ,
• deposits DRt+1 = D
H
t+1,
• wholesale funding BSt+1 = B
R
t+1,
• capital management services KRt+1 = K˜
R
t+1,
and satisfy the aggregate resource constraint (1.2.29). In a no-run equilibrium, the
bank run condition (1.2.31), which is discussed in detail in the next subsection, does
not hold.
Shadow Bank Run Equilibrium
As in the model of GKP, retail banks can run on shadow banks. We consider only
runs on the shadow banking sector as a whole. If such a run happens, the assets of
the shadow banks are liquidated at the liquidation price Q∗t and returned to the retail
banks. Incumbent shadow banks exit once their assets are liquidated. Define xt as the
recovery rate for the retail banks through shadow bank liquidation:
xt = ξt
[
rKt +(1−δ )Q∗t
]
KSt
(1+ rBt )Bt
, (1.2.30)
where ξt is a liquidation cost shock following an iid log normal distribution with
mean 0 and variance σξ . The liquidation cost shock helps to quantitatively pin down
the frequency of bank runs. One interpretation for this liquidation cost shock is
that it represents a market illiquidity discount in the collateral market due to search
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frictions.14 If liquidity is low, retail banks incur an additional loss on the recovery
value.
Runs are persistent and continue into the next period with probability π . New
shadow banks start reentering the economy at rate σS only once the run has ended.
Bank runs can be self-fulfilling. In that case, the market price of capital deteriorates
in anticipation of a bank run. This weakens balance sheets of shadow banks so much
that they cannot repay their liabilities. As a consequence, it is optimal for the retail
banks to run on shadow banks. However, it will only occur if the assets of the shadow
banks, valued at the liquidation price of capital, are insufficient to cover the liabilities
of shadow banks, that is, if
xt < 1. (1.2.31)
We assume that once this condition is fulfilled, a bank run will be triggered. The
liquidation condition in (1.2.31) states that, if a bank run happened, i.e., shadow banks’
assets got liquidated, the retail banks would suffer from a loss on their wholesale
lending. But if all retail banks coordinate to not run, then even if the bank run
condition holds, bank runs would never take place. Our assumption eliminates this
possibility by implying that retail banks can never successfully coordinate. Hence
in our model, bank runs do not arise randomly as a consequence of sunspot shocks,
but are closely tied to the fundamentals of the shadow banking sector. Gorton (1988)
presents evidence that historically, bank runs in the United States were indeed related
to an increased fundamental riskiness of deposits, that is, during times when expected
losses on deposits were high. Further, the large number of retail banks in an economy
and the high competition in the retail banking business reduces the ability of banks to
coordinate (especially with the absence of a credible lender of last resort Rochet and
Vives (2004)).
Since the recovery rate is strictly increasing in ξt , the probability of a bank run
happening in t+1 can be written as a state-contingent cutoff ξ¯t , which is defined by
ξ¯t =
(1+ rBt )Bt[
rKt +(1−δ )Q∗t
]
KSt
.
The probability of a bank run in t conditional on Zt is given by
pt ≡ F(ξ¯t).
This probability is endogenous. It depends, in particular, on the liquidation price
of capital during a bank run. A lower liquidation price of capital makes a bank run
14For a microfoundation for time-varying liquidity discounts in collateral markets, see for example
He and Milbradt (2014). In their model, collateral of defaulted bonds is sold on a search market as in
Duffie et al. (2005). Liquidity is determined endogenously by the default decision of the bond issuer.
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both more likely and more severe. While our liquidation shock assumption is slightly
different from the sunspot shock which determines the bank run probability in GKP, it
also leads to a bank run probability that is decreasing in xt .
1.3 Calibration
In this section, we outline our calibration strategy and provide some evidence for
the model fit by comparing untargeted moments from the model to the data. Of
particular interest is the ability of the model to produce financial crises that are similar
to financial crises observed in developed economies. We also check whether the model
can generate realistic business cycle dynamics for real and financial variables.
1.3.1 Calibration Strategy
We calibrate the model using US data between 1990 and 2007 for the model economy.
Since financial crises are relatively rare events and there are not enough observations
for a single economy, we use financial crises data of OECD countries after WWII for
the calibration of bank run parameters. The length of one period in the model is a
quarter. We divide all parameters into three groups. The first group of parameters are
taken from the literature. The second group are set to match steady state properties of
the model to the data. The third group are calibrated to match dynamic properties of
the model.
Parameters in Panel (a) of Table 1.1 are set following the literature. The capital
share of consumption goods production and quarterly depreciation rate of capital are
set to be 0.36 and 0.025, respectively. The banks endowments υR and υS to yield
a planning horizon of shadow banks of about two years and retail banks of about
five years, similar to Gertler et al. (2016).15 These are the same targets for the banks
endowment as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). We set the discount rate of households β
to target at an annual steady state return on deposits of 4 percent.
We set the adjustment cost parameter θ to match an elasticity of the capital price
to the investment-to-capital ratio of 0.25, which is the target of Bernanke et al. (1999).
This implies a parameter of θ = 10.16 There is considerable variation in the choice
of this parameter in the literature. Christiano and Fisher (2003) estimate an elasticity
of 0.76, targeting asset price comovement with real GDP. Gertler et al. (2007) target
an elasticity of the capital price to the investment-capital ratio of 2, which would in
15The planning horizons are simply 1/σR and 1/σS.
16The elasticity of the capital price to investment is given by ∂Qt∂ It
It
Qt
= θ 1Kt
It
1+θ
(
It
Kt
−δ
) . Evaluated in
Steady State, this expression becomes θδ .
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(a) Parameters from the literature
α δ υR,υS β θ
0.36 0.025 0.001 0.9902 10
RD = 1.04 ∂ ln(Qt)∂ ln(It) = 0.25
(b) Parameters set to match steady state properties
γ ηH ηR σR σS
0.6676 0.0286 0.0071 0.0521 0.1273
RK,R−RB = 0.4% RK−RK,R = 1.2% RK,R−RD = 1.2% KR/K = 0.4 KS/K = 0.4
ψ ω
0.2154 0.5130
φR = 10 φS = 20
(c) Parameters set to match dynamic properties
ρZ σZ σξ π
0.9 0.01 0.0188 12/13
ρ(Yt ,Yt−1) = 0.9 σ(Yt) = 0.025 Crisis freq. of Runs last
0.68% per quarter 3.25 yrs on avg
Table 1.1 Calibration
our model correspond to adjustment cost parameters of 30 and 80, respectively. More
recent papers in the financial accelerator literature often use investment adjustment
costs, which is different from capital adjustment cost. We find this infeasible, since
it would introduce another endogenous state variable, which would complicate the
numerical solution of our model substantially. However, since these models typically
target the steady state elasticity of the price of capital with respect to investment, we
can compare their choice to our target. For example, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011)
target an elasticity of investment to the price of capital of 1.5, which would correspond
to a parameter value of 60. The business cycle literature generally uses much lower
parameter values for the quadratic capital adjustment costs. Begenau and Landvoigt
(2017) use a parameters value of 2, Christensen and Dib (2008) of 0.5. Basu and
Bundick (2017) also estimate a value of around 2 for their quadratic capital adjustment
cost. By using a value of 10, we use a high value relative to the business cycle literature,
but a very conservative value relative to the financial accelerator literature.
Parameters in Panel (b) of Table 1.1 are set to match steady state properties of
the economy. We use the same targets for these parameters as GKP. To find data
equivalents for the steady state values, GKP assume that the US economy was in
steady state in the years before the financial crisis of 2007-2009. We use leverage
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ratios of 10 and 20 for retail banks and shadow banks, respectively, to calibrate the
diversion parameters ψ and ω . We choose the remaining diversion parameter γ to
match an average annualized spread between the return on retail lending and the return
on wholesale funding of 0.4 percent. We set the exit shock probabilities σR and σS
such that the shares of assets intermediated by retail banks and shadow banks in steady
state both equal to 40 percent. These values correspond to the respective share of
intermediated assets in the data between 2003 and 2007.17 For the capital holding
cost parameters ηH and ηR, we target at the spread between the return on shadow
bank lending and retail bank lending and the spread between the return on retail bank
lending and the deposit rate in annualized terms, respectively.
Parameters in Panel (c) of Table 1.1 are calibrated to match dynamic properties
of the model. We choose ρZ and σZ to match the conditional volatility and the
autocorrelation of detrended GDP for the United States. Two key parameters for the
welfare cost of bank runs are the volatility of the liquidation cost shock σξ and the
persistence of the run π . We choose the persistence of financial crises such that the
average length of a financial crisis is 3.25 years. We calibrate the volatility of the
liquidation cost σξ to match an annual frequency of bank runs of 2.7 percent, or one
bank run every 36.76 years.
We use data of historical banking crises between 1970-2011 from Table A1 in
Laeven and Valencia (2012), where the authors provide a comprehensive database on
systemic banking crises during 1970-2011. They classify a time period as a systemic
financial crisis if it exhibits "[s]ignificant signs of financial distress in the banking
system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank
liquidations)." and "[s]ignificant banking policy intervention measures in response
to significant losses in the banking system." (Laeven and Valencia (2012), p. 228)
This definition corresponds well to a crisis in our model, which is characterized by a
shadow bank run, liquidation of the shadow banking sector and losses on both capital
holdings and wholesale lending for the retail banking sector.
We calculate the frequency of a financial crises per country per quarter by dividing
the number of financial crises which occurred during the period 1970-2011 in the
OECD countries by the number of countries (i.e., 35) and the length of the period in
quarters. We sum up the length of all financial crises which happened in the OECD
countries during this time and divide the number by the number of financial crises to
get the average length of financial crises.18
17According to GKP, assets intermediated by retail banks comprise equity of non-financial firms,
bonds, commercial paper, household and non-financial firm loans, mortgages and consumer credit. For
shadow banks, intermediated assets comprise equity of non-financial firms, mortgages and consumer
credit.
18The banking crises started in 2008 in many countries do not have specific ending date in this table.
In this case we set a uniform ending date of 2012.
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Schularick and Taylor (2012) Model
0 yr 0-1yr 0-2yr 0 yr 0-1yr 0-2yr
Real GDP -2.02% -4.46% -6.3% -1.89% -1.46% -1.16%
Real Investment -3.45% -12.45% -19.9% -8.32% -6.15% -4.69%
Bank Assets -1.89% -6.98% -7.7% -3.69% -2.89% -2.21%
Table 1.2 Untargeted financial crisis moments
1.3.2 Numerical Solution and Simulation Procedure
We solve the model nonlinearly with a projection method on a Smolyak grid, using
the toolbox of Judd et al. (2014). Details of the solution algorithm can be found in
Appendix A.4.
The model has three shocks: the productivity shock εt , the liquidation cost shock
ξt , and the re-entry-shock πt . We simulate N = 5000 economies for T = 1000 periods.
The first 200 periods are dropped to eliminate the effects of initial conditions. One
issue in simulating the model is that the net worth NRt and N
S
t and the price of capital
Qt are simultaneously determined by a nonlinear equation. Therefore, we guess an
initial path for
{
Qdt
}T
t=1, use this path to update the optimal policies and compute{
NR,d+1t
}T
t=1
and
{
NS,d+1t
}T
t=1
, and use these new sequences of net worth to compute
the updated sequence
{
Qd+1t
}T
t=1
. We iterate on the simulation until the distance
between
{
Qdt
}T
t=1 and
{
Qd+1t
}T
t=1
becomes sufficiently small.
1.4 Untargeted Moments
1.4.1 Financial Crises
In this section, we show that the model is able to generate financial crises which are
quantitatively similar to the crises we observed in the data. Schularick and Taylor
(2012) use an event study approach to measure the cumulative change in real and
financial aggregate variables relative to the pre-crisis trend. Their empirical definition
of a financial crisis follows Laeven and Valencia (2012). The dataset they use covers
14 economies spanning the years 1870 to 2008. For the comparison, we use their post-
WWII results, which is comparable with our calibrated model using the post-WWII
US and OECD data.
Table 1.2 reports the results. Using the same data and method as in Schularick and
Taylor (2012), we calculate the average cumulative percentage change in real GDP,
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real investment, and bank assets after a systemic banking crisis.19 We distinguish
three time intervals after the start of the crisis: the first year, the first two years, and
the first three years after the breakout of the crisis. Our measure of bank assets is
given by (Qt + f Rt )K
R
t+1+QtK
S
t+1. Real GDP is Yt as defined in Equation (1.2.27) and
real investment is I˜t as defined in Equation (1.2.28). For instance, in the case of the
first three years after the systemic crisis, given that a bank run starts in period t, we
compute the log change in the variables of interest between period t and period t+11.
Using the same empirical method as in Schularick and Taylor (2012), we estimate the
average change of the real and financial variables for each period between t and t+11
by the panel regression:
d.log(Xi,t) = αi+
11
∑
s=0
βs+1runi,t−s+ εi,t
where Xi,t ∈
{
Yi,t , I˜i,t ,(Qi,t + f Ri,t)K
R
i,t+1+Qi,tK
S
i,t+1
}
, runi,t−s is a dummy variable
which takes the value of 1 if a run happens in period t− s, αi is the unconditional
growth rate of Xi in country i, and βs+1 is the growth rate s periods after the start of
a financial crisis. We then add up the coefficients of the dummy variables to get the
cumulative effect of banking crises on the variables of interest 0-2 years after the crises
happened.
As shown in Table 1.2, the immediate effect of systemic banking crises on real
GDP from the model matches quite closely with that in the data. In general, our
model economy reacts stronger in the first year after the crisis and recovers faster
afterwards from the recession compared to the data, in which a banking crisis has a
more persistent negative effect on the economy.
1.4.2 Business Cycle Statistics
We compare the simulated business cycle moments of the model with the business
cycles in the US to lend additional confidence to the ability of the model to account
for fluctuations. For this purpose, we use data from the NIPA and the Flow of Funds
between 1986Q1 and 2010Q4. For the wholesale funding rate we only have data
from 2001Q1 onwards. We stop in 2010, because afterwards there has been a secular
decline in wholesale funding of the shadow banking sector. We describe the data in
Appendix A.1. A notable deviation from the business cycle literature is that instead of
19In Table 2 in Schularick and Taylor (2012), the authors report the cumulative percentage change
0-5 years after the start of the banking crises. According to our model calibration however, a systemic
bank run lasts on average 3 years. Therefore we recalculate the Table 2 results for the 0-2 (instead of
0-5) year cumulative effects of banking crises using their data and method to make it comparable to the
simulation results of our model. We consolidate both banking sectors for the comparison.
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σ(X)/σ(Y ) ρ(X ,Y ) ρ(Xt ,Xt−1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Output (Yt) 0.027 0.029 1.000 1.000 0.898 0.931
Consumption (CHt ) 0.929 0.527 0.916 0.864 0.887 0.961
Investment (I˜t) 4.368 1.632 0.943 0.966 0.886 0.905
Deposits (Dt+1) 2.449 1.657 0.759 0.895 0.891 0.946
Wholesale Lending (Bt+1) 10.379 9.606 0.187 0.625 0.853 0.963
Deposit Rate (RDt+1) 0.648 0.104 0.431 -0.494 0.900 0.898
Wholesale Funding Rate (RBt+1) 0.532 0.136 0.249 -0.665 0.599 0.889
Return on Equity (RKt /Qt−1) 6.385 1.089 0.379 0.184 0.829 0.445
Table 1.3 Untargeted business cycle moments
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, we detrend the data using the routine proposed by
Hamilton (2017), which avoids the spurious correlations that can arise with HP-filtered
time series.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.3 report unconditional standard deviations of
variables relative to output for the data and the model.20 We calibrate the model such
that output volatility roughly matches that in the data. Consumption is less volatile
than output both in the model and the data. Investment is more volatile. The volatility
of deposits and the volatility of wholesale lending match the data quite well. In terms
of interest rates, the volatility of the deposit interest rate, the wholesale funding rate
and the return on equity is a bit low relative to the data, which is not surprising given
that we use a simple log utility function.
Columns (3) and (4) report the contemporaneous correlations of all variables with
output. As in the data, consumption, investment and deposits are strongly pro-cyclical.
The most problematic statistic is the correlation between wholesale lending and output,
which is positive in the model, but only weakly positive in the data. This seems
puzzling, since one of the stylized facts of the financial crises is a contraction in
wholesale lending. There is a clear trend break in the data around the year 2002
for wholesale lending, which is not properly picked up by either the HP-filter or
the Hamilton filter. This trend break may be responsible for our counter-intuitive
observation of acyclical wholesale lending. The deposit rate is fairly acyclical both in
the model and in the data, and the return on equity is weakly pro-cyclical.
Finally, columns (5) and (6) show that the model can roughly match the autocor-
relations in the data, with the exception of the return on capital being too weakly
autocorrelated in the model.
20In the first row we report the standard deviation of output instead.
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1.5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how a regulator can improve financial stability through
retail bank capital regulation. We will also discuss the steady state effects of bank
capital regulation, in which capital requirements reduce financial intermediation. This
leads to the trade-off between the frequency of bank runs and financial intermediation.
We determine the quantitative importance of this trade-off in section 1.6.
1.5.1 How Can Bank Capital Regulation Increase Welfare?
There are two key inefficiencies in the model that retail bank capital requirements can
address. First, retail banks do not internalize the effect of their leverage and asset
allocation decisions on the probability of bank runs. We call this the run externality.
Second, there is a feedback loop between the incentive constraints of the banks and the
price of capital, which is also not internalized by the retail banks. This feedback loop
increases the frequency and severity of both bank runs and business cycle fluctuations.
We call this the capital price externality. Bank capital requirements can address these
inefficiencies in two ways. First, bank capital requirements force retail banks to reduce
leverage. Since they cannot issue equity to households, they will instead intermediate
less funds to the shadow banking sector. Second, if retail banks build up higher capital
buffers during normal times, they can absorb the liquidated assets of the shadow
banking sector during a bank run more easily and therefore stabilize the liquidation
price of capital. We will discuss in more detail about both channels in the following
subsections.
The Run Externality
It might appear to be odd at first glance that retail banks do not internalize the impact
of their leverage choice on bank runs. After all, it is the retail banks who initiate the
run. The point here is, we consider only systemic bank runs, in which the whole retail
banking sector runs on the whole shadow banking sector. The probability of such a
systemic bank run depends only on aggregate equilibrium prices and quantities and
not on bank-specific variables. Hence, from the perspective of an individual retail
bank, the probability of bank run is exogenous. As we show below, while retail banks
charge a premium on wholesale lending for the expected loss in a bank run, they do not
internalize that by increasing leverage and thereby increasing lending to the shadow
banking sector, they increase the probability of a bank run in the next period.
The equilibrium choices kRt+1,b
R
t+1 and d
R
t+1 of the retail banks are determined by
either the incentive constraint (1.2.14) or the capital requirement (1.2.17), the balance
sheet constraint (1.2.13) and one first order condition. Define ΩRt+1 =V
R
t+1/n
R
t+1. This
28 Endogenous Shadow Banking Crises and Bank Capital Regulation
expression corresponds to the value of an additional unit of net worth. Substituting the
incentive constraint and the balance sheet constraint into Equation (1.2.18) for kRt+1
and dRt+1 and differentiating with respect to b
R
t+1, we get that
Et
[
(1− pt+1)ΩRt+1(
RKt+1
Qt + f Rt
−RDt+1)+
∫ ξ¯t+1
0
ΩR∗t+1(
RK∗t+1
Qt + f Rt
−RDt+1)dF(ξ )
]
=
1
γ
Et
[
(1− pt+1)ΩRt+1(RBt+1−RDt+1)+
∫ ξ¯t+1
0
ΩR∗t+1(xt+1R
B
t+1−RDt+1)dF(ξ )
]
.
(1.5.1)
We derive this condition in Appendix A.3.2. This condition essentially states that
retail banks must be indifferent between lending on the wholesale market and holding
capital. The return on wholesale lending is lower than the return on capital holdings,
because the retail bank can use more leverage to finance wholesale lending, i.e., since
γ < 1. Both the ex-post return on capital holdings and the ex-post return on wholesale
lending are lower if a run occurs in the next period. The return on capital holdings
is lower, because those capital holdings are valued at the liquidation price if a bank
run occurs, since RKt+1 = r
K
t+1+(1−δ )Qt+1 > rKt+1+(1−δ )Q∗t+1 = RK∗t+1. The return
on wholesale lending is lower, because retail banks will not recover the full amount
when a bank run occurs, since xt+1 < 1 by definition of the bank run equilibrium.
Rearranging the first order condition (1.5.1) yields the following expression for the
ex-ante (safe) return on retail bank lending:
RBt+1 = γEt
[
(1− pt+1)ΩRt+1
RKt+1
Qt + f Rt
+
∫ ξ¯t+1
0
ΩR∗t+1
RK∗t+1
Qt + f Rt
dF(ξ )
]
+(1− γ)RDt+1Et
[
(1− pt+1)ΩRt+1+
∫ ξ¯t+1
0
ΩR∗t+1dF(ξ )
]
×
(
Et
[
(1− pt+1)ΩRt+1+
∫ ξ¯t+1
0
ΩR∗t+1xt+1dF(ξ )
])−1
. (1.5.2)
Consider first the case in which bank runs are unanticipated, i.e., Et [pt+1] = 0. In this
case, the ex-post return on wholesale lending is safe. Then, Equation (1.5.2) reduces to
RBt+1 = γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1
RKt+1
Qt+ f Rt
]
Et
[
ΩRt+1
] +(1− γ)RDt+1.
The fraction γ of wholesale lending is financed in the same way as capital holdings
and must yield a return equal to the expected return on capital. The fraction 1− γ of
wholesale lending is non-divertible and can therefore be fully financed with deposits.
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Fig. 1.3 General equilibrium effects of a constant retail bank capital requirement on
the bank run probability
Since retail banks are competitive, this fraction must therefore yield a return which
corresponds to the return on deposits. The full Equation (1.5.2) essentially includes an
additional compensation for the loss in default in the denominator plus an adjustment
to the marginal value of an additional unit of equity, ΩRt+1, which varies between
bank run and no-run states. Importantly, however, agents do not incorporate how their
decisions change the probability of a bank run, that is Et
[
∂ pt+1/∂φRt
]
= 0. Therefore,
when leveraging up and expanding their balance sheet, retail banks invest too much in
wholesale lending from a social welfare perspective.
Figure 1.3 shows that a constant retail bank capital requirement can substantially
increase the probability of a bank run in the next period and is therefore not an
appropriate policy to address the bank run externality. In this figure, we plot the next
period bank run probability Et [pt+1] and the two components of the bank run condition
(1.2.30) as a function of φ¯Rt . We set KHt , KRt , KSt , Bt , Dt , RDt and RBt at the steady
state level and report results for two Zt , one unconditional standard deviation above
and below the unconditional mean, respectively. We fix a level of φ¯Rt , recompute the
general equilibrium given this fixed level of φ¯Rt and then compute the statistics of
interest. This figure shows the effects of a constant retail bank capital requirement on
the equilibrium bank run probability.
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First, in Panel (a), we report the bank run probability as a function of φ¯Rt . The
solid line depicts the bank run probability if productivity is one standard deviation
below the mean, the dotted line if productivity is one standard deviation above the
mean. We mark the policies the retail banks choose in the absence of regulation by the
thin vertical solid and dashed lines, respectively. Note that the leverage ratio of retail
banks φRt is counter-cyclical, because during an expansion, retail banks will increase
wholesale lending relative to capital holdings. Since wholesale lending enters leverage
only with weight γ , this shift in the composition of assets reduces the leverage of retail
banks.
As we can see in Panel (a) of Figure 1.3, imposing a higher static capital require-
ment can increase the future probability of a bank run. By increasing the capital
requirement from 0 to about 20 percent, the probability of a bank run increases from
2.5 percent to around 3 percent per quarter in a recession, and from 0.6 percent to
about 1.1 percent in an expansion. For low values of 1/φ¯Rt , there is no effect, since the
capital requirement is never binding. There is a small effect even before the capital
requirement starts binding in the current period, since it will already bind in some
states of the world in the next period.
To see through which channels the capital requirements impact the run probability,
we decompose the bank run condition given by Equation (1.2.30) into two components.
The first component, RK∗t+1/R
B
t+1, is the spread between asset and liability returns for
shadow banks during a bank run. We show in Panel (b) that increasing the capital
requirement reduces this spread, meaning that it is less likely that shadow banks
can repay their liabilities. This effect is mostly due to a lower liquidation price of
capital. The second component, KSt+1/Bt+1, is the assets-to-debt ratio of the shadow
banks. This ratio is inversely related to the tightness of the incentive constraint of
shadow banks. The higher the leverage of shadow banks, the lower the ratio of assets
to liabilities is. A higher leverage ratio of retail banks hence tightens the incentive
constraint of shadow banks. Panel (c) shows that the reduction in the first component
less than one for one offset by an increase in the second component. Because of this
under-adjustment, the probability of a bank run increases as the capital ratio of retail
banks decreases. The reason for the strong increase in the bank run probability is
that the regulator imposes a less counter-cyclical capital requirement than the market.
This forces retail banks to deleverage more during a bank run compared to the case of
no regulation, which in turn lowers the future liquidation price of capital and hence
increases the bank run probability. Therefore, the regulator should optimally relax
the capital requirement as much as possible ex-post during a bank run to reduce the
probability of a bank run ex-ante.
Whether the bank run probability increases or decreases depends theoretically
on whether KSt+1/B
S
t+1 increases more or less than R
K∗
t+1/R
B
t+1 increases. This in turn
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Fig. 1.4 General equilibrium effects of a run-contingent retail bank capital requirement
on the bank run probability
depends on how much the incentive constraint of the shadow bank tightens in response
to an reduction in the future net worth of the shadow bank.
We show the effects of a policy that imposes a capital requirement only during
the no-run equilibrium in Figure 1.4. This policy is successful in eliminating bank
runs. Panel (a) shows that imposing a capital requirement of 20 percent can eliminate
bank runs both in recession and in expansion states. Panel (b) shows that the lower
bank run probability is due to a higher spread between the returns on assets and
liabilities of shadow banks during a bank run. This effect is primarily driven by a
higher liquidation price of capital. As the capital requirement is relaxed during a run,
retail banks can increase leverage and will hence expand their capital holdings, the
only asset they have access to in the case of a bank run. This higher investment demand
will increase the liquidation price of capital. From Panel (c), we can see that this policy
increases shadow bank leverage initially, because a lower bank run probability relaxes
the incentive constraint of shadow banks by raising their continuation value, allowing
them to use more leverage and hence a lower ratio of assets to liabilities. However,
leverage also decreases for capital requirements higher than 12 percent. This reversal
occurs because for a small enough bank run probability, a reduction in the bank run
probability only relaxes the incentive constraint little. In addition, a higher capital
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requirement still tightens the incentive constraint of shadow banks during normal
times.
In summary, agents fail to internalize the effects of their decision on the probability
of a bank run. In particular, the probability of a bank run is very sensitive to the capital
ratio of retail banks, especially if the economy is in a recession. Therefore, retail bank
capital requirements can be an effective way of reducing shadow bank runs, but only
if the regulator relaxes them during a bank run.
The Capital Price Externality
Due to the incentive constraints (1.2.8) and (1.2.14), the extent to which banks can
leverage their equity depends on the aggregate capital price. A low capital price lowers
the maximum leverage ratio of shadow banks, since the value of diverting assets today
decreases less than the continuation value. Therefore, banks have to deleverage, which
lowers their desired level of investment. This lower level of investment in turn leads
to a lower capital price. The model therefore exhibits a feedback loop, the classical
financial accelerator effect, which operates through the endogenous capital price and
the incentive constraints.21
An inefficiency arises, because banks do not internalize the effects of their current
borrowing decisions on the future aggregate price of capital. By borrowing less during
times of high capital prices, banks could reduce the co-movement between the tightness
of the incentive constraint and the price of capital and thereby reduce the strength of
this feedback loop.22 This feedback loop is especially prominent in the economy with
bank runs, because bank runs are more likely to occur and more severe if the capital
price is more volatile.
A regulatory policy that is designed to restrict deposit lending during good eco-
nomic conditions and ease deposit lending during bad economic conditions can in-
crease welfare by mitigating the feedback loop and reducing the frequency and severity
of bank runs. In contrast, a policy that restricts lending in all states of the world
equally may actually reduce welfare, because such a policy acts as a tighter borrowing
constraint and makes the feedback loop more severe.
In Figure 1.5, we illustrate that a higher constant retail bank capital requirement
1/φ¯Rt reduces both the expected future capital price and the expected future liquidation
price of capital. We follow the same procedure to compute these statistics as in Figure
1.3. The expected future capital price Et [Qt+1] in Panel (a) incorporates the probability
that a bank run may occur in the next period.
21The financial accelerator effect was first introduced in the business cycle literature by Bernanke
et al. (1999).
22This mechanism is well known in the literature, see for example Lorenzoni (2008) for theoretical
work and Bianchi (2011) for numerical work that studies this pecuniary externality.
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Fig. 1.5 General equilibrium effects of a constant capital requirement on the future
capital price
The thick, solid line in the left panel of Figure 1.5 is the expected future capital price
as a function of φ¯Rt if productivity Zt today is one unconditional standard deviation
below the mean. The thin, solid line denotes the level of φRt that retail banks actually
choose in equilibrium. We report the expected capital price relative to the expected
capital price under the actually chosen policy, which in a recession implies a capital
ratio of around 9 percent. Imposing a capital requirement 1/φ¯Rt of 20 percent decreases
the future capital price by more than 5 percent. The unconditional quarterly standard
deviation of the capital price in the simulated model is about 0.6 percent, so this is
a large change. The reason for this effect is that the regulator tightens the financial
constraint of the retail banking sector, which forces them to deleverage, reducing both
lending to consumption goods producers and shadow banks. Retail banks and shadow
banks are forced to contract their balance sheets, which reduces investment and the
price of capital.
The thick, dashed line in the left panel of Figure 1.5 is the same function, except
when productivity is one standard deviation above the mean. In this case, retail banks
choose a higher capital ratio, which is shown by the thin, dashed line. Increasing the
capital ratio has a weaker effect on the future price of capital. Imposing a capital
requirement of 20 percent reduces the capital price by only 4 percent. Looking at the
right panel, we see that imposing a constant capital requirement has a similar effect on
the future liquidation price of capital.
In Figure 1.6, we show the effects of a capital requirement that is imposed during the
no-run equilibrium, but relaxed to zero during a bank run. This policy has a weaker
negative effect on the expected future capital price, because it has a strong positive
effect on the future liquidation price of capital. In addition, this policy reduces the
frequency of bank runs, which in turn lowers the probability that assets are valued at
the liquidation price of capital, increasing the capital price even further. Contrasting
Panels (a) of Figures 1.5 and 1.6, we can see that by setting a capital requirement of 20
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Fig. 1.6 General equilibrium effects of a run-contingent retail bank capital requirement
on the future capital price
percent that is relaxed during a bank run, the regulator still reduces the capital price,
but by only 4 instead of more than 5 percent if he does not relax the capital requirement
during a run. Panel (b) shows that a higher capital requirement now strongly increases
the liquidation price of capital, both in recessions and expansions. Imposing a capital
requirement of 20 percent increases the liquidation price of capital by 1.5 percent
relative to the model without regulation. This is because by restricting lending today,
the regulator increases the capital buffer of retail banks during a bank run, which
increases their ability to increase leverage and therefore their capital holdings during a
bank run. As a consequence, the liquidation price is higher compared to the baseline
model.
In summary, the retail bank capital ratio can affect future capital prices substantially,
so a policy aimed at influencing this retail bank capital ratio can mitigate the financial
accelerator effect. In particular, the regulator should tighten the capital requirement
during expansions and relax it during recessions and bank runs to stabilize the capital
price and reduce both the financial accelerator effect during normal business cycles as
well as the probability of large bank runs.
1.5.2 The Steady State Effect of Retail Bank Capital Requirements
In this section, we explore the steady state implications of retail bank capital require-
ments. We characterize the non-stochastic steady state equilibrium absent of bank runs
in Appendix A.2. In the steady state, the capital adjustment cost is zero, therefore the
price of capital Q equals 1. We denote steady state variables without time subscript.
In the following subsections, we conduct comparative statics analysis of the impact
of varying bank capital regulation on retail banks, i.e., the consequence of changing
the policy parameter 1φ¯R while keeping other parameters constant.
1.5 Discussion 35
20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
Ca
pi
ta
l S
ha
re
 (%
)
(a) Capital Allocation
KH/K
KR/K
KS/K
20 40 60 80 100
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
Ca
pi
ta
l L
ev
el
 (%
 
 
vs
 B
as
el
in
e) (b) Aggregate Capital Stock
Fig. 1.7 Steady state effect of a retail bank capital requirement on the capital allocation
and the aggregate capital stock
Capital Allocation and the Aggregate Capital Stock
Other things being equal, under a tighter capital requirement, retail banks are faced
with a higher financing cost as they have to use more costly capital and less relatively
cheap deposit from the households. This higher financing cost is further passed on
by the retail banks to the shadow banks. Therefore, the required return for capital
investment from the banking sector increases. On the other hand, the required return
for capital investment for households remains the same. As a result, households’
capital holding share increases. The first order condition regarding KHt+1 in steady state
is given by (B.5 in the Appendix):
RK =
1
β
(
1+ηH
KH
K
)
.
Hence the return on capital, RK , increases as the household hold a larger share
of capital of the economy. As investment in the economy becomes more costly, the
aggregate capital stock and aggregate output decrease.
Figure 1.7 shows the comparative statics for the distribution of capital among
households, retail banks and shadow banks in Panel (a) and the aggregate capital
stock in Panel (b). We vary the minimum capital requirement between 0 and 100
percent. The solid line is the share of capital held by households, the dotted line is
the share of retail bank capital holdings and the dashed line is the share of shadow
bank capital holdings. For a retail bank capital requirement below 10 percent, the
capital requirement is not binding and the retail bank leverage ratio is determined by
its incentive constraint.
For a retail bank capital requirement between 10 and 25 percent, the capital
requirement is binding and retail banks will invest in both capital and wholesale
lending. As the capital requirement increases in this range, retail banks substitute
away from capital lending to wholesale lending. This is because an additional unit of
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capital lending requires 1/φ¯ of equity finance, while an additional unit of wholesale
lending only requires γ/φ¯ of equity finance. If the regulator tightens the retail bank
capital requirement, wholesale lending will therefore become relatively more attractive
for retail banks. Hence, direct capital holdings by retail banks decrease, and capital
holdings by shadow banks increase in this range.
For a capital requirement above 25 percent, retail banks will only invest through
wholesale lending. If the regulator increases the capital requirement in this range,
retail banks can no longer substitute away from capital holding and therefore can only
reduce wholesale lending. Consequently, both retail and shadow banks will reduce
their assets in this range.
In Panel (b), we plot the aggregate capital stock relative to the unregulated economy
as a function of the capital requirement. The capital stock is very sensitive to the
capital requirement: If retail banks were required to finance themselves using 100
percent equity, the capital stock would reduce by more than 40 percent. The reason
for this strong effect is that banks in this economy cannot raise outside equity from
households. Hence, a higher capital requirement forces retail banks to sharply cut
the asset side of their balance sheet, which in turn forces the shadow banks to reduce
their assets as well. If banks could issue equity to households, their required return
on equity would not increase monotonically with a higher capital requirement, which
would imply a lower bound on the aggregate capital stock.
Leverage and the Coverage Ratio of Shadow Banks
In Figure 1.8, we report how leverage of retail and shadow banks and the coverage
ratio of shadow banks change with the capital requirement. We define the steady state
coverage ratio of shadow banks as the ratio of beginning of period assets over liabilities
by shadow banks, i.e.,
RKKS
RBBS
=
RK
RB
φS
φS−1 .
Mechanically, an increase in the retail bank capital requirement lower the leverage
ratio of retail banks. For shadow banks, there are two cases. As long as retail banks
can substitute away from capital holdings towards wholesale lending, higher retail
bank capital requirements increase the leverage ratio of shadow banks. When retail
banks lend only on the wholesale market, regulating retail banks reduces shadow bank
leverage.
The coverage ratio is an interesting statistic, because it indicates how run-prone the
shadow banking sector is. While it does not exactly correspond to the recovery rate of
wholesale lending by the retail banks after a bank run, a given fall in the liquidation
price of capital can ceteris paribus trigger a bank run more often if the coverage
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Fig. 1.8 Steady state effect of a retail bank capital requirement on leverage and the
coverage ratio
ratio is low. We can see that the coverage ratio decreases as soon as the retail bank
capital requirement becomes binding and increases as soon as retail banks exclusively
lend on the wholesale funding market. This has a significant effect on the bank run
probability. In the baseline model, the economy could sustain a drop in the liquidation
price of capital of at most 5.5 percent without a bank run being triggered. With fully
equity-financed retail banks, the economy could sustain a drop in the liquidation price
of capital of more than 8.5 percent without a self-fulfilling bank run being triggered.23
The coverage ratio is decreasing in the leverage of shadow banks and increasing in
the excess return RK−RB. Looking at the right upper and lower panel of Figure 1.8,
we find that the increase in the coverage ratio is primarily driven by the lower leverage
ratio of shadow banks, because RK −RB is decreasing in the capital requirement
throughout.
Consumption and Welfare
Figure 1.9 shows how retail bank capital requirements affect consumption and hence
welfare of agents in steady state. Households consume less in a regime with a higher
capital requirement. For households this is because they can save less through deposits
23The formula to calculate this threshold price is Q∗ =
(
RBB
KS − rK
)
1
1−δ .
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Fig. 1.9 Steady state effect of a retail bank capital requirements on consumption
and make more inefficient direct investment. Also, aggregate output decreases strongly
due to the decrease in the aggregate capital stock, which lowers wages.
Retail banks and shadow banks, on the other hand, enjoy higher consumption
under a higher capital requirement. This is because competitive retail banks do not
internalize that by lending less to consumption goods producers they can increase the
returns on their assets, RK/(Q+ f R) and RB, relative to the return on their liabilities,
RD, and thereby increase their net worth. Shadow banks receive a consumption gain
as long as they can increase leverage, and a decrease in consumption once retail banks
can no longer substitute from direct lending to wholesale lending.
Overall, because in our calibration consumption of retail and shadow banks is very
small relative to household consumption, higher retail bank capital requirements lead
to a welfare loss. However, by reducing the coverage ratio of shadow banks, retail
bank capital requirements can reduce the susceptibility of the economy to shadow
bank runs.
1.6 Counterfactuals
We conduct two experiments in this section. First, we compute the welfare cost of
bank runs from the perspective of households, retail banks and shadow banks. This
experiment gives us an upper bound on the positive effect of a policy designed to
reduce bank runs. Second, we consider different rules for capital requirements, both in
an economy with and without shadow bank runs.
1.6.1 Welfare Computation
We compute welfare in consumption equivalent terms. We use the realized con-
sumption sequences to compute welfare. For households, welfare computation is
straightforward. For the banks, we include both incumbent and newly entering banks
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Baseline, No Runs Baseline, With Runs % ∆
CH 0.824 0.822 0.203
CR 0.576 0.570 1.055
CS 0.205 0.189 8.467
Table 1.4 Agents’ willingness to pay to avoid bank runs in the baseline model
into our welfare measure. Since they have linear utility, the regulator can then simply
consider the welfare of each of the banking sectors as a whole. The utility of banking
sector J, J ∈ {R,S}, as a whole if net worth is constant over time is given by
UJ = σ J
NJ−W JK
1−σ J +β (1−σ
J)UJ, (1.6.1)
with consumption given by CJ = σ J N
J−W JK
1−σ J . The consumption equivalent welfare of
banking sector J is therefore
CJequiv =
[
1−β (1−σ J)]UJ. (1.6.2)
1.6.2 The Welfare Cost of Bank Runs
Before investigating the welfare effects of bank capital requirements, we want to
know how costly bank runs are in our calibrated model. For this purpose, we conduct
the following experiment. We first simulate the model with the liquidation cost
shock. We compute the permanent consumption equivalent of welfare for each type of
agent in this economy. Next, we simulate a model without bank runs by setting the
liquidation cost shock to a large enough number > 1. We then calculate the permanent
consumption equivalent for each type of agent in this economy without bank runs. The
difference between the two consumption equivalents is the welfare gain if bank runs
were completely eliminated, expressed in permanent consumption equivalent units.
Table 1.4 shows how much households, retail banks and shadow banks are willing
to pay to avoid bank runs. We report the results as percentage change in the consump-
tion equivalent of welfare from eliminating bank runs, i.e., if welfare in consumption
equivalent terms is given by CJ , the percentage change in welfare for agent J is
CJNo Runs−CJRuns
CJRuns
.
Shadow banks gain the most from eliminating bank runs and would be willing accept
an 8.4 percent permanent decrease in consumption to avoid bank runs. Bank runs
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are also very costly for retail banks, who would pay 1 percent of their permanent
consumption to eliminate bank runs. Households gain about 0.2 percent in quarterly
consumption equivalent terms from the elimination of bank runs.
To compare our results to the literature, Chatterjee and Corbae (2007) estimate
a consumption equivalent welfare gain from eliminating the likelihood of economic
crises 24 to be around 0.97 percent. Their estimated contribution of a reduction in
consumption volatility to this welfare gain is around 0.196 percent in consumption
equivalent terms, which is comparable to the welfare gain of households in our model.
Their depression state has a similar frequency and similar output effects to a financial
crisis in our model. The unconditional probability of a depression state in their model
is 9.75 percent, whereas the unconditional probability of a financial crisis state in our
model is around 8 percent, which is also comparable. They assume however a constant
relative risk aversion of 3, which is much higher than the value of 1 that we use.
Barro (2009) estimates a welfare gain of 4 percent in output equivalent terms for a
representative household with log utility from eliminating consumption disasters like
World War II. In his case, disasters however have an output cost of almost 30 percent
on average, which is one order of magnitude larger than the output loss from a bank
run in our model. Overall, we conclude that the welfare gain from eliminating bank
runs is sizable for all agents in the economy.
1.6.3 Policy Experiments
We discuss two different rules for setting the capital requirement 1φ¯t . First, we consider
the simple case of a constant capital requirement:
1
φ¯t
=
1
φ¯
. (1.6.3)
Second, we look at the case where the regulator can condition the capital requirement
on whether or not the economy is in a run equilibrium. Denote as 1Runt an indicator
variable that is 1 if the economy experiences a run in period t and 0 otherwise. Then,
we can write a capital requirement that conditions on the no-run state as
1
φ¯t
=
1
φ¯
(1−1Runt ). (1.6.4)
Such a requirement has the advantage that the regulator can impose higher equity
buffers of retail banks during normal times, which can be used to absorb the liquidated
capital from shadow banks during a run, thereby pushing up the liquidation price of
24Chatterjee and Corbae (2007) define economic crises as depressions of the same magnitude of the
Great Depression in terms of increase in unemployment.
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Fig. 1.10 Probability of bank runs with a constant minimum capital requirement
capital. In this sense, the more access to deposits retail banks have during a banking
crisis, the higher the fire sale price of the capital will be ex-post, and the less likely
bank runs would happen ex-ante. Therefore, the optimal capital requirement in face
of a bank run is its lower bound, i.e., zero. In what follows we focus on this specific
run-contingent capital requirement.
For each policy experiment, we are interested in two questions. i) How effective is
the policy in reducing bank runs? ii) What is the welfare effect of the policy?
Constant Capital Requirements
First, we discuss the case of a constant capital requirement. The Panel (a) of Figure 1.10
shows that the frequency of bank runs increases as the minimum capital requirement
increases. The reason is that the capital requirement tightens very strongly during a
bank run, which lowers the ability of the retail banking sector to absorb the liquidated
capital of the shadow banking sector. Therefore, this capital requirement has a negative
effect on the liquidation price of capital. Since the higher constant capital requirement
implies that the capital price is more volatile, bank runs become more likely.
In Figure 1.11, we show the welfare effects of a constant capital requirement. On
the x-axis, we vary the capital requirement between 0 percent and 20 percent. On the
y-axis, we show the percentage change in welfare relative to the capital requirement
of 0 percent, which is never binding. We report the percentage change in welfare
relative to the model without regulation for each type of agents as well as for the sum
of utilities, which corresponds to a utilitarian welfare function. We show the results for
three different variations of the model. The dashed line is the steady state equilibrium.
The dotted line is the model without bank runs and the solid line is the model with
bank runs. The purpose of including the steady state is to illustrate the strong steady
state effect, and the purpose of the No Runs case is to illustrate the isolated effect of
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Fig. 1.11 Welfare with a constant minimum capital requirement
the capital requirement on the capital price externality that is also present in the model
without runs.
First, we can see that in steady state, a higher capital requirement reduces the
welfare of households, but increases the welfare of retail and shadow banks. Overall,
measured in consumption equivalent units, capital requirements are welfare reducing
in steady state. Retail and shadow banks gain in welfare terms, because the return on
their assets increases more than the return on their liabilities, which increases the net
worth of incumbent banks.
Second, we can see that a constant capital requirement reduces welfare more in
the dynamic model without bank runs relative to the steady state. This is because
this constant capital requirement amplifies the effect of the pecuniary externality. To
see this, compare the incentive constraint (1.2.14) of the retail banks to the case of a
constant capital requirement (1.2.17), we get:
ψ
[
(Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+ γb
R
t+1
]≤ βEt [V Rt+1] ,
ψ
[
(Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+ γb
R
t+1
]≤ φ¯nRt .
While the left hand sides are identical, the right hand sides differ. The incentive
constraint has the continuation value of the retail bank on the right-hand side, while the
capital requirement has the current net worth times some constant on the right-hand
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Fig. 1.12 Probability of bank runs with a run-contingent capital requirement
side. In particular, rewriting the incentive constraint slightly, we get
ψ
[
(Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+ γb
R
t+1
]≤ βEt [ΩRt+1 nRt+1nRt
]
nRt .
Using that both the marginal value of net worth ΩRt+1 and the net worth growth rate
nRt+1/n
R
t are independent from n
R
t , which we show in Appendix A.3.2, we can state
that the derivative of the right hand side of the incentive constraint with respect to nRt is
given by βEt
[
ΩRt+1
nRt+1
nRt
]
, which in our calibration is counter-cyclical. The derivative
of the right hand side of the capital requirement with respect to nRt is φ¯ , which is
constant. Hence, the market imposed leverage partially offsets fluctuations in net
worth of the retail bank, which reduces the pro-cyclicality of the retail bank balance
sheet. The constant regulatory capital requirement does not do this.
Third, we can see that a constant capital requirement reduces welfare even more in
the dynamic model with bank runs compared to the dynamic model without bank runs.
The reason is that, as can be seen in Figure 1.10, in addition to amplifying the effect
of the pecuniary externality, a higher capital requirement increases the frequency and
severity of bank runs. To summarize the results: From a macro-prudential perspective,
constant capital requirements not only distort the allocation of capital, which leads to a
steady state welfare loss, but they also amplify the effects of the pecuniary externality
during normal times and increase the frequency and severity of bank runs. While
constant capital requirements may be beneficial at the microprudential level, our results
indicate that macroprudential regulation of the retail banking sector should not use
constant capital requirements.
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Fig. 1.13 Welfare with a run-contingent capital requirement
Run-Contingent Capital Requirements
In Figures 1.12 and 1.13, we show the effects of a capital requirement that is only
imposed if the economy is in the no-run equilibrium. First, we can see in Panel (a) in
Figure 1.12 that by implementing a run-contingent capital requirement, the regulator
can reduce the probability of bank runs substantially. As we show in Panels (b) and (c),
the main channel through which the regulator achieves this effect is through a higher
liquidation price of capital: increasing the capital requirement to 20 percent increases
the liquidation price of capital by more than 2 percent. While the run-contingent
capital requirement also increases the volatility of the liquidation price of capital, this
effect is more than offset by the higher mean of the liquidation price. Nevertheless, a
policy which is designed to offset cyclical fluctuations in the price of capital may lead
to superior welfare outcomes.
The welfare results for the steady state case and the case without bank runs are the
same as in figure 1.11. Focusing on the welfare results for the model with bank runs,
we can see that a run-contingent capital requirement can undo the negative externality
of capital requirements on the probability of bank runs. In fact, welfare of shadow
banks increases more in the model with runs compared to the model without runs.
However, the capital requirements are still overall welfare reducing, and more so in
the dynamic models than in the steady state. This is because the run-contingent capital
requirement still increases the pro-cyclicality of the retail bank balance sheet constraint
1.7 Conclusion 45
during normal times, which amplifies the pecuniary externality from the capital price
and therefore the welfare cost of business cycles.
The intuition for the better performance of the run-contingent capital requirement
relative to the constant capital requirement is as follows. A higher capital requirement
increases the net worth of retail bank, which in turn increases the continuation value
of the retail banks. This means that the incentive constraint and hence the market
imposed borrowing constraint is relaxed. If the regulator now removes the capital
requirement during a shadow bank run, the retail banks can increase leverage relative
to the case without regulation. Hence, they can absorb the liquidated capital of the
shadow banks more easily, which increases the liquidation price of capital. Finally, a
higher liquidation price of capital reduces the ex-post cost of realized bank runs and
reduces the ex-ante probability of bank runs. The success of this policy is illustrated
by a relatively higher welfare gain from regulation in the model with bank runs for
all agents compared to the steady state model. However, the steady state cost of bank
capital regulation is still dominant, such that capital regulation overall lowers welfare.
This high cost relies on the extreme assumption that banks can never raise outside
equity from households, no even in the long run. Removing this constraint may yield
a significantly less pessimistic cost of bank capital requirements.
1.7 Conclusion
We study the macroeconomic effects of retail bank capital regulation in a quantitative
model with regulated retail banks and unregulated shadow banks. In our model,
financial crises occur in the form of runs on shadow banks. A negative externality
exists because banks do not internalize that their capital structure decisions affect the
likelihood of financial crises, which leads to over-borrowing during normal times. This
externality creates a role for bank capital regulation.
From the regulators’ perspective, the trade-off that determines the optimal capital
requirement is: on the one hand, higher capital requirements increase the ability of
retail banks to absorb liquidation losses during a shadow bank run, thereby reducing
the frequency and severity of bank runs. For this effect, it is crucial that capital
requirements are relaxed during a bank run. A higher constant capital requirement
induces more bank runs instead. On the other hand, tightening capital requirements
reduces the steady state capital stock and output due to less financial intermediation.
We conclude that capital requirement on retail banks is an effective tool to reduce
banking crises and improve financial stability. However, there is substantial costs of
the policy, especially when capital accumulation is endogenous and equity issuance
is very costly for banks. Therefore, the optimal capital requirement in a model with
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endogenous capital accumulation should be substantially lower than that in a model
with exogenous capital.
An interesting extension of our model would be to include sticky prices and
nominal debt. A bank run could then result in a Fisherian debt deflation spiral: the
initial effects of the run depresses goods prices, which worsens the real debt burden
of banks, which in term depresses investment, and so on. Bank runs can then lead
to episodes that cause the economy to be at the lower bound of the nominal policy
interest rate. In this case, the possibility of bank runs will also affect how monetary
policy should be conducted.
Chapter 2
Housing, Financial Crises and
Macroprudential Regulation: The
Case of Spain
with Johannes Pöschl and Marcus Mølbak Ingholt
2.1 Introduction
Between 2008 and 2016, the Spanish economy witnessed a financial crisis unprece-
dented in its modern history. At the center of this financial crisis was a house price
bust intertwined with a severe disruption in the Spanish banking sector. For this reason,
macroprudential policies that focus on the prevention of such financial crises have
become an important part of the agenda for the financial regulators.
Our goal in this chapter is to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of three different
types of macroprudential policies in reducing the frequency and severity of financial
crises resembling the 2008-2016 Spanish financial crisis. The three policies are: (i)
minimum bank capital requirement, (ii) provisioning against expected credit losses1
(also known as "dynamic loan loss provisioning" in Spain), and (iii) maximum loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio restrictions.
To achieve this goal, we first build a macroeconomic model to understand the
interaction among house prices, mortgage loans and bank runs in the context of the
Spanish financial crisis. We calibrate the model to match dynamics of key financial
and real variables during the crisis, namely house prices, total output, leverage and
credit spreads of both banks and households. With the calibrated model, we conduct
1An accounting rule for banks, under which banks have to set aside funds to cover anticipated future
losses. More details about the policy is discussed in subsection 2.3.3.
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counter-factual policy experiments of the aforementioned macroprudential policies
and evaluate their effects in moderating housing and banking crises.
We study a non-linear DSGE model with heterogeneous agents (patient and impa-
tient households), a housing market and a banking sector. Our model exhibits three
key features: endogenous default on mortgage loans, financially constrained borrowers
and lenders in the mortgage credit market, and endogenous banking crises in the form
of bank runs. Mortgage borrowers can default on their loans, in which case the banks
seize the houses of the defaulted households and sell these houses in the housing
market. Importantly, the mortgage market is disciplined by two constraints. On the
one hand, mortgage lending is restricted by a leverage constraint faced by banks as
a result of a regulatory capital requirement. In other words, given the level of bank
net worth, the bank’s lending ability is constrained. On the other hand, mortgage
borrowers face a borrowing constraint, due to a restriction on the maximum LTV ratio
they can adopt. Whether the lending constraint or the borrowing constraint binds
depends on the state of the economy and therefore varies over time. Banks experience
a run from the depositors whenever the liquidation value of the banks in a run is lower
than the value of their outstanding debt.
There are two exogenous aggregate shocks in the model: a productivity shock and
a house quality shock (a shock to the recovery values of mortgages and deposits in the
event of default). The productivity shock works through the real side of the economy
and affects house prices primarily through lowering the income of households and
thereby lowering the demand for houses. The house quality shock works through the
financial side of the economy and impacts house prices by reducing the net worth of
banks and thereby lowering the supply of mortgages and demand for houses. There
is a financial accelerator effect, independently of whether the lending constraint or
the borrowing constraint is binding in the mortgage credit market. When the lending
constraint is binding, a lower house price leads to an increase in mortgage default and
a lower mortgage recovery rate, both reduce the profitability of the bank and thereby
lower the bank net worth. This reduces the bank’s lending ability, causing house prices
to drop further. When the borrowing constraint is binding, a lower house price directly
leads to lower value of the collateral for the loan, reducing the borrowers’ ability to
borrow, which also results in further decreases in the house price.
Bank runs occur more frequently when bank leverage is high and bank profitability
is low (e.g., due to a negative shock to the recovery of defaulted mortgages through
foreclosure). A bank run leads to the collapse of the mortgage market, which lowers the
housing demand of the borrowers substantially. As a result, the house price decreases
dramatically in the event of a bank run, lowering the liquidation value of the banks
further. In that sense, the model is capable of generating intertwined housing and
banking crises like the one happened in Spain.
2.1 Introduction 49
Using the resulting model economy, we calibrate a series of productivity shocks
such that the model matches the evolution of the Spanish GDP between 2003 and
2017. In the implied simulation, the model closely predicts the historical movements
in untargeted variables, such as consumption, house prices, mortgage debt, and bank
liabilities. This is interesting, since linear and piecewise linear DSGE models typ-
ically also need to rely on intertemporal preference and housing preference shocks
in order to match consumption and house prices accurately (i.a., Liu et al. (2013),
Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017)). An implication of the close match is that both the
consumption cycle and the housing-financial cycle can largely be accounted for by
productivity shocks. Starting from 2003, positive productivity shocks initially pushed
up consumption and house prices. These movements were then propagated into the
banking sector via a reduction in the household credit spread and a relaxation of the
collateral constraint, which lead homeowners to borrow more. From around year 2009,
however, a series of negative productivity shocks overturned this expansion in output
and credit, consequently causing a recession.
We find that a higher minimum capital requirement on banks can effectively
eliminate bank runs in this calibrated model economy. By restricting mortgage lending
of banks, a higher minimum capital requirement leads to lower aggregate household
leverage. With a higher equity share in housing, the mortgage default rate declines, and
the recovery rate of defaulted mortgage loans increases. All these effects contribute
to less frequent and less severe bank runs. This result is in contrast with the result of
a similar policy experiment in Chapter 1, where the opposite effect of the policy is
found: increasing the static capital requirement would actually result in more bank
runs rather than less. The reason for the different findings is the following. In the
model of Chapter 1, there are two banking sectors in the economy, retail and shadow
banks, and bank runs happen in the shadow banking sector instead of the regulated
retail banking sector. Therefore, under a tighter static capital requirement, when a
bank run happens, the retail banks’ ability to absorb the liquidated assets of shadow
banks is constrained, which further reduces the liquidation price of assets. As a result,
bank runs are more likely to occur under higher static capital requirements. However,
in the model set-up of this chapter, there is only one banking sector, which is subject
to runs and is regulated. In this case, a higher capital regulation results in a stronger
bank balance sheet and lower frequency of bank runs.
Provisioning against expected credit losses does not substantially affect the house
prices or the consumption of households. The impact on the leverage dynamics of
households and banks is also limited. It does, however, lead to a reduction in the
average mortgage default rate and lower probability of bank runs, although to a much
lesser extent than doubling the minimum capital requirement. Moreover, the bank
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leverage becomes less cyclical under the provisioning policy, suggesting that the policy
does play a role in reducing the cyclicality of the capital structure of banks.
Finally, imposing a tighter LTV constraint on mortgage borrowers can also effec-
tively reduce the bank leverage and the mortgage default rate, thereby reducing the
frequency of bank runs. However, since the LTV constraint reacts more strongly on
house prices (a more direct financial accelerator effect) than bank capital requirements,
it amplifies the cyclicality of household and bank leverage as well as the cyclicality of
the default and recovery rate of mortgage loans.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This chapter is closely related to the literature that studies financial distress and their
real effects. There are two branches in this literature. The first one explores the
financial accelerator effect, where weak balance sheet conditions of financial or non-
financial firms undermine their access to credit, which impairs their balance sheet
condition further, creating a negative feedback loop and amplifies business cycle
fluctuations. This line of research is pioneered by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Since the global financial crisis, it has been
an important mechanism in many studies that try to link financial disruptions and the
real effects of financial crises, such as Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2015), Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2016). The second branch studies
bank run events, pioneered by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). There are two slightly
different ways to model bank runs, one is as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler,
Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016), where bank creditors suddenly stop rolling over their
short-term investment in banks. The other way is to model a liquidity run due to
mismatch of the liquidity from illiquid assets and liquid liabilities, such as in Martin,
Skeie, and von Thadden (2014). Our model includes both a financial accelerator effect
and the bank run mechanism as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015). One thing that this
literature is silent about is the role of the housing market boom and bust in the financial
crisis. This chapter adds to this literature by adding the interaction of the housing
market and the financial market into a macroeconomic framework of financial crisis.
There is an extensive empirical literature on financial crises. Examples include, but
are not limited to, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2011),
Gorton and Metrick (2012), Laeven and Valencia (2012), Schularick and Taylor (2012),
Mendoza and Terrones (2012), Romer and Romer (2017), Jordà, Richter, Schularick,
and Taylor (2017), Krishnamurthy and Muir (2017) and Muir (2017). Relative to this
literature, we document dynamics of asset prices and financial leverage during the
Spanish financial crisis and study to what extent these dynamics are driven by financial
and real shocks.
2.2 The Spanish Financial Crisis 51
This chapter is also related to the literature on macroprudential regulation, which
explores how regulators can ensure that the market equilibrium internalizes the pe-
cuniary externalities that arise if there are price-sensitive borrowing constraints and
endogenous capital prices. Examples include Lorenzoni (2008), Bianchi (2011),
Garcia-Macia and Villacorta (2016), Farhi and Werning (2016), Korinek and Simsek
(2016), Dávila and Korinek (2017) and Gersbach and Rochet (2017). We discuss
different regulatory policies (dynamic provisioning and LTV constraints) and compare
these policies in a concrete context, namely the Spanish housing and financial crisis.
Finally, this chapter relates to the literature that studies the interaction between
housing crises and financial crises, e.g., Justiniano et al. (2015) and Guerrieri and
Uhlig (2016). Most of the studies in this literature focus on the US housing crisis,
whereas we study the Spanish housing crisis case.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 documents the key
dynamics of the financial crisis in Spain, which we aim to match with our quantitative
model. Section 2.3 describes the model economy. Section 2.4 provides a discussion of
the binding constraints in the mortgage market. Section 2.5 lays out the model calibra-
tion to the Spanish economy. Section 2.6 contains counter-factual policy experiments
on the three macroprudential policies. Finally, section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The Spanish Financial Crisis
In this section, we document important dynamics of the Spanish financial crisis, which
we aim to match later with our banking crisis model. We also document the pre-crisis
macroprudential policy in Spain, i.e., the dynamic loan loss provisioning. We use
aggregate data on GDP, house price, bank leverage, household leverage, and credit
spread in Spain between 2007 and 2017. A detailed data description can be found in
Appendix B.1.
2.2.1 Housing Crisis and Economic Recession
Since the mid 1990s, the real estate price in Spain embarked on an expansionary path,
with nominal house prices soaring by 300 percent between 1995 and 2007.2 In the
aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Spanish real estate market collapsed. As
shown in the left panel of Figure 2.1, average house price dropped from e2100 per
square meter in 2008Q2 to e1450 (i.e., a 30 percent decrease) in 2015Q1, putting an
end to the housing boom in Spain.
2See, for instance, Martín et al. (2018) for the full time trend of the Spanish house price during this
period.
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Fig. 2.1 House prices and real GDP in Spain, 2007-2017
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Fig. 2.2 Bank leverage and household leverage in Spain, 2007-2017
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to households as a ratio of gross disposable income: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
Following the conventional definition of economic recessions as two consecutive
quarters of decline in real GDP, Spain experienced two economic recessions since
2000: the first one in 2008Q4–2010Q1 and the second recession in 2011Q1–2013Q4
(marked as shaded areas in the figures). The first recession corresponds with the
2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis, and the second one with the 2009-2013 European
Sovereign Debt Crisis.
From the right panel of Figure 2.1, we observe an interesting pattern: the GDP
growth (solid line) and house price growth (dashed line) co-move closely, suggesting
a strong positive correlation between the house price and real GDP.3 However, the
decrease in house prices is much stronger than that of real GDP, with the lowest growth
rate of house prices being −10 percent in 2012Q4, compared to about −5 percent for
real GDP.
3The growth rates of GDP and the house price are calculated as the percentage change compare to
the same quarter in the previous year.
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Fig. 2.3 Deposit and mortgage rates and the credit spreads in Spain, 2007-2017
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2.2.2 Banks and Households in the Financial Crisis
Leverage Over the course of the Spanish Financial Crisis, significant deleveraging
took place in the banking sector. This trend can be seen in the left panel of Figure
2.2, where we define bank leverage as total asset over total equity. The average bank
leverage in Spain decreased from the pre-crisis level of more than 15 in 2008 to around
7 in 2014. A simultaneous decrease in total bank asset and increase in bank equity
jointly contributed to this trend.
In fact, deleveraging happened not only in the banking sector but also in the
household sector during the financial crisis. Figure 2.2 shows the household debt to
disposable income ratio as a measure of household leverage. However, compared to
the deleveraging of banks on the left, the progress of household deleveraging is much
slower yet more persistent.
Credit Spread Another important observation during the financial crisis is the credit
spread dynamics, which captures the risk premium or the probability of default of
the debt issuers. We calculate the bank credit spread as the difference between the
annual interest rate on bank deposits and the ECB refinancing rate (interest rate on
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the bulk of liquidity provided to the banking system by the ECB). The household
credit spread is calculated as the difference between the annual interest rate on newly
issued mortgage loans and the annual interest rate on bank deposits. Figure 2.3 clearly
shows that the credit spread of banks increased during the financial crisis, suggesting
that banks had to pay higher risk premium to compensate for a higher risk of default.
However, household credit spread decreased during the crisis, suggesting a lower risk
premium paid by households on mortgage loans. This can be explained by a cut in bank
lending to households, which forced the households to increase self-financing in house
purchases. As a result, the average probability of default within the household sector
decreases and the recovery of defaulted mortgage increases accordingly, reducing the
credit spread.
2.2.3 Macroprudential Policy in Spain
In July 2000, Banco de España, the Spanish central bank and banking supervisor,
introduced dynamic provisioning in Spain, which requires banks to provision against
expected loan losses.4 Under the prevailing standards, loss identification was based on
"triggering events", e.g., decrease in collateral values and past-due status. The obvious
drawback of the "triggering events" accounting rule is that loss recognition occurs too
late, creating a procyclical effect: banks provision less (lower capital buffer) during
the booming period when credit losses are low and provision more (higher capital
buffer) during recessions when credit losses surge. In contrast, under the dynamic
provisioning regime, banks identify potential credit losses earlier and build up buffers
in good times that can be used in bad times, creating a counter-cyclical effect similar
to the capital conservation buffer and counter-cyclical buffer in Basel III.
In 2014, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) published IFRS 9
(the accounting standard for financial instruments), which includes a new accounting
standard for provisioning against expected credit losses (see, e.g., Cohen and Edwards,
2017). On that account, Spain was advanced in financial macroprudential regulation
before the financial crisis hit the economy.
2.3 Model
In this section, we introduce a non-linear DSGE model with heterogeneous agents, a
housing market, and a banking sector. One of the key features of the model is that both
banks and households are leveraged and may default endogenously on their liabilities.
4See Saurina (2009) for a detailed description of the policy rule for dynamic loan loss provisioning
in Spain.
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2.3.1 The Model Environment
We study a closed economy with discrete time and infinite horizon. The economy
is populated by patient households (fraction µ) and impatient households (fraction
1−µ). Households consume consumption goods and housing services, and supply
labor inelastically to the production sector. They invest in housing and either borrow
from or lend to banks. Banks take deposits from households and make loans to
households in the form of mortgages. To keep things simple, the total housing supply
is fixed to H , so that house prices are entirely demand driven. There is no rental
markets for housing, so households can only purchase houses for housing services.5
There is a production sector that employs labor and produces consumption goods.
We denote variables related to the patient households with "P", impatient house-
holds with "I", and banks with "B".
Figure 2.4 gives an overview of how resources flow in the economy.
 
Firm  s
 Patient HH  Banks  Impatient HH
 Mortgage
       House 
 (upon default)
 Housing Market
 Deposit
 Labor  Labor
 House 
 trading
 House 
 trading
 Foreclosure
Fig. 2.4 Overview of the economy in equilibrium
2.3.2 Households
Preferences and Housing
Preferences Households of type J, J ∈ {P, I}, maximize their utility:
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
(
β J
)t
UJ
(
CJt ,H
J
t
)]
.
5Spain is a high home-ownership country with a relatively small house rental market. Between 2007
and 2017, 79 percent of the Spanish population lived in an owner-occupied dwelling, within which 32
percent had an outstanding loan or mortgage. Data source: Eurostat(ilc_lvho02).
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The instantaneous utility function is given by:
UJ
(
CJt ,H
J
t
)
= χJ
(CJt )
1−σ −1
1−σ +(1−χ
J)
(HJt )
1−σ −1
1−σ ,
where CJt is consumption of household J in period t, H
J
t is housing at the beginning
of period t, β J is the discount factor, σ captures risk aversion of the households
and χJ captures the consumption weight in the utility function. Patient households
and impatient households differ along two dimensions. First, impatient households
discount future utility more than patient households do, i.e., β I < βP. Second, patient
households have a weaker preference for housing than impatient households, i.e.,
χP > χ I.6
Housing The representative household of each household type holds a portfolio of
houses denoted by HJt , which consists of individual houses H
J
it :
HJt =
∫
i
HJitdi,
where HJit is house i held by household J in period t and H
J
t denotes the total housing
stock of households of type J at the beginning of period t. Pt is the aggregate house
price expressed in units of consumption goods. The idiosyncratic price of house i, Pit ,
is the product of the aggregate house price and an idiosyncratic shock εit :
Pit = Ptεit .
The idiosyncratic shock εit is distributed lognormal with standard deviation σ ε and
mean −12(σ ε)2, such that εit has mean 1, and the expected house price is equal to the
aggregate price Pt . Houses depreciate at rate δ . At the end of period t, the households
sell off their remaining housing stock (1−δ )HJt at price Pt and make a new purchase
HJt+1 for the next period at the current aggregate price Pt . Therefore, the net change in
housing is given by
[
HJt+1− (1−δ )HJt
]
Pt .
6It is necessary that patient households and impatient households have different preferences for
housing. Otherwise, impatient households would not hold sufficient housing share of the economy. As
discussed in the calibration section, the impatient households’ preference for housing is calibrated to
match the share of owner-occupied houses with outstanding mortgage or loans.
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Financial Markets
Households can lend to banks in the form of bank deposits DJt , and borrow from banks
in the form of mortgage loans MJt .
7 In equilibrium, patient households are depositors
and impatient households are mortgage borrowers.
Deposits If there is no bank run in period t, households receive a non-contingent
gross return RDt in period t on the deposit they made in period t−1. In the event of a
run, only a share XDt of their deposit (including due interest) can be recovered from the
liquidation of the banks’ assets. A detailed discussion of the recovery rate of deposits
can be found in Subsection 2.3.3 about bank runs.
Mortgages A representative household borrows a portfolio of mortgages MJt =∫
i M
J
itdi from banks. Each individual mortgage loan M
J
it is secured by a corresponding
house HJit . Households may default on mortgages. If a household chooses not to
default, a gross interest rate RMt on the mortgage loan is paid to the bank. If the
household chooses to default, the bank will seize the house that serves as collateral
and sells it at price Pit to make up the losses on the loan. If the proceeds from selling
the house are not sufficient to cover the losses, the bank cannot seek the deficiency
balance from the borrower, i.e., the recovery is limited to the value of the house.8 The
recovery rate of the defaulted mortgage loan MJit is given by:
XMit = At
(1−δ )PitHJit
RMt MJit
,
where At captures a multiplicative quality shock to the foreclosed houses, with
At = min(Aˆt ,1),
ln Aˆt = ρA ln Aˆt−1+ εAt ,and ε
A
t ∼ N(0,νA).
The At shock functions like the "capital quality shock" in Gertler, Kiyotaki, and
Prestipino (2016). It provides an exogenous source of variation in the mortgage
recovery rate and has a maximum value of 1. The lower the value of At , the less a bank
recovers its defaulted mortgage from selling the house. The intuition behind this shock
is that once the borrowers know they will default on the mortgage loan and give up the
houses, they use the houses with less care and stop conducting proper maintenance
7There is no direct financial market between patient and impatient households. Therefore, in our
model impatient households cannot directly borrow from patient households.
8In practice, mortgages are recourse loans in Spain. However, the recovery of the full value of the
loan usually takes time and is not guaranteed, e.g., the mortgagor is too broke to reply. As such, we
model mortgages as non-recourse loans.
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of the houses. As such, there is a variation in the quality of the houses that the banks
receive from defaulted borrowers.
Optimal Default Decision The repayment on a mortgage is RMt MJit . If a household
chooses to default on the mortgage, they have to give up the share At ∈ [0,1) of their
depreciated house value (1− δ )PitHJit to the bank. They keep the remaining 1−At
share of the value of the house.9 In equilibrium, it is optimal for the households to
default on a mortgage if the value of the house that the household gives up is less than
the outstanding liability the household owes to the bank, i.e.,
At(1−δ )PitHJit < RMt MJit .
Or equivalently, the households default on their mortgages whenever the recovery rate
for the bank is less than 1, i.e., XMit < 1.
The aggregate mortgage default rate, ΦMt , can be characterized by a cutoff rule
for the idiosyncratic house price shock. Define ε∗t as the cutoff value of idiosyncratic
shock, such that:
At(1−δ )PtHJt ε∗t = RMt MJt .
If εit , the realized idiosyncratic shock for house i, falls below the cutoff value, it is
optimal for the household to default on the mortgage. Therefore, the default rate is
given by ΦMt = Pr(εit ≤ ε∗t ).
Borrowing Constraint The amount of the mortgage loan a representative household
is able to borrow is constrained by the value of their house, i.e., the collateral of the
loan:
MIt+1 ≤ κPtHIt+1,
where κ captures the maximum LTV ratio that a household is allowed to take. Later in
the policy experiment, we will vary the value of κ to evaluate the effect of changing
LTV constraints on mortgage default and bank runs.
Capital Income and Government Transfer
Patient households own the production sector and banks. Each period, they invest EP
as equity to banks and receive ΠB,Pt dividends from banks and Π
F,P
t profits from the
firms. Capital income is taxed at rate τ .
9Alternatively, one could model the share 1−At as a deadweight loss of default. However, this
would make the model more cumbersome to solve, since the information to compute the aggregate loss
is not contained in the set of state variables we currently use.
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Impatient households do not invest in bank equity and have no capital income,
i.e.,EI = ΠF,It = Π
B,I
t = 0. Instead, they receive a transfer T It from the government
each period. Patient households receive zero transfer, i.e.,T Pt = 0.
Budget Constraint and Aggregation
Households provide labor L¯J inelastically at wage Wt . The budget constraint of a
representative household J ∈ {P, I} is given by:
CJt +Pt
[
HJt+1−HJt (1−δ )
]
+
[
1− (1−XMt )ΦMt
]
RMt M
J
t +D
J
t+1+E
J
=Wt L¯J +MJt+1+X
D
t R
D
t D
J
t +(1− τ)(ΠF,Jt +ΠB,Jt )+T Jt ,
where
XMt =
∫
XMit <1
XMit dF(X
M
it )
is the expected recovery value of the mortgage loans in default, with F(X) denoting
the cumulative distribution function of X .
Full Statement of the Household’s Problem In summary, the complete households’
problem is given by:
max
{CJt ,HJt+1,MJt+1}∞t=0
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
(
β J
)t
U I
(
CJt ,H
J
t
)]
,
s.t.
CJt +Pt
[
HJt+1−HJt (1−δ )
]
+
[
1− (1−XMt )ΦMt
]
RMt M
J
t +D
J
t+1+E
J =
=Wt L¯J +MJt+1+X
D
t R
D
t D
J
t +(1− τ)(ΠF,Jt +ΠB,Jt )+T Jt , Budget Constraint
MJt+1 ≤ κPtHJt+1, Borrowing Constraint
CJt ,H
J
t+1,M
J
t+1 ≥ 0.
2.3.3 Banks
Banks function as financial intermediaries in the economy. They take deposits from
households and make mortgage loans to households. Banks are prone to runs from
depositors. As such, they are subject to capital regulations.
Bank Problem
Entry and Exit Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), we assume that every period
η share of the banks exit the economy. This assumption makes sure that banks do not
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accumulate equity infinitely.10 To keep the aggregate number of banks constant, new
banks enter at the same rate as banks exit.
Objective Function Banks are owned by patient households. As such, the objective
of a bank is to maximize the discounted future dividend payouts at the discount rate of
the patient households:
E0

∞
∑
t=0
 Uc(CPt ,HPt )Uc(CP0 ,HP0 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stochastic Discount Factor
[
βP (1−η)]tΠBt

 ,
where η is the constant bank exit rate and ΠBt is the dividend payout in period t, which
equals the net worth of the exiting banks. The net worth of an incumbent bank in
period t is given by:
nBt = R˜
M
t M
B
t −RDt DBt ,
where R˜Mt =
[
1− (1−XMt )ΦMt
]
RMt denotes the actual return on mortgage loans, taking
into account the default and recovery of the loans. The net worth of the aggregate
banking sector (including both incumbent and newly entering banks) in period t is
given by:
NBt = ηE
P+(1−η)nBt .
Recall that EP is new capital invested by patient households into the newly entering
banks, which enter the economy at rate η .
Balance Sheet Banks face a balance sheet constraint, which requires that the value
of mortgage loan MBt+1 on the asset side of the bank must equal the sum of deposits
DBt+1 and bank net worth n
B
t on the liability side of the bank:
MBt+1 = D
B
t+1+N
B
t .
Capital Requirement / Lending Constraint Banks are subject to runs from depos-
itors, and are thus regulated. We consider bank regulation in the form of bank capital
requirement. If the capital requirement is binding, it means that banks are constrained
in their ability to finance lending with household deposits. Banks are required to keep
10An violation of such assumption would lead to banks over-accumulating equity in equilibrium, such
that they no longer need to take deposits from the households, which contradicts the role of financial
intermediary of the banks.
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a minimum equity to asset ratio, Γt :
Γt = Γ+ γ
{
Et
[
Φt+1(1−XMt+1)
]}
,
which consists of two components. Γ is the static minimum capital ratio that a bank
must satisfy. The second is a dynamic component that captures provisioning against
expected future credit losses. The higher expected losses on mortgage loans, the higher
capital ratio a bank has to keep.
Full Statement of the Bank’s Problem The bank’s maximization problem is given
by:
max
{MBt+1,DBt+1}∞t=0
E0
{
∞
∑
t=0
[
Uc(CPt ,H
P
t )
Uc(CP0 ,H
P
0 )
[
βP (1−η)]tΠBt ]
}
,
s.t.
MBt+1 = D
B
t+1+N
B
t , Balance Sheet Constraint
NBt ≥ ΓtMBt+1. Bank Capital Requirement
Bank Runs
Existence of the Bank Run Equilibrium We model bank runs as coordination
failure of the depositors, i.e.,the patient households, as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015).
We consider the case of a bank run on the banking sector as a whole. Once a bank run
happens, banks’ assets get liquidated and banks can no longer take deposits or grant
mortgage loans.
In a bank run, bank assets get liquidated. Patient households receive the liquidation
value of the bank assets subject to the same house quality shock. The recovery rate on
deposits for patient households when a bank run happens is given by:
XDt = At
R˜M∗t MBt
RDt Dt
, (2.3.1)
where R˜M∗t is the return on mortgages in a bank run, which depends on the house
price in a bank run P∗t . We use the asterisk to distinguish variables in a run state from
variables in a normal state whenever the distinction matters.
Given this recovery rate of deposits in a run, a bank run equilibrium exists when
patient households cannot fully recover their deposits from liquidating the assets of
the bank if a run happens, i.e.,
XDt < 1. (Bank-run Condition)
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Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), a bank run occurs with probability:
πNoRun→Runt = 1−min(XDt ,1), (2.3.2)
The less the households recover their deposits in a run, the more likely that they would
run on the banks.
Transition Matrix After the bank run, banks reenter the economy with exogenous
probability πRun→NoRun, a parameter to be calibrated. The full transition matrix
between the run state and the no-run state is given by:
πt =
[
1−πNoRun→Runt πNoRun→Runt
πRun→NoRun 1−πRun→NoRun
]
.
2.3.4 Rest of the Model
Production Consumption goods producers hire labor from households to produce
consumption goods. The production technology of the consumption goods producer is
given by:
Yt = ZtLαt ,
where log productivity follows an AR(1) process: lnZt = ρZ lnZt−1 + εZt ,and εZt ∼
N(0,νZ).
Consumption goods producers maximize profits and choose the amount of labor to
employ:
max
Lt
ΠFt = ZtL
α
t −WtLt ,
Rearranging the first order condition of the consumption goods producers’ problem
gives the equilibrium wage:
Wt = αZtLα−1t . (2.3.3)
During a bank run, a fraction of output gets lost. We model the output loss as a
reduction in labor supply from L¯ to (1−ξ )L¯.
Government The government runs a balanced budget every period. That is, the
capital income tax from the patient households equals the transfers made to the
impatient households:
τ
(
ΠB,Pt +Π
F,P
t
)
= T It . (2.3.4)
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2.3.5 Equilibrium
Market Clearing
There are five markets in our model economy: the consumption goods market, the
labor market, the housing market, the deposit market, and the mortgage market. The
deposit and mortgage markets are only active in the no-run state.
Market Clearing in the No-Run State In the case without bank runs, all five
markets are active. The market clearing conditions in a no-run state are (recall that the
share of patient households is µ and impatient households is 1−µ):
Yt = µCPt +(1−µ)CIt +δPtH , (2.3.5)
Lt = µL¯P+(1−µ)L¯I, (2.3.6)
H = µHPt+1+(1−µ)HIt+1, (2.3.7)
DBt+1 = µD
P
t+1, (2.3.8)
MBt+1 = (1−µ)MIt+1. (2.3.9)
In Equation (2.3.5), δPtH denotes the amount of consumption goods that is used
to make up for the depreciated value of housing every period, such that housing supply
in the economy is constant.
Market Clearing in the Run State In the case of a bank run, all banks get liqui-
dated. Therefore, there are no deposit and mortgage markets in the economy. The
consumption goods market and housing market clear just as in the no-run state. The
labor market clearing needs to adjust for the reduction in labor supply during a financial
crisis. In sum, the market clearing conditions in a bank run state are:
Yt = µCPt +(1−µ)CIt +δP∗t H , (2.3.10)
Lt = (1−ξ )
[
µL¯P+(1−µ)L¯I
]
, (2.3.11)
H = µHPt+1+(1−µ)HIt+1. (2.3.12)
Competitive Equilibrium
The recursive competitive equilibrium of the model economy is given by a sequence
of prices: {
Pt ,RDt ,R
M
t ,Wt
}∞
t=0 ,
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and allocations: {
CPt ,C
I
t ,H
P
t+1,H
I
t+1,D
B
t+1,D
P
t+1,M
B
t+1,M
I
t+1,Lt
}∞
t=0 ,
such that, if the economy is in a no-run state according to Equation (Bank-run Con-
dition), markets clear as described in Equations (2.3.5) to (2.3.9) and agents solve
their respective optimization problems described by Equations (B.3.1) to (B.3.4) in the
Appendix for the impatient households, (B.3.5) to (B.3.8) for the patient households,
the (Balance Sheet Constraint) and the (Bank Capital Requirement) for the banks and
Equation (2.3.3) for the consumption goods producers. If the economy is in a run state
according to Equation (Bank-run Condition), markets clear according to Equations
(2.3.10) to (2.3.12) and agents solve the optimization problems described by Equations
(B.3.1) to (B.3.8).
2.4 Financial Accelerator Effect under Different Finan-
cial Constraints
In the model, the equilibrium mortgage loan amount is determined either by the
borrowing constraint faced by the households or the lending constraint faced by banks.
Since house prices affect both types of constraints, they create a positive feedback
loop: if house prices increase, both borrowing and lending constraints loosen. As a
result, house prices increase further. Therefore, the financial accelerator effect is active
in both cases, but it operates through different channels.
For the purpose of this section, it is convenient to redefine the capital requirement
as a constraint on aggregate bank leverage. In other words, the capital requirement is
equivalent to a constraint on the maximum level of bank leverage:
Mt+1
NBt
≤ ψt ,
where ψt is the maximum bank leverage corresponding to the minimum capital re-
quirement faced by the bank, i.e.,ψt = 1Γt .
2.4.1 Case I: Binding Borrowing Constraint
If the borrowing constraint is binding, the equilibrium mortgage loan is given by
Mt+1 = κPtHIt+1.
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A marginal increase in the house price increases mortgage credit by κHIt+1+κPt
∂HIt+1
∂Pt .
There is a negative income effect, a negative substitution effect and a positive wealth
effect which determine the sign of ∂H
I
t+1
∂Pt .
Income effect: Under a higher house price, the budget set of households shrinks,
holding wealth constant. If housing is a normal good, this will reduce the demand for
housing.
Substitution effect: As the relative price of housing increases, holding income
and wealth constant, the demand for housing decreases.
Wealth effect: A higher house price increases the value of houses and hence assets
of households. Consequently, there is a higher demand for housing.
If the income and substitution effects dominate the wealth effect, then ∂H
I
t+1
∂Pt < 0,
which will reduce the strength of the financial accelerator effect.
2.4.2 Case II: Binding Lending Constraint
If the lending constraint is binding, the amount of mortgage loans in equilibrium is
given by the capital requirement for banks:
Mt+1 = ψtNBt .
Constant capital requirement Consider first the case of a constant capital require-
ment, ψt = ψ . A marginal increase in the house price hence increases mortgage credit
ceteris paribus by ψ ∂N
B
t
∂Pt , with
∂NBt
∂Pt
= (XMt −1)
∂φMt
∂Pt
+φMt
∂XMt
∂Pt
.
As such, an increase in the house price has two effects on bank net worth: First, it leads
to a lower mortgage default rate ∂φ
M
t
∂Pt < 0, which increases the net worth of the banks
(since XMt < 1). Second, it increases the recovery value of banks conditional on a
default, ∂X
M
t
∂Pt > 0, which also increases the net worth of banks. Overall,
∂NBt
∂Pt > 0, such
that a higher house price will increase the mortgage credit. Importantly, fluctuations in
bank net worth translate into fluctuations in mortgage credit by a factor of ψ > 1.
Dynamic Capital Requirement In the case of a dynamic capital requirement, the
regulator can offset or amplify the effect of fluctuations in house prices on mortgage
credit:
∂Mt+1
∂Pt
=
∂ψt
∂Pt
NBt +ψt
∂NBt
∂Pt
.
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Parameter Description Value Target / Source
Households
βP Discount factor of patient households 0.9949 Annual real deposit rate = 0.3%
β I Discount factor of impatient households 0.9919 Annual real mortgage rate = 1.1%
χP Patient HH consumption weight 0.9425 Value added of real estate activities/GDP = 5%
χ I Impatient HH consumption weight 0.7875 Share of houses with mortgage loans = 40%
µ Share of patient households 0.6 Share of homeowners w/o mortgage = 60%
σ Risk aversion 2 Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (Kaplan et al.)
δ Depreciation of housing stock 0.00625 Favilukis et al. (2017)
κ Borrowing constraint 0.8 Maximum LTV ratio = 80%
νε Volatility, idiosyncratic house value shock 0.2675 Quarterly default rate = 0.5%
Banks
Γ Minimum bank capital requirement 0.08 Maximum bank leverage = 12.5
γ Dynamic provisioning parameter 0 No dynamic provisioning in the baseline model
η Bank exit rate 0.1 Bank asset to quarterly GDP ratio = 9.761
πRun→Run Bank run persistence 12/13 Average run length = 3.25 yrs
Production and Government
α Labor share of output 0.572 Labor share of output = 57.2%
ρZ Autocorrelation, productivity 0.9704 Autocorrelation of detrended real GDP = 0.9704
νZ Volatility, productivity 0.0145 Unconditional volatility of detrended real GDP = 6.13%
ρA Autocorrelation, aggregate liquidation shock 0.95 Autocorrelation of bank equity = 0.9315
νA Volatility, aggregate liquidation shock 0.01 Volatility of bank equity = 17.56%
τ Capital income tax rate 0.2 Capital income tax rate = 20%
ξ Labor supply loss in bank run 0.1 Unemployment increase during the financial crisis = 10%
Table 2.1 Parameters of the baseline model
If ∂ψt∂Pt =−
ψt
NBt
∂NBt
∂Pt , the regulator can offset the effect of fluctuations in house prices on
mortgage credit completely.
2.4.3 Financial Constraints and Bank Runs
In general, a binding borrowing constraint implies that the lending constraint is not
binding,11 i.e.,Mt+1 < ψtNBt . This means that banks have excess leverage capacity.
Therefore, the probability of a bank run is low in this case.
2.5 Calibration
In this section, we describe the calibration of the model. Our goal is to characterize
quantitatively the behavior of the Spanish economy in the recent financial crisis. We
solve for both the no-run and run equilibrium using global nonlinear methods. A
detailed description of the solution algorithm can be found in Appendix B.4.
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2.5.1 Parameters
The choice of parameter values are listed in Table 2.1. Each model period corresponds
to a quarter. For the baseline calibration, we use the Spanish data between 1997Q3
and 2017Q3. A detailed description of the dataset can be found in Appendix B.1.
There are in total 21 parameters in the model to be calibrated. We begin with the
parameters related to the household sector. The discount factors of the households,
βP and β I , are set to match the average real interest rate on deposit and mortgage
loan,12 respectively. The consumption weight in utility for impatient households, χ I ,
is set to match the share of houses financed by mortgage loans, i.e.,share of houses
owned by impatient households. The consumption weight for patient households, χP,
is calibrated to match the value added of real estate activities as share of GDP, i.e.,
patient households’ housing expenditure. The share of homeowners without mortgage
loans in Spain is 60 percent, therefore the share of patient households µ is set to
0.6. The households risk aversion is set to σ = 2, following the convention in the
macroeconomic literature. The depreciation rate of housing is set to 2.5 percent per
year following Favilukis et al. (2017). The borrowing constraint parameter, κ , is set
to match the maximum LTV ratio in 1997-2017, which is 80 percent. Finally the
volatility of idiosyncratic house value shock is set to match an annual mortgage default
rate of 2 percent.
The parameters related to banks are calibrated using the following strategy. The
constant component of bank capital requirement Γ is set to be 8 percent, corresponding
to the average bank leverage of 12.5 in 1997-2017. The bank exit rate η is set to match
the average bank asset to quarterly GDP ratio of 9.761. The bank run persistence rate
πRun→Run is set to match an average length of bank runs of 3.25 years.13
The rest parameters are related to the production sector and the government. The
production function parameter α is chosen to match the labor share of output of 57.2
percent.14 The autocorrelation and volatility of productivity are calibrated to match
the data counterpart of detrended real GDP. The autocorrelation and volatility of the
aggregate liquidation shock are calibrated to match the autocorrelation and volatility
of bank equity. We choose the value of capital income tax rate to match the capital
income tax in Spain of 20 percent. The labor supply loss ξ is set to 10 percent to
account for the increase in unemployment rate during the Spanish financial crisis.
11Unless both lending and borrowing constraints happen to be binding at the same time, which is
unlikely.
12Only interest rate on newly issued mortgage loans are included in the calculation of the interest
rate. Existing loans are excluded from the calculation.
13We use financial crises data of OECD countries after WWII to calculate the average length of bank
runs in OECD countries, see Chapter 1 Section 1.3.
14See Estrada et al. (2014), Figure 3.
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Table 2.2 lists the targeted moments where the parameter values are not set to
match the data moments exactly. It can be seen that the calibrated model matches real
estate share of GDP, mortgage financed house share and mortgage default rate very
well. However the bank asset to GDP ratio under this calibration is rather low compare
to the data.
Model Data
Real estate share of GDP 5.5% 5%
Houses with mortgages 41.17% 40%
Quarterly mortgage default rate 0.66% 0.5%
Bank asset to GDP ratio 1.84 9.76
Table 2.2 Model fit: targeted moments
2.5.2 Matching Aggregate Dynamics
In this subsection, we calibrate a series of productivity shocks such that the model
matches the historical evolution of the detrended GDP, during the years 2003-2017
in Spain. This exercise allows us to evaluate the ability of the model to predict the
historical movements in key economic and financial variables, and to shed light on the
contribution of productivity shocks to the consumption and housing-financial cycles.
Figure 2.5 plots the endogenous and actual movements in GDP, consumption, house
prices, the household credit spread, mortgage credit, and bank liabilities, conditional on
the productivity shocks. The model, by construction, perfectly matches the historical
path of GDP. However, an important success of the model is that it closely predicts
the empirical paths of consumption and house prices. The direct implication of this
is that productivity shocks have been the principal source of variation not only in
GDP, but also in house prices and consumption. This result is interesting, since
linear and piecewise linear DSGE models typically also need to rely on intertemporal
preference and housing preference shocks in order to match consumption and house
prices accurately (e.g., Liu et al. (2013), Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017)).
The model also matches the lion’s share of fluctuations in mortgage credit and bank
liabilities. In both the model and the data, mortgage credit and bank liabilities rise until
around 2008, after which they remain roughly constant for four years, and then fall.
The model captures this financial expansion through two channels. First, the initially
high labor incomes induced the patient homeowners to save more, consequently forcing
banks to narrow the household credit spread, so as to invest the savings. This is evident
from Figure 2.5d, which shows that the theoretical credit spread fell in the boom
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Fig. 2.5 Empirical and theoretical paths of aggregate variables
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Data Model
Note: GDP, consumption, house prices, mortgage credit, and bank liabilities have been
detrended by series-specific linear trends.
years, and rose in the bust years, roughly consistent with the data. Second, the house
price appreciation relaxed the collateral constraint, concurrently allowing impatient
homeowners to take on additional debt. The financial expansion was eventually undone,
as a series of negative productivity shocks capped labor incomes, and caused house
prices to plummet, from around 2009.
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2.5.3 The Role of Financial Shocks and Real Shocks
In this subsection, we report the generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) to
both the house quality shock and the productivity shock.15 The goal is to investigate
to which extent these shocks can match the following key dynamics observed during
the Spanish financial crisis, as we documented in section 2:
• A strong and persistent decrease in GDP and house prices.
• Deleveraging in both the banking and the household sector.
• An increase in the credit spread for banks (i.e., the spread between deposit rates
and the risk free interest rate), and a decrease in the credit spread for households
(i.e., the spread between mortgage rates and deposit rates).
To compute the generalized impulse responses, we simulate one million economies for
1100 periods, discard the first 1000 periods, and hit the economy with an additional
shock in period 1010. The reported impulse responses are the averages across the
simulated economies.
House quality shock
Figure 2.6 shows the response of the economy to a negative five standard deviation
house quality shock. In the current version of the model, this shock reduces only the
value of a house that is used as collateral for a defaulted mortgage. We choose the size
of the shock to ensure that the shock will induce bank runs for at least some simulated
economies. A five standard-deviation house quality shock reduces the value of a house
by about 7 percent.
As Figure 2.6 shows, a negative house quality shock leads to a persistent decline in
output. This decline is in line with our empirical evidence. Intuitively, output declines
because a house price shock can trigger a bank run by reducing the value of the assets
of banks below the value of their liabilities. Houses show up on the asset side of the
bank balance sheet, since banks seize the houses underlying defaulted mortgages. A
bank run, in turn, causes an exogenous output loss. Quantitatively, the initial response
is not very large: A decrease in the value of defaulted mortgages of 7 percent leads to
a decrease in output of 0.25 percent. The response of output to a house quality shock
is however very persistent, since bank runs in our model are very persistent events:
Even after 20 quarters, output is on average 0.2 percent lower than before the shock.
15The model is non-linear. Hence, the impulse response to any given shock depends on the initial
state of the economy. Therefore, we focus on generalized impulse response functions. Intuitively, these
can be interpreted as the average response of the economy to a shock.
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Fig. 2.6 Generalized impulse response functions to a negative 5-sd house quality shock
at t = 0
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Similarly to output, the shock leads to a persistent and endogenous decline in
house prices. This is also in line with the empirical evidence. The main reason for
this decline is that during a bank run, output and hence labor income of both patient
and impatient households are lower, which lowers housing demand. The house price
adjusts downward to equate housing demand and supply. Through a deterioration in
the balance sheet of banks, this decrease on house prices endogenously amplifies the
decrease in housing demand. As a result, house prices decrease by about 0.4 percent
after the shock, and stay below the initial state until about 40 quarters after the shock.
As in the data, bank leverage decreases strongly in response to the house quality
shock. In the current version of the model with unanticipated bank runs, this delever-
aging is the result of realized bank runs, in which bank leverage decreases to 1, i.e.,
banks cannot use leverage. In a version of the model with anticipated bank runs, the
shock would raise the borrowing costs of the banking sector even in a state without a
bank run by raising the likelihood of a future bank run, and hence the bank run risk
premium on deposits. This would reduce the profitability margin of banks from issuing
deposits to finance mortgages, which can induce them to choose a leverage ratio which
is below the regulatory leverage constraint.
Household leverage decreases, but more weakly and with a bigger delay than bank
leverage. This also squares well with the empirical evidence from the Spanish financial
crisis. The main reason for this decline is that banks cannot extend mortgages to
households during a bank run, such that impatient households need to finance house
purchases fully with equity.
The spread between deposit rates and mortgage rates increases on impact, reflecting
an increase in default rates after the negative house quality shock. Subsequently, as
households deleverage, the default rate of households decreases, which leads to a
reduction in the spread between mortgage and deposit rates.
The spread between the deposit rate and the risk free rate is flat in the model with
unanticipated bank runs.16 In the model with anticipated bank runs, this spread would
increase, reflecting both an increase in expected default losses and in the household
risk premium.
All of these dynamics are consistent with the dynamics observed during the Spanish
financial crisis, lending support to the importance of the house quality shock in the
financial crisis. However, the shock has currently relatively weak effects, since it only
affects houses serving as collateral for defaulted mortgages.
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Fig. 2.7 Generalized impulse response functions to a negative 2-sd productivity shock
at t = 0
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Productivity shock
Figure 2.7 shows the result of a negative two standard deviation shock to productivity.
A negative productivity shock leads to persistent decrease in output of the same
magnitude. Unless there is a bank run, output in the model moves one for one with
productivity since labor supply is exogenous. In a bank run, an additional output loss
can occur.
House prices also decrease, as lower household income reduces household demand.
House prices are more than twice as volatile as output, but exhibit otherwise very
similar dynamics.
Bank leverage decreases only very little, but very persistently in response to a
productivity shock. This is because the bank profit margin from deposit financed
mortgage lending, R˜Mt+1−RDt+1, decreases. This reduction in the profit margin arises,
because the consumption of patient households in response to the shock decreases
more than the consumption of impatient households. Hence, the mortgage rate R˜Mt+1,
which is determined by the Euler equation of impatient households, increases less
than the interest rate on deposits, RDt+1, which is determined by the Euler equation of
patient households. In some cases, this induces banks to reduce their leverage below
the leverage constraint.
In contrast to the data, impatient household leverage increases, as their net worth
decreases more than their assets. The net worth of impatient households is given by
the value of their end of period assets minus the value of their end of period liabilities.
Their end of period assets are just their houses at the market value, PtHIt+1. The amount
of houses they own is determined by the Euler equation of the impatient household
with respect to housing. Their liabilities are their mortgage debt MIt+1. The amount of
mortgage debt they take up is either determined by their borrowing constraint, by the
leverage constraint of the banking sector, or, if none of those constraints is binding,
by the Euler equation of the impatient households with respect to mortgages. In the
current calibration, it is mostly the leverage constraint of the banking sector which is
binding. Hence, household mortgage borrowing is largely unresponsive to the balance
sheet of the impatient households and decreases less than the value of their assets. Net
worth must therefore, to satisfy the balance sheet constraint of impatient households,
decrease more than the value of their assets, which pushes up the leverage of impatient
households.
As a consequence of the higher household leverage, the default rate increases,
which increases the default premium on mortgages. Hence, the spread between
mortgage interest rates and deposits, RMt+1−RDt+1 increases. Note that this does not
16The risk-free rate is the interest rate on a non-defaultable government bond held by households that
is in zero net supply.
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preclude that the bank profit margin, which is given by the default risk-adjusted spread
R˜Mt+1−RMt+1, decreases.
With unanticipated shocks, the spread between the return on deposits and the
risk-free interest rate is again flat. If bank runs are instead anticipated, a negative
productivity shock can either increase or decrease the probability of a bank run: On
the one hand, bank profit margins decrease, which increases the bank run probability.
On the other hand, banks also reduce their leverage, which reduces the bank run
probability. Hence, the effect of a productivity shock on the bank run premium, i.e., on
the spread between the deposit rate and the risk-free rate, is theoretically ambiguous in
this model.
In conclusion, while productivity shocks and house quality shocks lead to the
same sign for output, house price and bank leverage dynamics, they do so through
very different mechanisms. Moreover, they lead to different dynamics of household
leverage and hence the spread between mortgage and deposit rates. Finally, while
house quality shocks lead to a clear prediction for the spread between the deposit rate
and the risk-free rate, productivity shocks do not. Therefore, given the data we have,
the two shocks are in principle identified.
2.6 Macroprudential Policy
In this section, we evaluate the macroeconomic effects of three different macropruden-
tial policies:
1. Increasing the minimum bank capital requirement
2. Imposing dynamic loan loss provisioning on banks
3. Regulating the maximum LTV ratio of mortgage borrowers
For each policy, we study their impact on the frequency of financial crisis and business
cycle fluctuations, as well as their long-run effects on the households and the aggregate
economy.
To do so, we simulate 1000 economies for 2000 periods and discard the first
1000 periods for each counterfactual policy. The reported results are averages across
economies. The policy experiment results are reported in Table 2.3, where the baseline
case is defined with Γ= 0.08, γ = 0 and κ = 0.8.
2.6.1 Higher Capital Requirement
As the first policy experiment, we double the minimum capital requirement from 8 to
16 percent. We report the results of this exercise in column 3 of Table 2.3.
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A higher capital requirement increases the average house price. It also increases
the consumption of impatient households and decreases the consumption of patient
households. The intuition for this result is that with a higher capital requirement,
impatient households borrow less and hence accumulate more wealth. Since they value
houses more than patient households, house price increases. Under a higher capital
requirement, the volatility of house prices and household consumption is lower as well,
which is mostly due to the lower frequency of bank runs.
Increasing the capital requirement leads to a direct decrease in bank leverage. As
banks reduce mortgage lending to households, the leverage of impatient households
decreases as well.
As households adopt a much lower leverage under the higher capital requirement,
the mortgage default rate falls. As such, the credit spread between mortgages rates and
deposit rates also decreases. The recovery rate on defaulted mortgages increases to 100
percent with the higher capital requirement, since there is almost no more mortgage
default.
Finally, as a result of a combination of lower bank leverage, lower mortgage
default rate and higher mortgage recovery rate, the policy eliminates bank runs from
the economy completely.
2.6.2 Expected Loan Loss Provisioning
For the second policy experiment, we maintain the minimum capital requirement of
8 percent, while allowing it to increase to cover the expected losses on mortgage
loans. That is, on top of the regulatory capital, banks have to hold additional capital
to cover expected losses on their mortgage loans. Such a capital requirement is
weakly procyclical, i.e., higher if GDP is high. It corresponds roughly to the dynamic
provisioning introduced in Spain, which, despite having a counter-cyclical component,
was overall procyclical. The policy experiment results are reported in column 4 of
Table 2.3.
We find that the expected loan loss provisioning slightly increases the house prices.
The intuition for this result is similar as before: as impatient households reduce
their leverage slightly under the provisioning policy, they accumulate more wealth
and demand more houses, driving up the house prices. This policy leads to a slight
increase in the consumption for impatient households and has barely any effect on the
patient households’ consumption. Similar to the higher capital requirement policy,
the expected loan loss provisioning also leads to lower volatility of house prices and
household consumption.
The expected loan loss provisioning leads to a slight decrease in household leverage
and a slight increase in bank leverage. Importantly, the bank leverage becomes less
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Baseline Γ= 0.16 γ = 1 κ = 0.4
Real Economy
Avg House Price (Level) 7.700 7.837 7.706 7.779
Avg Consumption, Patient HH (Level) 1.112 1.108 1.111 1.112
Avg Consumption, Impatient HH (Level) 0.723 0.740 0.732 0.731
StDev(House Price) (%) 8.652 8.085 8.446 8.297
StDev(Consumption, Patient HH) (%) 5.103 4.130 4.609 4.276
StDev(Consumption, Impatient HH) (%) 11.086 3.972 6.212 5.471
Leverage
Leverage, Impatient HH 1.811 1.231 1.803 1.608
Leverage, Banks 11.660 6.219 12.081 10.102
Corr(Household Leverage,GDP) -0.305 -0.936 -0.585 -0.403
Corr(Bank Leverage,GDP) 0.330 0.353 0.193 0.645
Default Rates and Asset Prices
Spread RM−RD (% per year) 1.933 1.396 1.375 1.570
HH Default Rate (% per year) 2.905 0.040 1.497 0.223
Mortgage Recovery Rate (%) 86.263 100.000 85.317 90.674
Corr(Spread, GDP) -0.089 -0.401 -0.215 -0.562
Corr(HH Default Rate, GDP) -0.252 0.000 -0.677 -0.595
Corr(Recovery Rate, GDP) 0.206 0.000 0.405 0.538
Bank Runs
Bank Runs per 100 years 1.564 0.000 0.411 0.149
Table 2.3 Policy experiment results for three different macroprudential policies: mini-
mum capital requirement, expected loan loss provisioning, and maximum LTV con-
straint
cyclical under the provisioning policy, suggesting that the policy does play a role in
reducing the cyclicality of the capital structure of banks.
As the households are less leveraged, the mortgage default rate decreases. As a
result, the credit spread for households decreases accordingly. However, the recovery
rate on mortgages decreases slightly despite the small increase in house prices.
Finally, the provisioning policy can also effectively reduce bank run frequency, but
to a lesser extent than doubling the minimum capital requirement, with the frequency
of bank runs decreasing from 1.6 to 0.4 runs per 100 years.
2.6.3 Tighter LTV Constraint
In the last policy experiment, we halve the maximum permissible LTV ratio of house-
holds from 80 to 40 percent while keeping the minimum bank capital requirement
of 8 percent. In other words, under the new LTV constraint, households can borrow
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up to only 40 percent of the house value from the banks. The results of this policy
experiment are reported in column 5 of Table 2.3.
Similar to the two policies discussed above, the tighter LTV constraint also leads
to higher house prices. The increase in house prices under the tighter LTV constraint
is weaker than the increase under the higher capital requirement but much stronger
than the increase under the provisioning policy. It again leads to a tiny increase in
consumption of impatient households due to lower household leverage, and has no
effect on the consumption of patient households.
The tighter LTV constraint leads to lower leverage of both households and banks,
but the effect is weaker than the higher capital requirement policy. Moreover, house-
hold leverage becomes more countercyclical and bank leverage more procyclical. This
is because mortgage credit under a tight LTV constraint is more often determined
by the LTV constraint instead of the capital requirement of the bank, and the LTV
constraint depends more strongly on the very volatile house prices.
The mortgage default rate decreases as households use less leverage in their
house purchases. Banks’ recovery rate on mortgage loans also increases accordingly.
Therefore, the credit spread on mortgage loan decreases with a tighter LTV constraint.
Finally, tightening the LTV constraint reduces the frequency of bank runs from 1.6
to 0.15 runs per 100 years, since it reduces the bank leverage and the mortgage default
rate simultaneously.
2.7 Conclusion
We build a tractable macroeconomic model to study a joint housing and financial crisis,
as was experienced in Spain in 2008-2016. We empirically document key features of
this financial crisis, namely a fall in house prices, a reduction in bank and household
leverage, and a rise in credit spreads for banks as well as borrowers. The model aims
to capture these key features in a parsimonious way. Key features of the model are
that both borrowers and banks use non-contingent debt. Borrowers may endogenously
default on their mortgage loans, and banks are subject to bank runs by depositors.
Dynamics in the model are driven by both real and financial shocks.
We find that all three macroprudential policies can reduce the mortgage default
rate and the frequency of bank runs, but the effect is stronger with the higher capital
requirement and the tighter LTV constraint. Dynamic loan loss provisioning is effective
at reducing the cyclicality of the capital structure of banks, while a tighter LTV
constraint amplifies the cyclicality of bank and household leverage.
In future work, we plan to use the model as a framework to disentangle to what
extent financial risk and productivity risk contributed to the housing crisis in Spain.
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Furthermore, we want to characterize the optimal policy mix between rule-based
capital requirements as well as LTV constraints from a welfare point of view.

Chapter 3
Capital Requirements and Credit
Easing: Ex-ante vs Ex-Post
Intervention Policy
3.1 Introduction
In the first two chapters, the policy focus is on ex-ante intervention policies for
combating financial crises, i.e., bank capital requirement in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2,
and dynamic provisioning and loan-to-value (LTV) constraints in Chapter 2. These
policies are introduced to improve the financial stability of the economy and prevent
future financial crises from an ex-ante perspective. So far, another class of policies has
been ignored: the ex-post intervention policies, such as credit easing and bank bailouts
upon the onset of a financial crisis. These policies are often introduced upon the break
out of a crisis to mitigate the collapse of the financial system and expedite the recovery
of the economy.
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis has spurred a rapidly growing literature on
policy interventions for financial crises.1 There is extensive policy debate among
policymakers and macroeconomists on both ex-ante and ex-post policies. A discussion
on the policy debate over bank capital requirement as an ex-ante intervention policy is
provided in Chapter 1. Regarding the ex-post intervention policies, supporters argue
that they are important in increasing market liquidity and stabilizing the economy
during the crises, whereas the opponents emphasize that such policies are costly for
1See, for instance, Gertler and Karadi (2011), Farhi and Tirole (2012), Keister (2015), Gertler et al.
(2016), Bianchi (2016), Garcia-Macia and Villacorta (2016), Farhi and Werning (2016), Korinek and
Simsek (2016), Dávila and Korinek (2017), Gersbach and Rochet (2017), and Begenau and Landvoigt
(2017).
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taxpayers and can cause moral hazard problems if financial institutions anticipate to
have an easy way out in crisis times.
In this chapter, I introduce credit easing as an ex-post intervention policy and
compare its macroeconomic effects with the effects of bank capital requirement, an
ex-ante policy. In particular, the research questions I address in this chapter are the
following: How does each policy impact the frequency and severity of financial crises?
What are the effects of these policies on financial intermediation? What are their
welfare implications? Are the two policies supplementaries or complementaries?
To address these questions, I introduce a credit easing policy à la Gertler and
Karadi (2011) into a simplified version of the model in Chapter 1 by having only
one banking sector instead of both retail and shadow banking. The credit easing
policy corresponds to the United States Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, in which the US Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to spend up to 700
billion dollar to purchase distressed assets, including mortgage-backed securities and
corporate bonds, to provide liquidity and increase availability of credit to the private
sector.2 Upon reasonable parameterization, I conduct quantitative policy experiments
of the two intervention policies and compare their macroeconomic, financial stability
and welfare implications.
I show that these two intervention policies exhibit very different trade-offs. By
limiting the leverage and risk exposure of banks in normal times, the ex-ante bank
capital requirement reduces the frequency and severity of financial crises, at the cost
of reducing financial intermediation in the economy, which is in line with our findings
in the first two chapters. To implement a credit easing policy, the central bank expands
its balance sheet and purchases private-sector assets at the onset of a financial crisis
to stabilize the asset prices in fire sales and reduce price volatility during a financial
crisis. However, aside from the ex-post stabilizing effect, the credit easing policy
also causes an unintended ex-ante effect: as the policy stabilizes asset prices during
crisis periods, the higher fire sale prices reduce the banks’ risk premium when a run
hits, making it more profitable for banks to use credit. Hence, banks take on higher
leverage and the financial system becomes more vulnerable to negative shocks and
is subject to more frequent runs. Nonetheless, the credit easing policy facilitates
financial intermediation in normal times and reduces the severity of a financial crisis
by mitigating asset price drops during crises. I find the two policies complement each
other well. The combination of the two policies reduces the frequency and severity
of financial crisis while maintaining the efficiency of the financial system, achieving
higher welfare of the agents.
2"US backs away from plan to buy bad assets" Reuters. Retrieved November 15, 2008.
Link: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-paulson/u-s-backs-away-from-plan-to-buy-bad-
assets-idUSTRE4AB7P820081112.
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3.1.1 Related Literature
This chapter is closely related to the fast growing literature on macroprudential policies
and ex-post intervention policies for combating financial crises. It contributes to the
literature that analyzes the effects of prudential policies and ex-post intervention
policies on financial stability and financial intermediation. For example, Gertler and
Karadi (2011) evaluate the effects of unconventional monetary policy on financial
stability and illustrate the moderate effect of central bank credit interventions on
economic downturns (but not bank runs). Keister (2015) argues that eliminating
bailouts of financial intermediaries makes them too cautious from a social point of
view, which can result in under-provision of financial services. Bianchi (2016) studies
the credit bailout policy for non-financial firms and points out that the anticipation
of bailout policies leads to an increase in risk-taking, making the economy more
vulnerable to financial crises. Begenau and Landvoigt (2017) show that tightening bank
capital requirement leads to a more financially stable retail banking system but more
intermediation activity by the shadow banking sector. Among this line of literature,
little has been done in comparing the effects of ex-ante and ex-post intervention
policies or studying the policy implication of combined policy intervention. This
chapter fills this gap in the literature.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
model economy. Section 3.3 lays out the parameterization of the model. Section
3.4 presents the policy experiment results and provides a discussion of the findings.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
The modeling framework is a simplified version of the two-banking sector model in
Chapter 1. I merge the two banking sectors into one banking sector and add a central
bank to the model. The model economy is populated by households, banks, capital
producers, consumption goods producers and a central bank.
Households are the ultimate investors in the economy. There are two ways for
households to make investments. One is to invest directly to consumption goods
producers (or “firms" for short henceforth). The other is to make deposits at banks.
Banks intermediate investments between households and firms. As financial interme-
diaries, banks have a relative advantage in their expertise in screening and monitoring
investments comparing to the households. However, financial market frictions (asset
diversion) restrict banks’ ability to borrow from households. As a result, households
have to make a certain amount of direct investment. Capital producers produce capital
using consumption goods subject to capital adjustment costs. Consumption goods pro-
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ducers hire labor and rent capital from households and banks to produce consumption
goods. The central bank’s role is to facilitate financial intermediation in the event of a
break down of the financial system, i.e., a bank run.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the resource flows in the model economy. The solid line
between households and consumption goods producers means this flow of capital
happens in every state of the economy. The dotted lines jointing the banking sector
denote resource flows that only exist in normal times and not in bank run periods, since
all banks collapse in a bank run. The dashed lines jointing the central bank are just
the opposite – the resource flows exist only in the state of bank runs (and for certain
periods after the runs).
Bank Household Central Bank 
Consumption 
Goods Producer 
Deposit Lump Sum Tax 
C
ap
ital 
D
irect Investm
en
t 
Fig. 3.1 Overview of the economy in equilibrium
3.2.1 Households
Households consume consumption goods and provide one unit of labor inelastically
to receive wage Wt . They invest KHt+1 directly at firms and deposit D
H
t+1 at banks in
period t. The price of capital relative to consumption goods is denoted by Qt . In the
next period, provided that a bank run does not happen, the deposits at banks yield a
gross return RDt+1, and investment at firms generate a gross return R
K
t+1, which is given
by:
RKt+1 = r
K
t +(1−δ )Qt ,
where rKt is the net return on capital investment and δ is the capital depreciation rate.
In the case of a bank run, households recover only xt (xt < 1) share of their deposit.3
Therefore, the return on households’ deposit is given by:
R˜Dt =
RDt , if no bank run,xtRDt , otherwise.
3A detailed discussion of the recovery rate of deposit in a bank run is provided in subsection 3.2.2.
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Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler et al. (2016), I assume that
households are relatively less efficient than banks in terms of screening and monitoring
their investments at the firms. This inefficiency is captured by a quadratic capital
investment cost for the households:
ηH
2
(
KHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt .
Households own the banks and production sectors. As such, the profits or losses
generated each period are transferred to households. In addition, households make an
equity injection, ωKt , to the newly entering banks in the banking sector.
During a bank run, if the central bank conducts credit policy, a lump sum tax Tt is
levied from the households to purchase liquidated assets from banks. After the run, as
banks reenter the economy, the central bank reduces its capital holding and return it to
the households in the form of subsidy, denoted as ΠGt .
The optimization problem of households can be summarized as:
max
{CHt ,KHt+1,DHt+1}∞t=0
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β t ln
(
CHt
)]
, (3.2.1)
s.t.
CHt +QtK
H
t+1+
ηH
2
(
KHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt +DHt+1+ωKt +Tt =Wt +R
K
t K
H
t + R˜Dt D
H
t +Ot ,
KHt+1,D
H
t+1,C
H
t ≥ 0,
where Ot captures the sum of net profits from the capital production sector (ΠKt ),
consumption good production sector (ΠCt ), the banking sector (ΠBt ) and the subsidy
from the central bank after the run (ΠGt ), i.e., Ot =ΠKt +ΠCt +ΠBt +ΠGt .
3.2.2 Banks
Banks intermediate funds between households and consumption goods producers and
have relative advantage over households in screening and monitoring investments. In
period t, banks take deposits DBt+1 from households and lend K
B
t+1 capital to consump-
tion goods producers.
Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), each period, banks exit with probability σ .
The net worth of the exiting banks is paid out to households in the form of dividends.
Without such an assumption, banks would accumulate net worth infinitely and could
save their way out of any leverage constraints. New banks enter at the same rate to
keep the number of banks constant. Since banks are owned by households, the banks’
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objective is to maximize the discounted future payouts to households, which is equal
to the net worth of the exiting banks:
E0
{
∞
∑
t=0
[[
β t(1−σ)t−1] U(Ct)
U(C0)
ΠBt
]}
.
where ΠBt is the dividend payout to households. The net worth of newly entering banks
is given by ωKt and the net worth of incumbent banks is given by:
NB,It = R
K
t K
B
t −RDt DBt .
Therefore, ΠBt = σN
B,I
t . The net worth of the aggregate banking sector is thus given
by:
NBt = (1−σ)NB,It +
ωKt
σ
.
The balance sheet constraint of the banks states that the value of bank assets must
equal the sum of deposits (liability) and bank net worth (equity):
QtKBt+1 = D
B
t+1+N
B
t ,
where QtKBt+1 is the value of the banks’ assets.
Financial Friction To introduce financial friction, I follow Gertler et al. (2016) by
assuming an asset diversion problem of the banks. In particular, banks can divert
a share of their asset each period and exit the economy. As a result, banks face an
incentive constraint imposed by depositors such that assets are never diverted:
ψQtKBt+1 ≤ βEt
[
V Bt+1
]
.
where ψ (0 < ψ < 1) is the share of asset that a bank can divert and V Bt+1 is the
continuation value of the bank. Therefore, the incentive constraint states that the value
of asset diversion must be no more than the continuation value of the bank.
Bank Capital Requirement Banks have to comply with a minimum capital require-
ment, such that the net worth to asset ratio has to be larger or equal to the minimum
regulatory level, Γ:
NBt
QtKBt+1
≥ Γ.
The banks’ optimization problem can be summarized as:
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V Bt = max{KBt+1,DBt+1}∞t=0
Et
[[
β t(1−σ)t−1] U(Ct)
U(C0)
ΠBt
]
, (3.2.2)
s.t.
QtKBt+1 = D
B
t+1+N
B
t , Balance Sheet Constraint
ψQtKBt+1 ≤ βEt
[
V Bt+1
]
, Incentive Constraint
NBt ≥ ΓQtKBt+1, Bank Capital Requirement
KBt+1,D
B
t+1 ≥ 0.
Bank Runs
As in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), depositors (households) have an incentive to run
on banks whenever they cannot fully recover their deposits, including interest, from
the liquidation assets of banks when a bank run happens. Only full bank runs are
considered, which means all banks get liquidated in a run. The recovery rate on deposit
in a bank run is given by:
xt = ξt
[
rKt +(1−δ )Q∗t
]
KBt
(1+ rDt )Dt
, (3.2.3)
where ξt captures a multiplicative liquidation cost shock to the liquidated value of the
bank assets, which follows an i.i.d. lognormal distribution with mean 0 and variance
σξ . The liquidation cost shock generates an exogenous variation in the liquidation
value of the banks, which helps to better account for the probability of bank runs.
I assume that households always fail to coordinate when the recovery rate is less
than 1. That is, whenever xt < 1, a bank run happens.
In the period of a bank run, all bank assets get liquidated at the liquidation price
Q∗t . With probability π , the bank run persists to the next period. In other words, after
the initial bank run period, new banks enter the economy at rate σ with probability
1−π . Therefore, there is a run persistence shock that follows the following Bernoulli
distribution:
πt ∼ B(π).
3.2.3 The Central Bank
In this subsection, I introduce a central bank. As this is new to the existing framework
in the first chapter, I give more details about the assumptions made about the central
bank activities.
88 Capital Requirements and Credit Easing: Ex-ante vs Ex-Post Intervention Policy
The central bank plays the role of the lender of last resort and conducts ex-post
credit easing policies in the event of a bank run. In particular, when a bank run
happens, the central bank intermediates capital from households to the consumption
goods producers. The central bank levies a lump sum tax Tt from the households,
which is used to purchase capital. Notice that this lump sum tax is collected (Tt > 0)
only in the period when a bank run happens. During normal times, Tt = 0. Therefore,
the net worth of the central bank in the period of bank run is given by:
NGt = Tt .
The central bank is more efficient than households in making investments but less
efficient than banks, i.e., 0 < ηG < ηH . Similar to the investment cost for households,
the central bank’s cost for investing KGt+1 to the firm in period t is given by:
ηG
2
[
KGt+1
Kt
]2
Kt .
Credit Policy Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), I assume the amount of credit
that the central bank intermediates depends on the expected credit spread between
the return on capital investment (RKt+1) and the deposit rate (R
D
t+1). This assumption
is motivated by the observation that credit easing typically follows a sharp increase
in spread due to higher risk premium in the credit markets, i.e., when it is costly for
non-financial firms to obtain credit. In particular, the central bank intermediates Φ
share of the total capital stock in the period when the bank run happens according to
the following policy rule:
KGt =ΦKt+1 = φ
[
ln(RKt+1)− ln(RDt+1)
]
Kt+1,
where KGt is central bank capital holding and φ is the policy parameter determining
the amount of capital intermediated by the central bank. Under such policy rule, at
the onset of a bank run in period t, the central bank intermediates ΦKt+1 amount of
capital, and the households invest the rest (1−Φ)Kt+1 directly to the consumption
goods producers. The central bank’s balance sheet constraint is given by:
QtKGt = N
G
t .
After the initial bank run period, banks start to re-enter with probability 1−π . As
banks are more efficient than central banks, they will gradually take over the capital
invested by the central bank. Over time, the central bank’s capital holding reduces to
zero as banks accumulate enough equity to absorb all the capital held by the central
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bank. The central bank transfers its profit from liquidating its capital to the households
in the form of subsidies:
ΠGt = Qt
[
(1−δ )KGt −KGt+1
]
− η
G
2
[
KGt+1
Kt
]2
Kt .
3.2.4 Capital Producers
Capital Producers transform consumption goods into capital according to the following
production function:
Y Kt = It ,
where Y Kt is the amount of capital produced, and It is the amount of consumption
goods invested into capital production. In addition, it is costly for capital producers to
adjust the amount of capital produced. In particular, the the capital adjustment cost
takes the form:
θ
2
(
It
Kt
−δ
)2
Kt ,
where δ is capital depreciation rate.
The capital producers’ profit maximization problem can be summarized as:
max
It
ΠKt = QtIt − It −
θ
2
(
It
Kt
−δ
)2
Kt . (3.2.4)
The equilibrium price of capital is given by the first order condition of the capital
producer:
Qt = 1+θ
(
It
Kt
−δ
)
.
3.2.5 Consumption Goods Producers
Consumption goods producers hire labor and capital to produce consumption goods
according to a Cobb-Douglas production technology:
Yt = ZtKαt L
1−α
t .
The log productivity follows an AR(1) process, i.e., ln(Zt)= (1−ρZ)µZ+ρZ ln(Zt−1)+
εt , where |ρZ|< 1 and εt ∼ N(0,σZ).
The standard profit maximization problem of the consumption goods producers
can be summarized as:
max
Kt ,Lt
ΠCt = ZtK
α
t L
1−α
t − rKt Kt −WtLt .
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The rental price of capital and wage are given by the standard first order conditions:
rKt = αZtK
α−1
t L
1−α
t , (3.2.5)
Wt = (1−α)ZtKαt L−αt . (3.2.6)
3.2.6 Equilibrium
The model economy has five markets in the no-run state: a consumption good market,
a labor market, a rental capital market, a capital market, and a deposit market. In a run
state, since all banks get liquidated, there is no deposit market.
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices
{
Qt ,RKt ,R
D
t ,Wt
}∞
t=0 and alloca-
tions{
CHt ,D
H
t+1,K
H
t+1,D
B
t+1,K
B
t+1,Kt ,Yt , It ,Y
K
t ,K
G
t+1
}∞
t=0, such that the following markets
clear:
• Labor: Lt = 1,
• Rental capital: Kt = KHt +K
B
t +K
G
t ,
• Capital: Y Kt = Kt+1− (1−δ )Kt ,
• Deposits: DHt+1 = D
B
t+1.
3.3 Parameterization
In this section, I provide a numerical example of the model with parameterization.
The purpose of the parameterization is not to match certain moments of the data,
but to create a reasonable example of the model for the numerical exercise of policy
experiments, which are detailed in the next section.
The model has 15 parameters in total. One model period corresponds to a quarter.
The choice of parameter values for the baseline model is listed in Table 3.1, and the
corresponding steady state value of the endogenous variables are listed in Table 3.2.
I use the same parameter values for β ,σ ,ψ,ηH ,ρZ and ω as in Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2015). The production function parameter α and the depreciation rate δ are
set to conventional values. The bank run persistence parameter π , capital adjustment
cost parameter θ , and serial correlation of productivity shocks σZ are set to the same
values as in Chapter 1.
In the baseline parameterization, the policy parameters Γ and φ are set to 0.08 and
0 respectively, corresponding to an 8 percent minimum bank capital requirement and
no ex-post credit intervention policy. In the subsequent policy experiment section, I
vary the values of Γ and φ and explore the impact of different policy combinations.
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Parameter Description Value
Households
β Household discount factor 0.99
ηH Household capital holding cost 0.008
Banks
σ Exit/entry probability 0.05
ψ Divertable asset share 0.19
ω Exogenous bank equity endowment 0.0011
Γ Minimum capital requirement 0.08
Bank Run
σξ Volatility of liquidation cost shocks 0.05
π Persistence of bank run 12/13
Central Bank
ηG Central bank capital holding cost 0.002
φ Credit easing policy rule 0
Production
α Production function curvature 0.36
ρZ Serial correlation of productivity shocks 0.9
σZ Volatility of productivity shocks 0.01
θ Capital adjustment cost 10
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025
Table 3.1 Baseline parameterization
3.4 Policy Experiments
In this section, I conduct counter-factual policy experiments by varying the policy
parameters of the bank capital requirement and the central bank credit easing policy
using the parameterization detailed in Section 3.3. In particular, I pick two values4
for each of the two policy parameters φ and Γ, and compare the model simulation
outcome of the four policy combinations:
4The low level of bank capital requirement is 8 percent as in the baseline case, which is the minimum
bank capital requirement from the Basel II Accord that was introduced before the 2007-2009 financial
crisis, and the high level is set to 15 percent, a level that is slightly higher than the minimum bank capital
requirement from Basel III (13.5 percent) including the capital conservation buffer and counter-cyclical
buffer. The low level of credit easing policy (φ = 0) corresponds to the lower bound of the policy - no
credit intermediation by the central bank, and the high level (φ = 8) is the highest credit easing policy
that the current model solution can solve.
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Variable Description Value
Q Price of capital 1
RD Gross return on deposit 1.0101
RK Gross return on capital investment 1.0126
KH Capital holding of household 3.4394
KB Capital holding of banks 7.8669
KG Capital holding of central bank 0
K Total capital stock 11.306
D Household deposit 7.1044
W Household endowment 0.7549
NB Net worth of banks 0.7625
CH Consumption of households 0.8657
Y Total output 1.1879
Table 3.2 Steady state under baseline parameterization
1. No intervention (baseline case): no credit intermediation by central bank after
bank run (φ = 0) and low bank capital requirement (Γ= 8%).
2. Ex-ante intervention only (tightening capital requirement): no credit in-
termediation by central bank after bank run (φ = 0) and high bank capital
requirement (Γ= 15%).
3. Ex-post intervention only (central bank credit easing policy): central bank
provide credit to consumption goods producers (φ = 8) and low bank capital
requirement (Γ= 8%).
4. Combination of two intervention policies: central bank provide credit to con-
sumption goods producers (φ = 8) and high bank capital requirement (Γ= 15%).
The model has three shocks, the productivity shock εt , the liquidation cost shock
ξt , and the bank run persistence shock πt . For each policy combination, I simulate
1000 economies, with 1500 periods for each economy, where the first 500 periods are
discarded to eliminate the effects of initial conditions. Therefore, eventually I have
simulation results of 1000 economies for 1000 periods. Then I take the average for
each variable across all 1000 economies for each period. Finally, the average values
across all 1000 periods are calculated. The permanent consumption equivalent is a
welfare measure that is calculated as the permanent consumption level that generates
exactly the same utility as the realized utility from simulated consumption sequences
of the households.
Table 3.3 lists the simulation results of endogenous variables related to bank run
frequency, financial intermediation and welfare for each policy experiment.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
No intervention Ex-ante Intv. Ex-post Intv. Combination
Bank Leverage 7.2898 6.5625 7.3373 6.5637
Capital Price 0.9999 0.9996 0.9999 0.9996
Capital Liquidation Price 0.9688 0.9733 0.9728 0.9768
Price Change in Run (%) -3.1103 -2.6311 -2.7103 -2.2810
Deposit Recovery Rate 0.9821 0.9851 0.9832 0.9863
Annual Bank Run Probability (%) 3.7296 0.5692 4.2524 0.5720
Deposit Interest Rate (%) 1.0500 0.9200 0.9300 0.8800
Central Bank Capital Holding in Run (%) 0.0000 0.0000 2.8932 2.0624
Bank Capital Holding (%) 46.986 45.059 47.032 46.729
Household Capital Holding (%) 53.014 54.914 52.252 52.915
Capital Stock 10.442 10.229 10.458 10.451
Consumption Equivalent (percent Dev from Baseline) 0 0.4843 0.0709 0.7088
Consumption Volatility 0.0200 0.0182 0.0203 0.0190
Table 3.3 Policy experiment results : simulation outcomes of different intervention
policy combinations
3.4.1 Discussion
In this subsection, I provide a discussion of the effects of the policy on the bank
run probability, financial intermediation, and welfare implications for each policy
combination.
Ex-ante Intervention
Automatically, a higher capital requirement implies lower leverage of the banks.
Comparing column (1) and (2), it is obvious that increasing bank capital requirement
from 8 percent to 15 percent has a significant direct negative effect on bank leverage,
which decreases from 7.29 to 6.56. As banks are less leveraged, the price drop in a
bank run becomes less severe. Accordingly, the capital liquidation price increases.
The lower bank leverage and higher liquidation price both contribute to a significantly
lower bank run probability, which drops from 3.7 percent to 0.6 percent per year.
However, increasing capital requirement restricts the banks’ ability to borrow,
forcing banks to increase costly equity financing, and pushes up the financing cost
of banks. As a result, there is less intermediation through banks, and households
hold a higher portion of the capital stock, from 53 percent to 55 percent. Since
households are less efficient in managing investment, this implies less efficiency of
capital investment in the economy. Aggregate capital stock also decreases, from 10.44
to 10.23, accordingly.
In terms of welfare, as bank runs become significantly less frequent under a higher
capital requirement, the permanent consumption equivalent increases by 0.48 percent.
For the same reason, consumption volatility decreases from 0.02 to 0.018. In sum, a
higher capital requirement leads to higher and less volatile consumption.
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Ex-post Intervention
Under an ex-post credit easing policy, the central bank purchases capital and lends
directly to consumption goods producers in the event of a bank run. Since the central
bank is more efficient than households in making capital investments, the credit easing
policy increases the liquidation price of capital in the crisis. Comparing column (1)
and (3), one can see that increasing the credit policy parameter φ from 0 to 8 leads to
an increase in the capital liquidation price from 0.9688 to 0.9728, and the central bank
holds on average around 3 percent of the total capital stock right after the run happens.
The higher liquidation price implies a higher recovery rate for households’ deposits,
which drives down the risk premium faced by the banks. Therefore, the deposit rate
decreases. The lower financing cost increases the banks’ profitability as well as the
continuation value of the bank, which relaxes the incentive constraint and results in
higher bank leverage. From (1) to (3), bank leverage increases from 7.29 to 7.34. The
increase in bank leverage results in a higher probability of bank run.
Under the ex-post intervention policy, banks opt for higher leverage. Banks
increase borrowing, and hold a larger share of the capital in the economy. Therefore,
in contrast to the capital requirement policy, the ex-post credit easing policy increases
financial intermediation and reduces inefficient investment of the households. As such,
the aggregate capital stock also increases accordingly.
The ex-post intervention leads to higher permanent consumption equivalent due to
an increase in the capital stock and therefore output. However, consumption fluctuates
more than the baseline case. This is because the policy leads to a higher frequency of
bank runs, in which consumption is more volatile than in normal times. As a result,
consumption volatility increases.
Combination of Two Intervention Policies
Now comparing column (1) and (4), when the capital requirement is increased to 15
percent and the central bank conducts credit easing policy in the event of a bank run,
the bank leverage decreases to 6.53, indicating the effect of capital requirement policy
on bank leverage is more dominant in this case. The capital liquidation price increases
as both policies contribute to higher liquidation prices. The probability of bank runs
decreases from 3.73 percent to 0.57 percent, which is only marginally higher than the
case of only the ex-ante capital requirement policy.
In terms of capital allocation, under the policy combination, the capital holding
shares of banks and households are both slightly lower than the baseline case. This is
because after the run, it takes time for banks to rebuild their net worth to absorb all
the capital from the central bank. Therefore, the central bank holds a small share of
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capital for some periods after the run, although this share decreases to 0 over time.
The aggregate capital stock also increases slightly from 10.442 to 10.451.
Due to both a lower frequency of bank runs and more financial intermediation, the
permanent consumption equivalent increases by 0.71 percent from the baseline case,
the highest among all policy combinations. Meanwhile, less frequent bank runs also
result in lower consumption volatility. Therefore, the two policies complement each
other.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I introduce credit easing as an ex-post intervention policy for financial
crisis into a simplified version of the bank run model in Chapter 1. The purpose of this
chapter is to conduct a quantitative exercise of comparing the two policies and study
their effects on financial stability, financial intermediation and welfare.
I show that despite positive welfare effects of both intervention policies, they
exhibit different trade-offs and therefore complement each other well. In particular,
tightening bank capital requirements effectively reduce bank leverage but leads to
under-provisioning of financial intermediation. The experiment on credit easing policy
highlights the ex-ante effect of the policy: it decreases the banks’ risk premium in
a financial crisis, resulting in more leverage taking of banks and a higher frequency
of bank runs. However, the credit easing policy facilitates financial intermediation
in both normal and crisis periods and stabilizes price volatility during bank runs. A
combination of the two policies can offset their respective negative effects, reducing
the frequency and severity of financial crises while maintaining efficient financial
intermediation in the economy.
In future work, it will be useful to conduct a careful calibration of the model to
specific economies. With the calibrated model, quantitative analysis of more policy
combinations of ex-ante and ex-post intervention policies can be conducted to shed
light on the optimal policy combination.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data
We measure output Y using real GDP, investment I˜ using real gross private domestic
investment and household consumption CH using personal consumption expenditures
from the US National Income and Product Accounts.
For the deposit rate RD, we use the real effective federal funds rate, provided by
the Federal Reserve Board, minus a four quarter moving average of the annualized
inflation rate. We use the US GDP deflator to construct the inflation rate. For the
wholesale funding market rate RB, we follow GKP, who use the 90 day asset backed
commercial paper rate, which is also provided by the Federal Reserve Board, minus a
four quarter moving average of the annualized inflation rate. For the return on capital
RKt /Qt−1, we use the Wilshire 5000 index, a return index, which we also deflate with
the GDP deflator.
For the construction of wholesale lending B and deposit lending D, we follow the
procedure in GKP. We take the data from the financial accounts of the U.S., provided
by the Federal Reserve Board. We calculate deposits as the sum of the asset holdings
of households and nonfinancial business of
1. checkable deposits and currency,
2. total time and savings deposits,
3. money market mutual fund shares, and
4. mutual fund shares.
The shadow banking sector comprises the following groups:
1. GSEs and federally related mortgage pools
2. Funding corporations
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3. Finance companies
4. Security brokers and dealers
5. Issuers of asset-backed securities
6. Holding companies
We compute B as the net liability position of these groups in the following short-term
asset classes:
1. Commercial Paper
2. Security repurchase agreements
We deflate the resulting time series using the GDP deflator. We detrend the time series
for Y , I˜, CH , D and B with the filter proposed in Hamilton (2017). We do not use the
Hodrick-Prescott filter, since Hamilton (2017) reports that the Hodrick-Prescott filter
can lead to spurious correlations and distorts the properties of the filtered series at the
beginning and the end of the series. We plot the detrended time series in Figure A.1.
We detrend quantities in logs and interest rates in levels. The Hamilton filter leads to
substantially different detrended time series compared to the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
In particular, the Hamilton-filtered time series displays a much stronger recession in
2007-2009 in terms of output, investment and consumption.
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A.2 Steady State
We focus on the case of the model under a binding capital requirement. Our approach
is to first characterize the steady state allocation of capital for a given aggregate capital
stock K. We then explain how the aggregate capital stock is determined. Given K, we
can compute the gross return on capital and the wage as
RKSS = αK
α−1
SS +1−δ (A.2.1)
WSS = (1−α)ZKαSS (A.2.2)
Steady state interest rates are determined by the first order conditions with respect to
DHt+1, and B
R
t+1:
RDSS =
1
β
(A.2.3)
RBSS = γ
RKSS
1+ f RSS
+(1− γ)RDS S (A.2.4)
Given RK , KH is determined by the euler equation of the household with respect to KH
RKSS =
1
β
(
1+ηH
KHSS
KSS
)
(A.2.5)
KH
K
=
1
ηH
(
βRK−1) (A.2.6)
We can now characterize the steady state allocation for the shadow banks: First, from
the balance sheet constraint of shadow banks follows
BSS = KSSS−NSSS (A.2.7)
Plugging this into the law of motion for aggregate net worth, we can write net worth as
NS =
υSKSS
1−
[
(RK−RB) KSNS +RB
]
(1−σS)
. (A.2.8)
From the incentive constraint, we then get a quadratic condition for KS/NS:
ψ
[
ω
KS
NS
+(1−ω)
]
= β
[
σS+(1−σS)ψ
[
ω
KS
NS
+(1−ω)
]]
1
1−σS
(
1−υS K
NS
)
= β
[
σS+(1−σS)ψ
[
ω
KS
NS
+(1−ω)
]]((
RK−RB) KS
NS
+RB
)
(A.2.9)
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We then can infer KS = KS/NSNS. The fraction of capital holdings of retail banks are
given by the market clearing condition for capital goods:
KRSS
KSS
= 1− K
H
SS
KSS
− K
S
SS
KSS
. (A.2.10)
From the balance sheet of the retail banking sector, we get
D =
(
1+ηR
KR
K
)
KR+B−NR. (A.2.11)
This allows us to substitute out D in the law of motion for aggregate net worth:
NR = (RKKR+RBB−RDD)(1−σR)+υRK
=
(
RKKR+RBB−RD
((
1+ηR
KR
K
)
KR+B−NR
))
(1−σR)+υRK
=
((
RK−
(
1+ηR
KR
K
)
RD
)
KR
NR
+
(
RB−RD) B
NR
+RD
)
NR(1−σR)+υRK
Hence,
NR =
υRK
1− (1−σR)
((
RK−
(
1+ηR KRK
)
RD
)
KR
NR +(R
B−RD) BNR +RD
) . (A.2.12)
Finally, from the capital requirement, we get(
1+ηR
KR
K
)
KR+ γB = φ¯
υRK
1− (1−σR)
((
RK−
(
1+ηR KRK
)
RD
)
KR
NR +(R
B−RD) BNR +RD
)
(A.2.13)
Substituting in the solutions for B from equation A.2.7, NR from equation A.2.12 and
KR/K, from equation A.2.10 this is a complicated nonlinear equation in K only.
Some additional variables of interest can be calculated residually. Total output is
given by:
YSS = ZKαSS+υ
RK+υSK−ηH
(
KH
K
)2
K−ηR
(
KR
K
)2
K. (A.2.14)
Then, household consumption is characterized by the aggregate budget constraint:
CHSS = Y −δK−σR
NR−υRK
1−σR −σ
S N
S−υSK
1−σS . (A.2.15)
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A.3 Equilibrium Conditions in the Dynamic Model
A.3.1 Households
The first-order conditions of the households’ problem with respect to capital holding
KHt+1 and deposit D
H
t+1 are given by:
FOC(KHt+1) :
1
CHt
(Qt +ηH
KHt+1
Kt
) = βEt
(
1
CHt+1
RKt+1
)
(A.3.1)
FOC(DHt+1) :
1
CHt
= βEt
(
1
CHt+1
RDt+1
)
(A.3.2)
The interpretation of these first-order conditions is standard. In the first expression,
the left-hand side and the right-hand side are the marginal cost and marginal benefit of
capital holding, respectively. The marginal cost of capital holding has two components.
One is the price the households have to pay for purchasing the capital goods, and the
second is the capital holding cost due to households’ low investment skills.
In addition, the households decide how much capital to hold through the retail
banking sector. The first order condition with respect to KRt+1 yields a first order
condition which pins down f Rt :
f Rt = η
R
(
KRt+1
Kt
)
.
Aggregate consumption of the household sector can be inferred from the resource
constraint of the economy. Therefore, we do not have to track the net worth of
households as a state variable.
CHt = ZtK
α
t +υ
RKt +υSKt − η
H
2
(
KHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt − η
R
2
(
KRt+1
Kt
)2
Kt
− It − θ2
(
It
Kt
−δ
)2
Kt −σR N
R
t −υRKt
1−σR −σ
S N
S
t −υSKt
1−σS
A.3.2 Banks
Shadow banks
The incentive constraint of the shadow bank is given by
ψ(nSt +ωb
S
t+1) = βEt
[
V St+1
]
. (A.3.3)
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The balance sheet constraint of the shadow bank reads
QtkSt+1 = n
S
t +b
S
t+1 (A.3.4)
The net worth of an incumbent shadow bank is
nSt = R
K
t k
S
t −RBt bSt (A.3.5)
The value of the shadow bank before the realization of the exit shock is given by
V St = σ
SnSt +(1−σS)βEt
[
V St+1
]
= σSnSt +(1−σS)ψ(nSt +ωbSt+1),
where the second line uses the binding incentive constraint to substitute out the contin-
uation value. Plugging this expression into A.3.3 yields the following characterization
for the shadow banks choices for kSt+1 and b
S
t+1:
ψ(nSt +ωb
S
t+1) = βEt
[
(σS+(1−σS)ψ)nSt+1+ψω(1−σS)bSt+2
]
(A.3.6)
QtkSt+1 = n
S
t +b
S
t+1 (A.3.7)
nSt = R
K
t k
S
t −RBt bSt (A.3.8)
We now conjecture and verify that the policy functions for bSt+1 and k
S
t+1 are linear in
net worth, such that it is sufficient to characterize the optimal choices of the shadow
banking sector as a whole in equilibrium.
Theorem A.3.1 (Linearity of Policy Functions). The policy functions for bSt+1 and
kSt+1 which solve the problem of the shadow bank given by equations A.3.6 to A.3.8
are linear in net worth.
Proof. Suppose that the policy functions are given by bSt+1 = A
S
bn
S
t and k
S
t+1 = A
S
kn
S
t ,
respectively. Then, it follows from equation A.3.8 that
nSt+1 = R
K
t+1k
S
t+1−RBt+1bSt+1
= (RKt+1A
S
k −RBt+1ASb)nSt
= ASnn
S
t .
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From equation A.3.7 follows that
QtASkn
S
t = n
S
t +A
S
bn
S
t
ASk =
1+ASb
Qt
.
Finally, from A.3.6 follows that
ψ(1+ωASb)n
S
t = βEt
[
(σS+(1−σS)ψ(1+ωASb))nSt+1
]
= βEt
[
(σS+(1−σS)ψ(1+ωASb))ASn
]
nSt
= βEt
[
(σS+(1−σS)ψ(1+ωASb))(RKt+1
1+ASb
Qt
−RBt+1ASb)
]
nSt
This equation yields a solution for ASb that is independent of n
S
t .
1 Consequently, ASk and
ASn are also independent of n
S
t .
Given the linearity of policy functions, it is sufficient to characterize the policies
KSt+1 and B
S
t+1 of the aggregate shadow banking sector. These choices are the solutions
to
ψ(NSt +ωB
S
t+1) = βEt
[
(σS+(1−σS)ψ)N
S
t+1−υSKSt+1
1−σS +ψω(1−σ
S)BSt+2
]
QtKSt+1 = N
S
t +B
S
t+1
NSt = (R
K
t K
S
t −RBt BSt )(1−σS)+υRKSt .
Retail banks, No Regulation
We characterize the problem of a retail banks under a non-binding and a binding
capital requirement. First, we consider the problem of a retail bank where the incentive
constraint is binding. The incentive constraint is given by
ψ((Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+ γb
R
t+1) = βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
. (A.3.9)
1Specifically, the solution is given by ASb = −p +
√
p2+q, with p =
− 12
(1/β−Et [RKt+1/Qt ])−Et [RKt+1/Qt−RBt+1]
ωEt [RKt+1/Qt−RBt+1]
and q =
1/β−Et [(σS+(1−σS)ψ)RKt+1/Qt ]
ωEt [RKt+1/Qt−RBt+1]
. When
Et
[
RKt+1/Qt −RBt+1
]
> 0 and Et
[
RBt+1−1/β
]
> 0, this solution is unique.
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The balance sheet constraint reads:
(Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+b
R
t+1 = n
R
t +d
R
t . (A.3.10)
Net worth is determined according to
nRt = R
K
t k
R
t +R
B
t b
R
t −RDt dRt . (A.3.11)
These three equations pin down kRt+1, d
R
t+1 and n
R
t . b
R
t+1 is determined by a first order
condition of the retail banks problem:
max
{kRs+1,bRs+1,dRs+1}∞s=t
βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
s.t.
V Rt = σ
RnRt +(1−σR)ψ((Qt + f Rt )kRt+1+ γbRt+1)
nRt +d
R
t+1 = (Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1+b
R
t+1
ψ((Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+ γb
R
t+1) = βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
nRt = R
K
t k
R
t +R
B
t b
R
t −RDt dRt
kRt+1,d
R
t+1,b
R
t+1 ≥ 0.
We conjecture, as in the shadow banking problem, that the policy functions for
kRt+1,b
R
t+1 and d
R
t+1 are linear in net worth n
R
t :
kRt+1 = A
R
k n
R
t
bRt+1 = A
R
b n
R
t
dRt+1 = A
R
d n
R
t
Plugging in the conjectured policy functions, we can rewrite the maximization problem
as
max
{kRs+1,bRs+1}∞s=t
βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
s.t.
V Rt+1 = (σ
R+(1−σR)ψ((Qt+1+ f Rt+1)ARk + γARb ))nRt+1
ψ((Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+ γb
R
t+1) = βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
nRt+1 = R
K
t+1k
R
t+1+R
B
t+1b
R
t+1−RDt+1((Qt + f Rt )kRt+1+bRt+1−nRt )
kRt+1,d
R
t+1,b
R
t+1 ≥ 0.
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Defining ΩRt+1 ≡ V Rt+1/nRt+1 = (σR + (1− σR)ψ((Qt+1 + f Rt+1)ARk + γARb )), the La-
grangian for this problem is given by
L = βEt
[
ΩRt+1(R
K
t+1k
R
t+1+R
B
t+1b
R
t+1−RDt+1((Qt + f Rt )kRt+1+bRt+1−nRt ))
]
+λ
[
ψ((Qt + f Rt )k
R
t+1+ γb
R
t+1)
−βEt
[
ΩRt+1(R
K
t+1k
R
t+1+R
B
t+1b
R
t+1−RDt+1((Qt + f Rt )kRt+1+bRt+1−nRt ))
]]
This yields the following first order conditions:
∂L
∂kRt+1
= βEt
[
ΩRt+1(R
K
t+1−RDt+1(Qt + f Rt ))
]
(1−λ )+λψ(Qt + f Rt ) = 0
∂L
∂bRt+1
= βEt
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1−RDt+1)
]
(1−λ )+λψγ = 0
Combining these two equations and rearranging, we arrive at the condition
Et
[
ΩRt+1
(
RKt+1
Qt + f Rt
−RDt+1
)]
=
1
γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1−RDt+1)
]
.
This is basically a condition that ensures that the retail bank is indifferent between
lending a marginal unit of funds to consumption goods producers or on the wholesale
funding market.
Showing the linearity of policy functions works in the same way as in the shadow
bank problem. Then, in equilibrium, it is sufficient to characterize the choices KRt+1,
BRt+1 and D
R
t+1 of the retail banking sector as a whole. These choices are characterized
by the following system of equations:
ψ((Qt + f Rt )K
R
t+1+ γB
R
t+1) = βEt
[
ΩRt+1
NRt+1−υRKRt+1
1−σR
]
(Qt + f Rt )K
R
t+1+B
R
t+1 = N
R
t +D
R
t
Et
[
ΩRt+1
(
RKt+1
Qt + f Rt
−RDt+1
)]
=
1
γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1−RDt+1)
]
NRt = (R
K
t K
R
t +R
B
t B
R
t −RDt DRt )(1−σR)+υRKRt
Retail banks, With Regulation
Under a binding regulatory capital requirement, the incentive constraint of the retail
bank is replaced by the capital requirement:
φ¯tnRt = (Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t + γb
R
t+1
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Otherwise, the model is unchanged. In particular, the linearity of policy functions is
preserved. Therefore, the choices of the aggregate retail banking sector are given by
φ¯tNRt = (Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t + γB
R
t+1
(Qt + f Rt )K
R
t+1+B
R
t+1 = N
R
t +D
R
t
Et
[
ΩRt+1
(
RKt+1
Qt + f Rt
−RDt+1
)]
=
1
γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1−RDt+1)
]
NRt = (R
K
t K
R
t +R
B
t B
R
t −RDt DRt )(1−σR)+υRKRt
A.3.3 Production Sectors
From the problem of the capital producer follows
Qt = 1+θ
(
It
Kt
−δ
)
.
The first order conditions of the consumption goods producer yield
rKt = αZtK
α−1
t
Wt = (1−α)ZtKαt .
A.3.4 Full Statement of the Equilibrium Conditions
No Run Equilibrium
• Household:
1
CHt
(
Qt +ηH
KHt+1
Kt
)
= βEt
(
1
CHt+1
RKt+1
)
1
CHt
= βEt
(
1
CHt+1
RDt+1
)
f Rt = η
R K
R
t+1
Kt
CHt = ZtK
α
t +υ
RKt +υSKt − η
H
2
(
KHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt − η
R
2
(
KRt+1
Kt
)2
Kt
− It − θ2
(
It
Kt
−δ
)2
Kt −σR N
R
t −υRKt
1−σR −σ
S N
S
t −υSKt
1−σS
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• Shadow Bank:
ψ(NSt +ωB
S
t+1) = βEt
[
(σS+(1−σS)ψ)N
S
t+1−υSKSt+1
1−σS +ψω(1−σ
S)BSt+2
]
QtKSt+1 = N
S
t +B
S
t+1
NSt = (R
K
t K
S
t −RBt BSt )(1−σS)+υRKSt .
• Retail Bank:
φ¯tNRt = (Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t+1+ γB
R
t+1
(Qt + f Rt )K
R
t+1+B
R
t+1 = N
R
t +D
R
t
Et
[
ΩRt+1
(
RKt+1
Qt + f Rt
−RDt+1
)]
=
1
γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1−RDt+1)
]
ΩRt =
(
σR+(1−σR)ψ
(
(Qt + f Rt )
KRt+1
N˜Rt
+
BRt+1
N˜Rt
))
NRt = (R
K
t K
R
t +R
B
t B
R
t −RDt DRt )(1−σR)+υRKRt
N˜Rt =
NRt −υRKRt
1−σR
• Firms:
Qt = 1+θ
(
It
Kt
−δ
)
RKt = αZtK
α−1
t +(1−δ )Qt
Wt = (1−α)ZtKαt
• Laws of Motion:
KHt+1+K
R
t+1+K
S
t+1 = (1−δ )Kt + It
ln(Zt) = (1−ρZ)µZ +ρZ ln(Zt−1)+ εt
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Run Equilibrium
• Household:
1
CH,∗t
(
Q∗t +η
H K
H,∗
t+1
Kt
)
= βEt
[
(1−π) 1
CHt+1
RKt+1+π
1
CH,∗t+1
RK,∗t+1
]
1
CH,∗t
= βEt
[
(1−π) 1
CHt+1
RDt+1+π
1
CH,∗t+1
RDt+1
]
f R,∗t = ηR
KR,∗t+1
Kt
CH,∗t = ZtKαt +υ
RKt − η
H
2
(
KH,∗t+1
Kt
)2
Kt − η
R
2
(
KR,∗t+1
Kt
)2
Kt
− I∗t −
θ
2
(
I∗t
Kt
−δ
)2
Kt −σR N
R,∗
t −υRKt
1−σR
• Shadow Bank:
CS,∗t = 0
NS,∗t = 0
B∗t+1 = 0
KS,∗t+1 = 0
• Retail Bank:
φ¯tNR,∗t = (Qt + f Rt )K
R,∗
t+1
(Q∗t + f
R,∗
t )K
R,∗
t+1 = N
R,∗
t +D
R,∗
t+1
ΩRt =
(
σR+(1−σR)ψ
(
(Q∗t + f
R,∗
t )
KR,∗t+1
N˜R,∗t
))
NR,∗t = (R
K,∗
t K
R
t +ξtR
K,∗
t K
S
t −RDt DRt )(1−σR)+υRKRt
N˜R,∗t =
NR,∗t −υRKt
1−σR
• Firms:
Q∗t = 1+θ
(
I∗t
Kt
−δ
)
RK,∗t = αZtKα−1t +(1−δ )Q∗t
Wt = (1−α)ZtKαt
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• Laws of Motion:
KH,∗t+1 +K
R,∗
t+1 = (1−δ )Kt + I∗t
ln(Zt) = (1−ρZ)µZ +ρZ ln(Zt−1)+ εt
A.4 Computation
We solve the model nonlinearly using a time iteration algorithm. Solving the model
nonlinearly is important, because bank runs can lead to large deviations from steady
state, where perturbation algorithms are inaccurate.
The state space of the model is S = (NR,NS,K,Z) in the "no bank run" equi-
librium and S ∗ = (NR,∗,K,Z) in the "bank run" equilibrium. We approximate the
consumption policy functions CH(S ),V R(S ),V S(S ),CH,∗(S ∗) and V R,∗(S ∗) and
the capital prices Q(S ) and Q∗(S ∗) using fourth order polynomials. We compute the
polynomial coefficients by imposing that the polynomial approximations must be equal
to the original functions on the grid. Specifically, denoting the polynomial coefficients
by α and the polynomials by Π(S ), we impose for example for the consumption of
households
Π(Si)αCH =C
H(Si) i = 1, . . . ,N. (A.4.1)
for all N grid points. We use a Smolyak grid with order µ = 4 for the endogenous states
and µ = 3 for the exogenous states. We compute the Smolyak grid and polynomials
using the toolbox by Judd, Maliar, Maliar, and Valero (2014).
One slight complication of the model is that the future net worth values NR and NS,
depends on Q(S ). This implies that, for example, the household net worth for a given
function Q(.) must be computed as a solution to the nonlinear function2
NR,
′
=
[
(rK +(1−δ )Q(NR,′,NS,′,K′,Z′))KR,′+RB,′B′−RD,′D′
]
(1−σR)+υRK.
(A.4.2)
With this in mind, we will now outline our solution algorithm for the "no bank
run" equilibrium. Suppose we are in iteration k and have initial guesses for the no-run
consumption policy functions CH(k)(S ),V
R
(k)(S ), and V
S
(k)(S ) and the capital price
function Q(k)(S ) as well as values for the future net worth N
R,′
(k) and N
S,′
(k).
2In principle, ΠQ is also a function of the states. We ignore this here for the sake of exposition. We
do however account for this correctly in the code.
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1. Given the value functions and the future net worth, compute the future value
functions and capital prices as
CH
′
(k) =C
H
(k)(S
′
(k)),
Q′(k) = Q(k)(S
′
(k)),
and so on.
2. Compute the new values for (KH,
′
,KR,
′
,KS,
′
,D′,B′,RD,′,RB,′,Q) for all grid
points i = 1, . . . ,N using the first order conditions A.3.1, A.3.2, A.3.9, A.3.10,
A.3.3, 1.2.26 and the leverage constraints 1.2.14 and 1.2.8. Compute the future
net worth where necessary according to
N˜R,
′
(k+1) =
[
(rK,
′
+(1−δ )Q(k)(NR,
′
(k),N
S,′
(k),K
′,Z′))KH,
′
+RB,
′
B′−RD,′D′
]
(1−σR)
(A.4.3)
+υRK′.
We compute expectations using Gauss-Hermite quadrature. Note that for each
quadrature node Z′, a different value of N˜R,
′
(k+1) must be computed.
3. Using the new policies and prices, update the consumption function of the
household using equation 1.2.29, and the value functions for the retail and
shadow banks using equations 1.2.9 and 1.2.18.
4. Update the next period net worth values using A.4.3, with some attenuation:
NR,
′
(k+1) = (1− ι)N
R,′
(k)+ ιN˜
R,′
(k+1), with ι = 0.5.
5. Repeat until the errors in the consumption, capital price and net worth values on
the grid are small. We iterate until the maximum error in consumption is smaller
than 1e-5 and the maximum error in the net worth is smaller than 1e-5.
If bank runs are unanticipated, we can first solve for the "no bank run" equilibrium
and then afterwards for the "bank run" equilibrium. Importantly, expectations during a
bank run are taken over the future "bank run" and "no bank run" states. It is therefore
necessary to keep track of two sets of net worth values, NR,
′
(k) and N
R,′,∗
(k) . Otherwise,
the algorithm works in the same way as for the "no bank run" equilibrium. For the
anticipated run case, we use the unanticipated run case as initial guess and solve jointly
for the "no bank run" and "bank run" policy functions.
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B.1 Data
Table B.1 Variable definitions and data sources
Variables Description Unit Frequency Source
Banks
Bank Assets Total bank assets Million Euro Monthly ECB Statistical Data Warehouse: Money, credit and banking: MFI aggregated balance sheet: Total Assets. Series Key:
BSI.M.ES.N.A.T00.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E
Bank Liabilities Total bank liabilities Million Euro Monthly ECB Statistical Data Warehouse: Money, credit and banking: MFI aggregated balance sheet: Liabilities. Sum of deposits,
debt securities, MMF shares, external liabilities, remaining liabilities.
Deposit Rate Nominal annualized interest rate on bank deposits Per cent Monthly ECB Statistical Data Warehouse: Financial markets and interest rates: Interest rates: Deposits. Series Key:
MIR.M.ES.B.L22.F.R.A.2250.EUR.N
Mortgage Rate Nominal annualized interest rate on mortgage loans Per cent Monthly ECB Statistical Data Warehouse: Financial markets and interest rates: Interest rates: Loans. Series Key:
MIR.M.ES.B.A22.A.R.A.2250.EUR.O
Risk Free Rate ECB refinancing rate Per cent Monthly ECB Statistics: ECB/Eurosystem policy and exchange rates: Official interest rates: Main refinancing operations: Fixed
rate
Share of NPL Ratio of bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans Per cent Annual World Bank: Bank nonperforming loan, Spain
Housing
House Price Average price per square meter of housing Euro Quarterly Spanish Ministry of Construction, Ministerio de Fomento: Informacion para el ciudadano: Informacion estadistica:
Vivenda y actuaciones urbanas: Estadisticas: Valor tasado de la Vivienda: 1.Valor tasado de la Vivienda libre
Home Ownership Distribution of population by tenure status Per cent Monthly Eurostat (ilc_lvho02): Distribution of population by tenure status, type of household and income group - EU-SILC
survey
Households
Household Leverage Loans granted to households as a ratio of gross disposable income Per cent Quarterly ECB Statistical Data Warehouse: Macroeconomic and sectoral statistics: Sector accounts: Sectors: Households(and
NPISH) . Series Key: QSA.Q.N.ES.W0.S1M.S1.N.L.LE.F4.T._Z.XDC_R_B6G_CY._T.S.V.N._T
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate of active population Per cent Quarterly Eurostat: Population and social conditions: Labour market: Employment and unemployment: Unemployment-LFS
adjusted series: Unemployment by sex and age-quarterly average(une_rt_a)
Economy
Real GDP Chain linked volumes 2010, seasonally and calendar adjusted Million Euro Monthly Eurostat: Database: Economy and finance: National accounts: Quarterly national accounts: Main GDP aggregates: GDP
and main components (namq_10_gdp)
GDP Growth Chain linked volumes, percentage change compared to same period in previous year Per cent Monthly Eurostat: Database: Economy and finance: National accounts: Quarterly national accounts: Main GDP aggregates: GDP
and main components (namq_10_gdp)
CPI Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) 2015=100 Monthly Eurostat: Database: Economy and finance: Prices: Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) (prc_hicp)
Note: All data are collected for Spain for the longest possible period available.
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B.2 Steady State of the Model
B.2.1 Steady State Conditions
Prices:
RD =
1
βP
(B.2.1)
W = αZLα−1 (B.2.2)
Patient households (P):
P = βP
(
P+
1−χ
χ
CP
HP
)
(B.2.3)
CP =WL¯P+(RD−1)DP+(1− τ)O
µ
(B.2.4)
Impatient households (I):
RM = max
(
1−β I PHIM Φ
β I(1−Φ) ,
1
β I
)
(B.2.5)
XM = min
(
PHI
RMMI
,1
)
(B.2.6)
P = β I
(
P+
1−χ
χ
CI
HI
)
(B.2.7)
CI +
[(
1− (1−XM)Φ)RM−1]MI =WL¯I + τ O
(1−µ) (B.2.8)
RMMI ≤ κPHI (B.2.9)
Banks (B):
NB+DB = MB (B.2.10)
nB =
[
1− (1−XM)Φ]RMMB−RDDB (B.2.11)
NB = nB(1−η)+Eη (B.2.12)
NB ≥ ΓMB (B.2.13)[[
1− (1−XM)Φ]RM−RD]D≥ 0 (B.2.14)
Firms:
Y = ZLα (B.2.15)
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Market clearing:
Y = µCP+(1−µ)CI (B.2.16)
L = µL¯P+(1−µ)L¯I (B.2.17)
1 = µHP+(1−µ)HI (B.2.18)
µDP = DB (B.2.19)
(1−µ)MI = MB (B.2.20)
Steady state variables to be determined:
Patient households: CP,HP,DP;
Impatient households: CI,HI,MI;
Banks: NB,DB,MB;
Aggregate: H.
B.2.2 Comparative Statics in Steady State
In Figures B.1 to B.4, we show comparative statics for the leverage constraint Γ,
the bank exit rate η , the discount factor of impatient households β I and steady state
productivity µZ . Γ is the main policy parameter we are interested in. We mark the
baseline parametrization of the model with a red vertical line.
Varying Γ
Consider first the effects of raising the leverage constraint Γ displayed in Figure B.1.
A higher leverage allows banks to use more deposits to finance a given amount of
lending. As long as the interest rate differential
[
1− (1−XM)Φ]RM−RD is positive,
taking on more leverage is profitable and increases the net worth of the bank. To see
this, we substitute B.2.10 and B.2.13 into B.2.11:
nB =
[[[
1− (1−XM)Φ]RM−RD]Γ+RD]NB.
A higher bank net worth in turn implies more deposits and more mortgages, which
raises the consumption of both consumption goods and housing of patient households,
since they will overall save more. Similarly, it lowers consumption of consumption
goods and housing of impatient households, since they save less. Moreover, a higher
mortgage coupled with less housing of impatient households means that mortgages
become more risky, since their recovery rate decreases and the mortgage default rate
increases. This leads to a higher required return on mortgages. Finally, since a larger
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share of housing is now held by patient households who value housing less than
impatient households, the house price index decreases.
Above a certain threshold, it is no longer the leverage constraint of banks, but
the borrowing constraint of impatient households which will constrain the amount of
mortgages in the economy. Beyond that threshold, raising the leverage constraint no
longer has any effect on the economy.
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Fig. B.1 Comparative statics with respect to the leverage constraint ψ
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Fig. B.2 Comparative statics with respect to the exit rate of banks η
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Fig. B.3 Comparative statics with respect to the discount factor of impatient households β I
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Fig. B.4 Comparative statics with respect to the steady state productivity µZ
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B.3 Complete Statement of the Model
B.3.1 Impatient Households
The impatient households’ problem can be summarized as:
max
{CIt ,HIt+1,MIt+1}∞t=0
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
(
β I
)t
U I
(
CIt ,H
I
t
)]
,
s.t.
CIt +Pt(H
I
t+1− (1−δ )HIt )+
[
1− (1−XMt )Φt
]
RMt M
I
t =Wt L¯It +M
I
t+1+Tt ,
MIt+1 ≤ κPtHIt+1,
CIt ,H
I
t+1,M
I
t+1 ≥ 0.
The FONC of the impatient households’ problem are:
U1(CIt ,H
I
t ) = λ
I
t , (B.3.1)
λ It Pt = β
IEt
[
λ It+1Pt+1+U2(C
I
t+1,H
I
t+1)
]
, (B.3.2)
λ It = β
IEt
[
λ It+1[1− (1−XMt+1)Φt+1]RMt+1
]
, (B.3.3)
CIt +Pt(H
I
t+1− (1−δ )HIt )+
[
1− (1−XMt )Φt
]
RMt M
I
t =Wt L¯It +M
I
t+1+Tt . (B.3.4)
B.3.2 Patient Households
The patient households face a standard consumption-and-saving problem with housing:
max
{CPt ,HPt+1,DPt+1}∞t=0
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
(
βP
)t
U
(
CPt ,H
P
t
)]
,
s.t.
CPt +Pt(H
P
t+1− (1−δ )HPt )+DPt+1 =Wt L¯Pt +XDt
(
RDt D
P
t
)
+(1− τ)Ot ,
CPt ,H
P
t+1,D
P
t+1 ≥ 0,
The FONC of the patient households’ problem are:
U1(CPt ,H
P
t ) = λ
P
t , (B.3.5)
λPt Pt = β
PEt
[
λPt+1Pt+1+U2(C
P
t+1,H
P
t+1)
]
, (B.3.6)
λPt = β
PEt
[
λPt+1R
D
t+1
]
, (B.3.7)
CPt +Pt(H
P
t+1− (1−δ )HPt )+DPt+1 =Wt L¯Pt +RDt DPt +(1− τ)Ot . (B.3.8)
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B.3.3 Banks
Full statement of the bank’s problem The surviving bank’s maximization problem
is:
max
{MBt+1,DBt+1}∞t=0
E0
{
∞
∑
t=0
[
Uc(CPt ,H
P
t )
Uc(CP0 ,H
P
0 )
[
βP (1−η)]t ηnBt ]
}
,
s.t.
MBt+1 = D
B
t+1+n
B
t , Balance Sheet Constraint
NBt ≥ ΓtMBt+1, Bank Capital Requirement
where net worth of the surviving banks nBt is given by:
nBt =
[
1− (1−XMt )Φt
]
RMt M
B
t −RDt DBt . (B.3.9)
Conditional on the leverage constraint being binding, the banker’s problem is fully
described by the leverage constraint, the balance sheet constraint and the non-negative
profit margin constraint.
B.3.4 Bank’s Problem: Non-binding Optimality Conditions
Consider the case of a bank that faces a non-binding capital requirement today. Re-
writing the bank’s problem in recursive form yields
Vt = max
MBt+1,D
B
t+1
βPEt
[
UPc (C
P
t+1,H
P
t+1)
UPc (CPt ,HPt )
V¯t+1
]
s.t.
MBt+1 = D
B
t+1+n
B
t
where
V¯t = ηnBt +(1−η)Vt ,
and
nBt = R˜
M
t M
B
t −RDt DBt .
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Define Ωt ≡ V¯tnt . In general, Ωt depends only on aggregate variables and is hence
exogenous from the point of view of an individual bank.1 Rewriting the bank’s
problem yields:
Vt = max
MBt+1,D
B
t+1
βPEt
[
UPc (C
P
t+1,H
P
t+1)
UPc (CPt ,HPt )
Ωt+1nt+1
]
V¯t = ηnBt +(1−η)Vt
s.t.
MBt+1 = D
B
t+1+n
B
t
nBt = R˜
M
t M
B
t −RDt DBt
Optimality of Deposit Funding Consider a bank that uses deposit financing. In this
case, the problem of the bank can be simplified to
Vt = max
DBt+1
βPEt
[
UPc (C
P
t+1,H
P
t+1)
UPc (CPt ,HPt )
Ωt+1(R˜Mt+1(D
B
t+1+n
B
t )−RDt+1DBt+1)
]
A bank will use some deposit funding in addition to lending out its equity whenever
∂Vt
∂DBt+1
= βPEt
[
UPc (C
P
t+1,H
P
t+1)
UPc (CPt ,HPt )
Ωt+1(R˜Mt+1−RDt+1)
]
≥ 0,
i.e. whenever the net benefit of raising an additional unit of deposits and lending it out
in the form of mortgages is positive.
Optimality of Mortgage Lending A bank will lend out its net worth in the form of
mortgages whenever
∂Vt
∂nBt
= βPEt
[
UPc (C
P
t+1,H
P
t+1)
UPc (CPt ,HPt )
Ωt+1R˜Mt+1
]
≥ 1,
i.e. when the benefit of reinvesting an additional dollar of net worth is higher than the
benefit of simply paying it out to the households.
1This is straightforward to prove in the case of an always binding lending constraint. Noting that
MBt+1 = 1/Γtn
B
t
DBt+1 = (1/Γt −1)nBt
nBt = R˜
M
t 1/Γtn
B
t−1−RDt (1/Γt −1)nBt−1,
we see that nBt /n
B
t−1 depends only on aggregate returns. Plugging this into the bank’s value function and
iterating forward gives the result.
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B.4 Numerical Solution Algorithm
Collect the exogenous states in Y = (A,Z). Collect the endogenous states in S =
(HP,NP,NI). The state space of the model without wage rigidity is characterized by
(S ,Y ). Adding wage rigidity adds the lagged wage as a state variable. The state
space in a bank run is characterized by
(
HP,Y
)
.
We need to find four unknown non-linear policy functions, namely cPNoRun(S ,Y ),
cINoRun(S ,Y ), c
P
Run(H
P,Y ) and cIRun(H
P,Y ) and laws of motion for net worth
NP
′
NoRunToNoRun, N
P′
NoRunToRun, N
P′
RunToNoRun, N
P′
RunToRun and N
I′
NoRunToNoRun as functions
of the endogenous and exogenous states.
The general idea is to approximate the unknown functions on a sparse state grid
and then solve the model by backward iteration. The outline of the algorithm is as
follows:
1. Find the steady state of the model. See above for details.
2. Set up grid: Adaptive sparse grid as in Brumm and Scheidegger (2017).
(a) Bounds:
• Exogenous processes: +- 4 unconditional standard deviations.
• Endogenous processes: around steady state.
(b) Grid level: 6, meaning that we use up to six nested sets of basis functions.
3. Initial guess for the unknown functions and the laws of motion for net worth
4. Compute expectations: Mixture of Gauss-Hermite and Gauss-Legendre quadra-
ture. 11 quadrature nodes on each shock. Gauss-Hermite quadrature is standard
to approximate the expectation over normally distributed variables. Gauss-
Legendre quadrature is useful, since it allows simple integration over a bounded
interval, which is what we want to do to work with the exact bank run cutoff.
5. Find new policy functions: Solving a system of non-linear equations. Need to
find HB
′
,HL
′
,P for both the run- and no-run equilibrium.
6. Update unknown functions and net worth laws of motion.
7. Check convergence: specify tolerances.
We provide details on the critical steps below.
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B.4.1 Grid
The policy functions in the no-run case are approximated on a five-dimensional grid,
the laws of motion for net worth in the no-run case on a seven-dimensional grid. The
functions in the run case do not have NB as a state variable.
B.4.2 Expectations
We want to numerically approximate expectations of the kind
E
[
f (HP
′
,NP
′
,NI
′
,A′,Z′)|A,Z
]
=
=
∫ ∞
0
(∫ A∗
0
f Run(HL
′
,A′,Z′)dG(A′|A)+∫ ∞
A∗
f NoRun(HP
′
,NP
′
,NI
′
,A′,Z′)dG(A′|A)
)
dF(Z′|Z),
where Z denotes productivity and A is the house quality shock. For productivity,
we simply use Gauss-Hermite quadrature with integration nodes xa and integration
weights wa. Since we want to compute the expectations using the exact thresholds
for the house quality shock, we use Gauss-Legendre quadrature, using integration
nodes xz ∈ [−1,1] and integration weights wz, with ∑z wz = 2. We assume that lnZ is
bounded between lnZ and lnZ. This procedure essentially follows Hatchondo et al.
(2016). The integration consists of four steps:
1. Find the exact bank run cutoffs εZ∗(HP,RDD,RMM,A,Z−1). The cutoffs can be
found by solving the non-linear equation
Zρ
A
−1 expε
Z∗ (1−π(P∗))RMM+π(P∗)P∗HI
RDD
= 1,
P∗ = pRun(HP,A,Z−1,εZ).
2. Determine the integration nodes for Z. We distinguish two cases:
(a) Z∗ ≤ Z or Z∗ ≥ Z. In this case, there is no interior bank run cutoff. We
compute the integration nodes to be equally spaced in probability: Define
ε =
lnZ−ρA lnZ
ηA
,
and
ε =
lnZ−ρA lnZ
ηA
.
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Then, we compute the adjusted integration nodes εz as
cd f (εz) = cd f (ε)+
1+ xz
2
(cd f (ε)− cd f (ε)).
cd f (.) is the cumulative distribution function of a standardized normal
distribution.
(b) Z < Z∗ < Z. In this case, there is an interior bank run cutoff. Hence, we
compute two sets of adjusted integration nodes. Define
ε∗ =
lnZ∗−ρA lnZ
ηA
.
Then, the first set of integration nodes is given by
cd f (εzRun) = cd f (ε)+
1+ xz
2
(cd f (ε∗)− cd f (ε)),
and the second set by
cd f (εzNoRun) = cd f (ε
∗)+
1+ xz
2
(cd f (ε)− cd f (ε∗)).
3. Integrate piecewise in the No-Run and Run-region of the state space. Define
ZzRun = exp(ρ
A lnZ+ηAεzRun).
and
Aa = exp(ρZ lnA+ηZxa).
Then, the run expectation can be approximated as
E
[
f Run|A,Z]= ∫ ∞
0
∫ Z∗
0
f Run(HL
′
,A′,Z,εZ)dG(εZ)dF(A′|A)
≈∑
a
∑
z
wa
wz
2
f Run(HL
′
,Aa,Z,εzRun)
The same applies to the no-run expectation E
[
f NoRun|A,Z] and the expectation
in the case of no interior cutoff, in which we can directly compute E [ f |A,Z],
subject to the adjustment below.
4. Sum up over the piecewise integrals. Note that since the probability mass
between Z and Z is not one, we need to adjust the expectation:
E [ f |A,Z] = E
[
f NoRun|A,Z]+E[ f Run|A,Z]
cd f (ε)− cd f (ε) .
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B.4.3 Nonlinear Equation Systems
We need to solve for the no run and the run equilibrium.
No Run System
Take the laws of motion of consumption at iteration i−1 as given. In iteration i, we
compute the following expectations:
CP
′
= cP(i−1)
(
hP
′
(S ,Y ),d
′
(S ,Y ),m
′
(S ,Y ),Y ′
)
takes the law of motion of aggregate net worth as given.
With these expressions for the expectations, it’s straightforward to compute the
solution to the first-order conditions:
Patient Household:
U1(CP,HP)P = βPE
[
U1(CL
′
,HL
′
)P′+U2(CL
′
,HL
′
)|A,Z
]
U1(CP,HP) = βPRD
′
E
[
U1(CL
′
,HL
′
)|A,Z
]
CP+PHL
′
+D
′
=WLP+PHL+RDD+Π+η
NB−ηE
1−η −ηE
Bank:
NB+D
′
= MI
′
M
′
= ψNB
NB = (RMM(1−φ(P))+P(H −HP)φ(P)−RDD)(1−η)+Eη
Impatient Household:
U1(CI,H −HP)P = β IE
[
U1(CB
′
,HB
′
)P′+U2(CB
′
,HB
′
)|A,Z
]
U1(CI,H −HP) = β IRM′E
[
U1(CB
′
,HB
′
)|A,Z
]
CI = ALα −CP
where CI comes from the aggregate resource constraint.
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Firms:
AαLα−1 =
W
1+ξ (RK−1)
Π= ALα −WL
Market Clearing:
H = HL
′
+HB
′
Effectively, this system of equations can be boiled down to solving a simple
nonlinear system of equations in two variables, HL
′
,P, which we do using MATLAB’s
fzero routine. All other variables can either be calculated explicitly or determined
residually.
Run System
Patient Household:
U1(CP,HP) = βPV PH (S ,A,Z)
CP+PHL
′
=WLP+XRDD+Π+η
NB−ηE
1−η −ηE +(ZR
K−1)K
X = Z
RMM(1−φ(P))+P(H −HP)φ(P)
RDD
Impatient Household:
U1(CI,H −HP) = β IV IH(S ,A,Z)
CI = ALα −CP
where CI comes from the aggregate resource constraint.
Firms:
AαLα−1 =
W
1+ξ (RK−1)
Π= ALα −WL(1+ξ (RK−1))
K = ξWL
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Market Clearing:
H = HL
′
+HB
′
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